The monitoring role of independent directors in CEO pay–performance relationship: the case of Malaysian government linked companies

2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hooy Chee-Wooi ◽  
Tee Chwee-Ming
2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vidya Sukumara Panicker ◽  
Rajesh Srinivas Upadhyayula

PurposeThis paper attempts to examine the activity and involvement of board of directors in internationalization activities of firms in emerging markets, by evaluating the resource provisioning roles of interlocks provided by board of directors, and the frequency of board meetings. We demonstrate that the effectiveness of board involvement is contingent upon the levels of family ownership in firms since family ownership could impact the firm’s ability to utilize the presence of different types of board members.Design/methodology/approachThe authors test our hypotheses on a sample of listed Indian companies, extracted from the Prowess database published by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), a database of the financial performance of Indian companies. On a panel of 3,133 firm years of 605 unique Indian firms with foreign investments, over a time period of 2006–2017, the authors apply different estimation techniques.FindingsThe results demonstrate that both board meeting frequency and director interlocks are instrumental in supporting internationalization activities in emerging market firms. However, family ownership moderates the role of insider and independent interlocks on internationalization investments in different ways; the authors find that interlocks provided by independent directors support internationalization activities in family firms, whereas those provided by insider directors do not. Further, the study also finds that board meetings are less effective in internationalization of family firms.Practical implicationsThe authors conclude that family firms aiming at international diversification require to develop more connected and networked independent directors to enable internationalization in firms. While independent director interlocks enhance the international investments, it is also useful to know that board meetings are ineffective in utilizing the resources in family firms. This points to the possibility that family firms should device mechanisms to integrate family meetings with board meetings so that they can utilize the within-family processes to aid in their internationalization decisions.Originality/valueThe study contributes to resource dependence theory by understanding its limiting role in family firms. Theoretically, it helps delineate the limiting resource provision role of the insider directors vis-à-vis independent directors. The authors argue that the resource provision role of insider director interlocks does not effectively help in internationalization in comparison to independent director interlocks in family-dominated firms. Consequently, the study shows the limiting role of resource provision and utilization by family-owned firms in comparison to non-family-owned firms.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joonil Lee ◽  
Sam (Sunghan) Lee ◽  
Kevin J. Murphy ◽  
Peter Oh

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenge Wang

Abstract This article explores the board independence of listed companies in the US and China – an ongoing and important issue of corporate governance concerning the true independence of independent directors from management in both countries. It aims to identify what elements have an impact on board independence and examine how these influence the independence of independent directors. Four elements, independence from management; dependence on shareholders; access to information; and incentive to monitor, may have a substantial influence on board independence and align with the in-fact independence of independent directors. This article examines how and why these four elements have an impact on the effectiveness of the role of independent directors in monitoring top management and lead to independent directors failing to be truly independent of management. To support this argument, this article also investigates the efficiency and effectiveness of independent directors serving as a governance mechanism in terms of board independence in Chinese listed companies. The aim was therefore to scrutinise whether independent directors in Chinese listed companies are truly independent from management. Based on statistics calculated on data collected from CSMAR, there appears to be little evidence that independent directors serve as a governance mechanism in monitoring top management in Chinese listed companies, which thus shows that independent directors are not independent in China. The implications arising from this article are that solutions addressing the four elements that have an impact on board independence will enable independent directors to become truly independent.


2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Go Meliana Indah Lestari ◽  
Senny Harindahyani

Family firms don’t have effective oversight, therefore they tend to do earnings management higher compare than others. This study aims to prove whether this phenomenon true or not and whether the role of independent commissioners have been effectively overcome the problem. Data used in this research covers all firms listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange for the period of 2012 to 2014, except for banking and finance sector. The study is conducted using multiple linear regressions. The result shows that there is no significant different between family firms and non-family firms to manage earnings, and the role of independent directors can’t decrease the earnings management in family firms.


2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-68
Author(s):  
Collins Ngwakwe ◽  
Fortune Ganda ◽  
Oladele John Akinyomi

This paper examined the stance of independent directors on corporate sustainable development initiative in South Africa and Nigeria. This has become apposite considering the role of independent directors in corporate strategic decisions and performance. It is believed that independent boards strive to direct corporate decisions to protect the investors and thus improve financial performance. Given that sustainability initiative is currently occupying a vital strategic position in protecting firms against inherent and imminent climate change and financial risks, the paper undertakes a survey of South African and Nigerian companies to ascertain the role of independent directors on corporate sustainable development initiatives. Using a mix method of primary and secondary data analysis, the paper finds that independent boards in both countries of study understand the importance of sustainability; however a pragmatic stance on sustainability is more visible in South Africa where independent boards are members of and/or participate in nominating corporate sustainability committees. The paper suggests the need for improved detailed disclosure on sustainability in the Nigerian corporate annual reports; the Nigerian Stock Exchange may boost this initiative by establishing a social and environmental reporting index supported by an annual survey of company sustainability disclosure. It also suggests the need to include sustainability awareness and interest in the metrics that are used in the appointment of independent boards in Nigerian companies


Author(s):  
Chetna Rath ◽  
Florentina Kurniasari ◽  
Malabika Deo

Chief executive officers (CEOs) of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) firms are known to take lesser pay and engage themselves in corporate social responsibility activities to achieve the dual objective of the enhancement of firm’s performance as well as benefit for stakeholders in the long run. This study examines the role of ESG transparency in strengthening the impact of firm performance on total CEO pay in ESG firms. A panel of 67 firms for the period of 2014–2019 has been analyzed using the two-step system GMM model, with NSE Nifty 100 ESG Index as the data sample and ESG scores from Bloomberg database as a proxy for transparency. Findings reveal that environmental and governance disclosure scores have the potential to intensify the negative relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation, while social disclosure scores do not. In addition, various firm-specific, board-specific, and CEO-specific attributes have also been considered controls affecting remuneration. This paper contributes to the literature by exploring the effect of exhibiting ESG transparency and its nexus with CEO pay as well as firm performance.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Md. Harun Ur Rashid ◽  
Syed Zabid Hossain

Purpose This study aims to investigate the moderating effect of independent directors on the relationship between politicians on the board and corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD). Design/methodology/approach The ordinary least square has been used to analyze the CSRD data collected from the annual reports of all 30 listed banks of Bangladesh covering six years period ranging from 2013–2018. Further, the study has applied the generalized method of moments to prove the robustness of the model across the endogeneity issue. Findings The study found a positive relationship between board independence and CSRD that indicates board independence enhances the CSRD to a great extent. On the contrary, the inclusion of politicians on the board has shown a negative impact on CSRD that implies the higher the presence of political members on the board of a bank, the lower the involvement of the bank in CSR activities. However, board independence positively and significantly moderates the politician directors on the CSRD. The findings imply that if the independent directors are empowered, they play the role of whistleblowers that, in turn, mitigates the negative role of politician directors to CSRD. Research limitations/implications The study suggests the banks’ management, and regulatory bodies formulate sound policies so that the banks are forced to include more independent directors with enough power and at the same time, reduce the politician directors on the board. Originality/value The study extends debate on the political CSR and CSRD through validating the role of board independence.


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