Abstract
How does authoritarian aid influence the durability of dictatorships? Western aid is thought to facilitate authoritarian durability because it can provide patronage. Authoritarian aid, by contrast, has received far less attention. This article examines both Soviet economic and military assistance, developing a theory of donor–recipient institutional complementarity to explain the impact of Soviet aid during the Cold War. The argument is developed through case studies of Vietnam and Ghana and a cross-national statistical analysis of Soviet economic aid and military assistance to developing countries from 1955 to 1991. Soviet economic aid was tied to the purchase of Soviet industrial equipment. When recipient states shared the Soviet Union's centrally planned economy, economic aid strengthened state infrastructural power by (1) enhancing fiscal capacity and (2) cultivating the dependency of the population on the state. Aid flows helped consolidate and maintain authoritarian institutions, promoting authoritarian durability. By contrast, while Soviet economic aid to noncommunist regimes provided some opportunities for patronage through employment in SOEs, the lack of institutional complementarity in planning institutions and overall lack of capacity of these institutions caused Soviet aid to contribute to inflation and fiscal crises. Economic problems, in turn, increased the vulnerability of noncommunist regimes to military coups, particularly when ideological splits emerged between pro-Soviet rulers and pro-Western militaries that undermined elite cohesion. The institutional subordination of the military to communist parties insulated communist regimes from the risk of coups.
State Infrastructural Power and Nationalism: Comparative Lessons from Mexico and Argentina
