scholarly journals Analysis of Experiment on Temperature Coefficient of Reactivity in Light-Water-Moderated and Heavy- Water-Reflected Cylindrical Core Loaded with Highly-Enriched-Uranium or Medium-Enriched-Uranium Fuel

1996 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 211-219
Author(s):  
Seiji SHIROYA ◽  
Masaaki MORI ◽  
Keiji KANDA
2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 54
Author(s):  
R. Andika Putra Dwijayanto ◽  
Dedy Prasetyo Hermawan

Molten salt reactor (MSR) is often associated with thorium fuel cycle, thanks to its excellent neutron economy and online reprocessing capability. However, since 233U, the fissile used in pure thorium fuel cycle, is not commercially available, the MSR must be started with other fissile nuclides. Different fissile yields different inherent safety characteristics, and thus must be assessed accordingly. This paper investigates the inherent safety aspects of one fluid MSR (OF-MSR) using various fissile fuel, namely low-enriched uranium (LEU), reactor grade plutonium (RGPu), and reactor grade plutonium + minor actinides (PuMA). The calculation was performed using MCNPX2.6.0 programme with ENDF/B-VII library. Parameters assessed are temperature coefficient of reactivity (TCR) and void coefficient of reactivity (VCR). The result shows that TCR for LEU, RGPu, and PuMA are -3.13 pcm, -2.02 pcm and -1.79 pcm, respectively. Meanwhile, the VCR is negative only for LEU, whilst RGPu and PuMA suffer from positive void reactivity. Therefore, for the OF-MSR design used in this study, LEU is the only safe option as OF-MSR starting fuel.Keywords: MSR, Temperature coefficient of reactivity, Void coefficient of reactivity, Low enriched uranium, Reactor grade plutonium, Minor actinides


Atomic Energy ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 116 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
A. D. Klimov ◽  
V. D. Davidenko ◽  
V. F. Tsibul’skii ◽  
S. V. Tsibul’skii

Author(s):  
J. K. August ◽  
J. J. Hunter

Over its 1968–1988 life, PSCo relicensed the Fort St. Vrain (FSV) High-temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR) for light water reactor (LWR) technology requirements. Estimates of the financial losses associated with the plant range from $500 million to $2 billion in 1980 dollars. Colorado ratepayers, the shareholders of Gulf General Atomics and its corporate successors — General Atomics, GA Technologies or just GA and Public Service Company of Colorado (PSCo) bore these losses. Two critical plant issues required solution for the plant’s economic success — (1) the high-cost of 93% enriched uranium fuel and (2) low unit availability. While fuel costs were beyond utility control, low availability was controllable, yet remained unresolved. Commercially isolated for twenty years, PSCo shut the plant down in 1988. Economic success of future HTGRs depends upon avoiding similar complications. This paper examines the issues that made FSV uneconomic, including those fundamental to HTGR technology and others attributable to the utility operator and its culture. Knowing the history of FSV and HTGR design, designers should anticipate reasonable challenges. Preparations will help manage future HTGR risks, costs, and assure operating success. Regulators and industry can assure more effective, economic operations in the next round of HTGR designs.


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