Optimal strategies for members in a two-echelon supply chain over a safe period under random machine hazards with backlogging

2022 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Brojeswar Pal ◽  
Subhankar Adhikari
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Optimal Strategies

Operation decision of logistics service supply chain: considering interruption probability in emergencies

Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guangsheng Zhang ◽  
Xiao Wang ◽  
Zhiqing Meng ◽  
Qirui Zhang ◽  
Kexin Wu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Logistics Service ◽  
Social Reputation ◽  
Punishment Intensity ◽  
Optimal Decision Making

PurposeTo remedy the inherent defect in current research that focuses only on a single type of participants, this paper endeavors to look into the situation as an evolutionary game between a representative Logistics Service Integrator (LSI) and a representative Functional Logistics Service Provider (FLSP) in an environment with sudden crisis and tries to analyze how LSI supervises FLSP's operations and how FLSP responds in a recurrent pattern with different interruption probabilities.Design/methodology/approachRegarding the risks of supply chain interruption in emergencies, this paper develops a two-level model of single LSI and single FLSP, using Evolutionary Game theory to analyze their optimal decision-making, as well as their strategic behaviors on different risk levels regarding the interruption probability to achieve the optimal return with bounded rationality.FindingsThe results show that on a low-risk level, if LSI increases the degree of punishment, it will fail to enhance FLSP's operational activeness in the long term; when the risk rises to an intermediate level, a circular game occurs between LSI and FLSP; and on a high level of risk, FLSP will actively take actions, and its functional probability further impacts LSI's strategic choices. Finally, this paper analyzes the moderating impact of punishment intensity and social reputation loss on the evolutionary model in emergencies and provides relevant managerial implications.Originality/valueFirst, by taking both interruption probability and emergencies into consideration, this paper explores the interactions among the factors relevant to LSI's and FLSP's optimal decision-making. Second, this paper analyzes the optimal evolutionary game strategies of LSI and FLSP with different interruption probability and the range of their optimal strategies. Third, the findings of this paper provide valuable implications for relevant practices, such that the punishment intensity and social reputation loss determine the optimal strategies of LSI and FLSP, and thus it is an effective vehicle for LSSC system administrator to achieve the maximum efficiency of the system.

scholarly journals Coordinating Pricing and Advertising Decisions for Supply Chain under Consignment Contract in the Dynamic Setting

Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhihui Wu ◽  
Lichao Feng ◽  
Dongyan Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Feasible Region ◽  
Comparison Analysis ◽  
On Demand ◽  
Dynamic Setting ◽  
State Dependent ◽  
Differential Game Theory ◽  
Advertising Effort

In this paper, via the differential game method, the problems of the pricing and advertising decision are investigated by considering the effect of number of the platform users on demand. In addition, a novel contract is developed to coordinate the supply chain. Firstly, the optimal strategies of the pricing and advertising are given in the decentralized and centralized scenarios by applying the differential game theory. Also, the comparison analysis concerning on the optimal strategies is proposed in two decision scenarios. It is shown that the centralized scenario could lead to the higher advertising effort of each member and a lower retail price. Next, we construct the state-dependent contract with hope to coordinate the supply chain and then improve the performance of the supply chain. Finally, a numerical example is provided to illustrate the impacts of the price-elasticity index of demand and the effectiveness of the number of retailer’s platform users onto the feasible region of the corresponding contract.

scholarly journals Green Supply Chain Management with Nash Bargaining Loss-Averse Reference Dependence

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (24) ◽  
pp. 3154
Author(s):  
Wentao Yi ◽  
Zhongwei Feng ◽  
Chunqiao Tan ◽  
Yuzhong Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Reference Point ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Efficiency Coefficient

This paper investigates a two-echelon green supply chain (GSC) with a single loss-averse manufacturer and a single loss-averse retailer. Since the Nash bargaining solution exactly characterizes endogenous power and the contribution of the GSC members, it is introduced as the loss-averse reference point for the GSC members. Based on this, a decision model of the two-echelon GSC with loss aversion is formulated. The optimal strategies of price and product green degree are derived in four scenarios: (a) the centralized decision scenario with rational GSC members, namely the CD scenario; (b) the decentralized decision scenario with rational GSC members, namely the DD scenario; (c) the decentralized decision scenario with the GSC members loss-averse, where the manufacturer’s share is below its own loss-averse reference point, namely the DD(∆m ≥ πm) scenario; (d) the decentralized decision scenario with the GSC members loss-averse, where the retailer’s share is below its own loss-averse reference point, namely the DD(∆r ≥ πr) scenario. Then, a comparative analysis of the optimal strategies and profits in these four scenarios is conducted, and the impacts of loss aversion and green efficiency coefficient of products (GECP) on the GSC are also performed. The results show that (i) GECP has a critical influence on the retail price and the wholesale price; (ii) the GSC with loss aversion provide green products with the lowest green degree; (iii) the retail price, the wholesale price and product green degree are decreasing monotonically with the loss aversion level of the GSC member without incurring loss; (iv) furthermore, the effect of the loss aversion level of the GSC member with incurring loss on the optimal strategies is related to GECP and the gap between the GSC members’ loss aversion levels.

Optimal Strategy of Social Responsibility and Quality Effort in Service Supply Chain with Quality Preference

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (03) ◽  
pp. 1850018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cui-Hua Zhang ◽  
Peng Xing ◽  
Jin Li
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Numerical Simulations ◽  
Optimal Strategy ◽  
Mathematical Reasoning ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Decision Models ◽  
Service Supply Chain

We investigate the optimal strategy of service supply chain (SSC) including one integrator and two suppliers under a two-layer game structure. Service integrator decides social responsibility and service price, while the two service suppliers with quality preference determine their quality efforts, respectively. By analyzing the two-layer game structure and eight different scenarios of decision models (i.e., CD, DD, ICD, IDD, ISD, SCD, SDD, and SSD), we establish members’ utility functions under different decision models. Meanwhile, based on game theory, the optimal strategies of SSC are obtained. Mathematical reasoning and numerical simulations show that, firstly, quality preference has impact on optimal strategy and members’ utilities under different constraints. Secondly, utility of supply chain with integrator as a leader is greater than the case with suppliers as the leader.

scholarly journals Optimal strategies for a capital constrained contract-farming supply chain with yield insurance

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ligang Shi ◽  
Tao Pang ◽  
Hongjun Peng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Unit Area ◽  
Total Yield ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Farm Size ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
Contract Farming ◽  
Yield Insurance

We consider a capital-constrained contract-farming supply chain with a risk-averse farmer and a risk-neutral agro-dealer, where the farmer faces some yield uncertainty that can be covered by insurance. Using the Stackelberg model, we derive the optimal strategies on the insured level, production and wholesale price. The result shows that farmers with low risk aversion tend not to be insured, while those with high risk aversion tend to insure. Further analysis indicates that, as the degree of the farmer's risk aversion increases, the farm size decreases, but the yield per unit area and the wholesale price of the agricultural product increases.  In addition, yield insurance and premium subsidies can lead to a decrease of the yield per unit area. However, the expansion of the farm size can compensate for the inhibitory effect of the decrease of yield per unit area on the total yield, and thus the total yield increases. We also find that when the premium subsidy rate is low, the yield insurance's value to farmers is negative. Moreover, the yield insurance's value to farmers increases with respect to the bank's interest rate.

The pricing strategy of dual-channel supply chain with risk-averse agents and heterogeneous preference consumers

Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rufeng Wang ◽  
Zhiyong Chang ◽  
Shuli Yan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Control ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Risk Attitude ◽  
Risk Attitudes ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Heterogeneous Preference ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the pricing strategy and the impact of agents' risk preference in a dual-channel supply chain in which both agents are risk-averse.Design/methodology/approachThe authors make use of the mean-variance (MV) method to measure the risk aversion of the agents and apply Stackelberg game to obtain the optimal strategies of the proposed models. Furthermore, the authors compare the optimal strategies with that in the benchmark model in which no agent is risk-averse.FindingsThe authors find that the pricing decisions can be divided into four categories according to the risk attitudes of the agents: the decisions that are independent of two agents' risk attitudes, the decisions that depend on only one agent’s risk attitude (i.e. depend on only manufacturer's risk attitude and depend on only retailer's risk attitude) and the decisions that depend on both agents' risk attitudes. In addition, the authors find that the retail price will be lower and the wholesale price in most cases will be lower than that in the benchmark when at least one agent's risk control is effective; the demand will be always increasing as long as one agent's risk control is effective. Furthermore, compared to the benchmark, a win-win strategy (i.e. Pareto improvement) for the supply chain members can be obtained in a certain range where the agents' risk controls are appropriate.Originality/valueThis research provides a theoretical reference for the managers to make the pricing decisions and the risk control in dual-channel supply chains with heterogeneous preference consumers.

The Effect of Risk Sensitivity on Collaborative New Product Development in a Supply Chain

2010 ◽  
Vol 450 ◽  
pp. 381-384
Author(s):  
Yu Zhou ◽  
Rong Yao He
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Development ◽  
New Product Development ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
New Product ◽  
Product Management ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Risk Sensitivity

The increasing risks and costs of new product development require firms to collaborate with their supply chain partners in product management. In this paper, a supply chain model is proposed with one risk-neutral supplier and one risk-averse manufacturer. The manufacturer has an opportunity to enhance demand by developing a new product, but both the actual demand for new product and the supplier’s wholesale price are uncertain. The supplier has an incentive to share risks of new product development via an advance commitment to wholesale price for its own profit maximization. The effects of the manufacturer’s risk sensitivity on the players’ optimal strategies are analyzed and the trade-off between innovation incentives and pricing flexibility is investigated from the perspective of the supplier. The results highlight the significant role of risk sensitivity in collaborative new product development, and it is found that the manufacturer’s innovation level and retail price are always decreasing in the risk sensitivity, and the supplier prefers commitment to wholesale price only when the risk sensitivity is below a certain threshold.

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