The optimal strategies in the supply chain with stochastic demand sensitivity to carbon emission

Author(s):  
Guoqing Jiang ◽  
Ying Ji ◽  
Zhong Wu ◽  
Mohamed Nabé
Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guangsheng Zhang ◽  
Xiao Wang ◽  
Zhiqing Meng ◽  
Qirui Zhang ◽  
Kexin Wu

PurposeTo remedy the inherent defect in current research that focuses only on a single type of participants, this paper endeavors to look into the situation as an evolutionary game between a representative Logistics Service Integrator (LSI) and a representative Functional Logistics Service Provider (FLSP) in an environment with sudden crisis and tries to analyze how LSI supervises FLSP's operations and how FLSP responds in a recurrent pattern with different interruption probabilities.Design/methodology/approachRegarding the risks of supply chain interruption in emergencies, this paper develops a two-level model of single LSI and single FLSP, using Evolutionary Game theory to analyze their optimal decision-making, as well as their strategic behaviors on different risk levels regarding the interruption probability to achieve the optimal return with bounded rationality.FindingsThe results show that on a low-risk level, if LSI increases the degree of punishment, it will fail to enhance FLSP's operational activeness in the long term; when the risk rises to an intermediate level, a circular game occurs between LSI and FLSP; and on a high level of risk, FLSP will actively take actions, and its functional probability further impacts LSI's strategic choices. Finally, this paper analyzes the moderating impact of punishment intensity and social reputation loss on the evolutionary model in emergencies and provides relevant managerial implications.Originality/valueFirst, by taking both interruption probability and emergencies into consideration, this paper explores the interactions among the factors relevant to LSI's and FLSP's optimal decision-making. Second, this paper analyzes the optimal evolutionary game strategies of LSI and FLSP with different interruption probability and the range of their optimal strategies. Third, the findings of this paper provide valuable implications for relevant practices, such that the punishment intensity and social reputation loss determine the optimal strategies of LSI and FLSP, and thus it is an effective vehicle for LSSC system administrator to achieve the maximum efficiency of the system.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Saman Esmaeilian ◽  
Dariush Mohamadi ◽  
Majid Esmaelian ◽  
Mostafa Ebrahimpour

Purpose This paper aims to minimize the total carbon emissions and costs and also maximize the total social benefits. Design/methodology/approach The present study develops a mathematical model for a closed-loop supply chain network of perishable products so that considers the vital aspects of sustainability across the life cycle of the supply chain network. To evaluate carbon emissions, two different regulating policies are studied. Findings According to the obtained results, increasing the lifetime of the perishable products improves the incorporated objective function (IOF) in both the carbon cap-and-trade model and the model with a strict cap on carbon emission while the solving time increases in both models. Moreover, the computational efficiency of the carbon cap-and-trade model is higher than that of the model with a strict cap, but its value of the IOF is worse. Results indicate that efficient policies for carbon management will support planners to achieve sustainability in a cost-effectively manner. Originality/value This research proposes a mathematical model for the sustainable closed-loop supply chain of perishable products that applies the significant aspects of sustainability across the life cycle of the supply chain network. Regional economic value, regional development, unemployment rate and the number of job opportunities created in the regions are considered as the social dimension.


Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhihui Wu ◽  
Lichao Feng ◽  
Dongyan Chen

In this paper, via the differential game method, the problems of the pricing and advertising decision are investigated by considering the effect of number of the platform users on demand. In addition, a novel contract is developed to coordinate the supply chain. Firstly, the optimal strategies of the pricing and advertising are given in the decentralized and centralized scenarios by applying the differential game theory. Also, the comparison analysis concerning on the optimal strategies is proposed in two decision scenarios. It is shown that the centralized scenario could lead to the higher advertising effort of each member and a lower retail price. Next, we construct the state-dependent contract with hope to coordinate the supply chain and then improve the performance of the supply chain. Finally, a numerical example is provided to illustrate the impacts of the price-elasticity index of demand and the effectiveness of the number of retailer’s platform users onto the feasible region of the corresponding contract.


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