Justice Speaks, but Who’s Listening? Mass Public Awareness of US Supreme Court Cases

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew P. Hitt ◽  
Kyle L. Saunders ◽  
Kevin M. Scott
2013 ◽  
pp. 179-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Silbey ◽  
Meghan Hayes Slack

2017 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 451-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Amsterdam

This article reconstructs the story behindFreeman v. Pitts(1992), one of the main US Supreme Court cases that made it easier for school districts to terminate court desegregation orders and that, in turn, helped to propel a widely documented trend: the resegregation of southern schools. The case in part hinged on the question of whether school officials in an Atlanta suburb were responsible for the racial segregation that had developed in the area alongside the rapid settlement of African Americans there in the late twentieth century. Thus, along with shedding new light on how the South transitioned from an era focused on desegregation to one enabling resegregation, the article makes contributions to two areas of increasing scholarly interest: the history of African American suburbanization and the history of suburban school districts. Finally, the article underscores disconcerting patterns in how the Supreme Court utilized history inFreeman.


2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valerie J. Hoekstra

Most research suggests that the mass public knows very little about the Supreme Court and, consequently, that decisions do not affect attitudes toward the Court. I argue that where there is sufficient access to information about Court cases and when the issues are perceived as important, people pay attention and use this information in their evaluation of the Court. The research is based on a series of two-wave panel studies that examine the effect of Supreme Court cases in the local communities where the controversies began. The results show that a substantial number of residents heard about the Court's decision and subsequently changed their evaluation of the Supreme Court, especially those who live in the immediate community. The results suggest that we need to consider other circumstances in which people hear about and care about Supreme Court decisions.


2008 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 232-244
Author(s):  
William L. Bahr

2008 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-251
Author(s):  
Cheryl Kelly Fischer

Author(s):  
Jake Linford

When a music group breaks up, what happens to the trademark? The music industry is full of stories about bad breakups of bands at their best, as well as dispirited dissolutions after disappointing downturns. Sometimes, multiple parties claim the right to use the name of the band as a trademark for ongoing musical pursuits. This chapter considers how courts in the United States handle trademark fights over band names. It also analyzes largely forgotten state “Truth in Music” Acts that aim to keep legacy performing groups and their managers honest by requiring them to tour with at least one original recording musician—or identify themselves as tributes, rather than the genuine article. This commitment to “truth” about the origin of these bands seems consistent with the purpose of federal trademark protection to make “actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks” and “to prevent fraud and deception” in commerce. But three recent US Supreme Court cases, United States v. Alvarez, Matal v. Tam, and Iancu v. Brunetti, indicate that courts might apply constitutional scrutiny to laws like Truth in Music acts that punish lies, even if those laws are consistent with standard justifications for trademark protection. Evaluating Truth in Music Acts in light of these cases may help us predict how much of the current trademark regime could be swept away on a rising tide of judicial scrutiny.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-85
Author(s):  
Thomas Y Lu

What are the further developments on pay-for-delay agreements following Actavis, the case decided by the US Supreme Court regarding a pay-for-delay dispute in 2013? We surveyed 17 pay-to-delay deals involving brand-name drug owners and generic companies to see how their deals were structured in light of Actavis, as well as the results of follow-on court cases involving such contracts. As a result, we posit here that a no-Authorized Generic (AG) provision, the clause in a pay-for-delay agreement that asks the company making the brand-name drug not to launch its own generic drug in the market, occurred in almost half of the deals in our survey. More importantly, we found that the judges in cases following Actavis did not establish a framework to analyse whether pay-for-delay payments were large and unjustified. Therefore, the judges could not adequately explain why a given pay-for-delay agreement may have been anti-competitive under the rule-of-reason test under Actavis. Through these findings, we inferred that drug manufacturers should be able to avoid including no-AG provisions in their settlements. Finally, we predicted that antitrust agencies and courts would achieve a stronger interpretation of ‘large and unjustified payments’ if they unified the analytical framework for pay-for-delay agreements.


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