You and Whose Army? How Civilian Leaders Leverage the Military’s Prestige to Shape Public Opinion

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael R. Kenwick ◽  
Sarah Maxey
2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik Lin-Greenberg

Abstract When advising civilian leaders on the use of force, are nonelected officials swayed by public opinion? Scholars have long debated whether public preferences affect foreign policy, but most studies focus on elected politicians, overlooking the nonelected officials who formulate policies and advise leaders. Bureaucrats and nonelected officials are expected to provide advice based on technical expertise, yet they may have institutional incentives and civic-minded reasons to recommend actions that align with popular preferences. This potentially creates additional channels through which public opinion influences policy decisions. An original survey experiment fielded on US military officers reveals that public opposition makes military leaders less likely to recommend the use of force. This article contributes to debates on the role of public opinion in foreign policymaking, integrates research on public opinion and civil–military relations, and yields broader insights for scholars studying the behavior of officials who are not subject to electoral incentives. Al asesorar a los dirigentes civiles sobre el uso de la fuerza, los funcionarios no electos ¿se dejan influir por la opinión pública? Los estudiosos llevan mucho tiempo debatiendo si las preferencias del público afectan a la política exterior, pero la mayoría de los trabajos se centran en los políticos electos, pasando por alto a los funcionarios no electos que formulan las políticas y asesoran a los líderes. Se espera que los burócratas y los funcionarios no electos ofrezcan un asesoramiento basado en la experiencia técnica, pero que puedan tener incentivos institucionales y razones de carácter cívico para recomendar acciones que se alineen con las preferencias populares. Potencialmente, esto crea canales adicionales a través de los cuales la opinión pública influye en las decisiones políticas. Una original encuesta realizada a oficiales militares estadounidenses revela que la oposición pública hace que los líderes militares sean menos propensos a recomendar el uso de la fuerza. Este trabajo contribuye a los debates sobre el papel de la opinión pública en la construcción de la política exterior, integra la investigación sobre la opinión pública y las relaciones cívico–militares, y aporta una visión más amplia para los estudiosos que evalúan el comportamiento de los funcionarios que no son objeto de incentivos electorales. Les officiels non élus sont-ils influencés par l'opinion publique lorsqu'ils conseillent des dirigeants civils sur le recours à la force? Des chercheurs ont longuement débattu pour déterminer si les préférences publiques affectaient la politique étrangère, mais la plupart des études se concentrent sur les politiciens élus en négligeant les officiels non élus qui formulent les politiques et conseillent les dirigeants. Les bureaucrates et officiels non élus sont supposés prodiguer des conseils reposant sur une expertise technique, mais ils peuvent toutefois avoir des motivations institutionnelles et des raisons d'ordre civique de recommander des mesures alignées sur les préférences populaires. Cela crée potentiellement des canaux supplémentaires par lesquels l'opinion publique influence les décisions politiques. Une expérience d'enquête originale menée sur des officiers de l'Armée américaine révèle que l'opposition publique rend les dirigeants militaires moins susceptibles de recommander le recours à la force. Cet article contribue aux débats sur le rôle de l'opinion publique dans l’élaboration de la politique étrangère en y intégrant des recherches sur l'opinion publique et sur les relations entre civils et militaires et en apportant des renseignements plus larges aux chercheurs qui étudient le comportement des officiels qui ne sont pas sujets à des motivations électorales.


2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 95-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
James McAllister

Scholars have long argued about why the United States pursued a conventional military strategy during the Vietnam War rather than one based on counterinsurgency principles. A recent article in this journal by Jonathan Caverley presents a bold challenge to the historiography of the Vietnam War. Rejecting the standard historical focus on the organizational culture and strategic perspective of Gen. William Westmoreland and the U.S. Army, Caverley argues that the roots of the United States' strategy in Vietnam can be traced to the direct influence of civilian leaders and the strong constraint of public opinion. Caverley's main arguments are a welcome challenge to the established wisdom, but they are not supported by the historical evidence. Civilian officials in Lyndon Johnson's administration did not instruct the military on how to fight the ground war within the borders of South Vietnam. Westmoreland did not want to change U.S. military strategy to focus on pacification at the expense of search and destroy tactics and the main force war. Both U.S. civilian and military officials were convinced that counterinsurgency was a South Vietnamese responsibility that U.S. ground forces should not assume. Public opinion was a weak, rather than a strong, constraint on the specific decisions of the Johnson administration during the pivotal years of the Vietnam War. Democracies may not be able to win certain counterinsurgency conflicts, but the primary source of this failure is not a civilian aversion to casualties.


1966 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 316-316
Author(s):  
No authorship indicated
Keyword(s):  

1951 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 302-302
Author(s):  
Donald G. Paterson
Keyword(s):  

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