John Morgan Gates. Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898–1902. (Contributions in Military History, number 3.) Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1973. Pp. ix, 315. $11.00

Author(s):  
Jon B. Mikolashek

The chapter covers the early history of what will become known as the tank and the creation of the United States Tank Corps. Patton is the first “tanker” in American military history. After leaving the staff of John J. Pershing, Patton embarks on an educational journey to learn about tanks. He attends tank school in France and tours the Renault tank factory. It is here that he learns to drive a tank and selects the Renault light tank for use by the United States Army. The Renault tank is covered in detail, and Patton prepares to establish the American light tank school in France.


Author(s):  
James DiCrocco

This is a comparison of the difficult situations facing two different American armies, one in the Philippines in 1941-1942 and the other in contemporary Europe, headquartered in Wiesbaden, Germany. Although there are many differences between the two situations confronting the two armies, there also are similarities. Both armies were understrength, consisting of about 30,000 US soldiers. Both operated in a resource-constrained environment. Both had to prepare to contend with large, aggressive powers in the region. Both armies were responsible for the defense of a broad regional expanse. The United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) ultimately were ill-prepared when the Japanese struck the Philippines on 8 December 1941. It is important that United States Army Europe (USAREUR) and its allies do not meet a fate similar to what their comrades in arms did in 1942.


Author(s):  
Robert J. Thompson

American history is replete with instances of counterinsurgency. An unsurprising reality considering the United States has always participated in empire building, thus the need to pacify resistance to expansion. For much of its existence, the U.S. has relied on its Army to pacify insurgents. While the U.S. Army used traditional military formations and use of technology to battle peer enemies, the same strategy did not succeed against opponents who relied on speed and surprise. Indeed, in several instances, insurgents sought to fight the U.S. Army on terms that rendered superior manpower and technology irrelevant. By introducing counterinsurgency as a strategy, the U.S. Army attempted to identify and neutralize insurgents and the infrastructure that supported them. Discussions of counterinsurgency include complex terms, thus readers are provided with simplified, yet accurate definitions and explanations. Moreover, understanding the relevant terms provided continuity between conflicts. While certain counterinsurgency measures worked during the American Civil War, the Indian Wars, and in the Philippines, the concept failed during the Vietnam War. The complexities of counterinsurgency require readers to familiarize themselves with its history, relevant scholarship, and terminology—in particular, counterinsurgency, pacification, and infrastructure.


2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 511-550 ◽  
Author(s):  
Will Smiley

Writing for his fellow military officers in early 1903, United States Army Major C.J. Crane reflected on the recent Philippine–American War. The bloody struggle to suppress an insurgency in the Philippines after the United States had annexed them from Spain in 1899 had officially concluded the previous July. The war had been accompanied by fierce racist sentiments among Americans, and in keeping with these, Crane described his foes as “the most treacherous people in the world.” But Crane's discussion drew as much on concepts of law as it did on race. The average American officer, Crane argued, had “remembered all the time that he was struggling with an enemy who was not entitled to the privileges usually granted prisoners of war,” and could be summarily executed, without benefit of “court-martial or other regular tribunal.” If anything, the Americans had been too generous. “Many [American] participants in the struggle,” he maintained, “have failed to fully understand that we were practically fighting an Asiatic nation in arms and almost every man a soldier in disguise and a violator” of the laws of war. But what did those laws mean to the United States during the conflict, and what does this indicate about the broader history of international law's relationship to empire?


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