Actions, Explanations, and Causes

Author(s):  
Alfred R. Mele

This chapter defends a causalist position on the explanation of intentional human actions. It defends the thesis that one necessary condition for an adequate explanation of such an action is that the explanation cite a cause of the action. Various options for a required causal condition are identified, including causation by reasons, by beliefs, desires, or intentions, by neural realizers of mental states of these kinds, or by facts about something the agents believed, desired, or intended. Leading anticausalist proposals are rebutted. A major problem highlighted for these proposals features cases in which an agent who has two or more reasons for performing a certain action performs it for only one of those reasons.

Author(s):  
Saam Trivedi

Philosophical reflection on music goes back in the West at least as far as the Pythagoreans and Plato, and has undergone an exceptionally fertile period within analytic philosophy since the 1960s. It encompasses issues pertaining to defining music; the ontology of musical works; musical meaning and understanding, including music perception and cognition of musical form; musical expressiveness; musical arousal; musical representation; musical performance; the aesthetics of song and opera; the value of music; and the aesthetics of popular and non-Western music. In defining music, organized sound is a necessary condition of music, though clearly not sufficient, as not all organized sounds are music. With regard to the ontology of musical works, there is broad agreement that these are abstract entities that can be performed and recorded on many occasions, and are not to be identified with manuscripts or scores, even though the existence of its manuscript may suffice for a musical work’s existence. Debate centres, then, on the nature of the abstract entity that is the musical work - whether it is a class or a kind or a type or some other sort of abstracta - and whether musical works are mere sound-structures or such things as instrumentation and musico-historical context of creation are somehow integral to their identity. There is also debate over whether musical works are created, or whether they are timeless abstract entities that are discovered, neither created nor destroyed. Music is also often said to have meaning, which is what we understand when we understand a musical work. This leads to issues about musical understanding: whether it is essentially a verbalizable, propositional knowledge, a know-that, or it is instead a know-how, a skill of following how the music goes. Recent years have also seen challenges to the traditional claim that musical understanding is architectonic, consisting in the apprehension of large-scale musical forms, by concatenationists, who contend instead that musical understanding is more moment to moment and local. Much debate within musical aesthetics has been about musical expressiveness. Given that music is without life, consciousness and mental states, it seems philosophically puzzling that many listeners, trained and untrained, readily and immediately hear a lot of music as, say, sad or happy, which music cannot literally be. Amongst other possibilities, it has been suggested that music cannot express emotions and that its beauty is instead only a function of its form; or that music is expressive of the composer’s or performer’s mental states; or that it is expressive of the mental states of the musically aroused listener; or that it is only metaphorically expressive or sad or happy; or that music resembles our vocal and bodily expressive behaviour and the affective feel of mental states; or that it is expressive of the mental states of an imagined, indeterminate agent in the music, the music’s persona; or that music is merely imagined to be sad or happy in a variety of ways. A related issue concerns musical arousal. There is disagreement over whether music arouses mental states in listeners because of its aesthetic features, or because listeners empathize with the mental states of an imagined persona in the music. There are also questions over whether music arouses full-fledged emotions in listeners, or instead merely quasi-emotions such as excitement, awe and wonder. A different issue pertains to whether music without words can represent such extramusical things as bird calls, bubbling brooks, thunderstorms and steam locomotives or somehow narrate a programme or tell a story with the aid of sounds and perhaps also a title. Musical performance raises issues as to why and to what degree performers should be faithful to the composer’s intentions as specified in the score, and what justifies performers’ interpretive freedom. Also, some wonder why period music should be played on authentic, historical instruments, especially if it sounds better on modern instruments. As regards song, there is the question of how the marriage of music and words is to be understood. And some have claimed that opera falls between two stools, necessarily failing either musically or else dramatically. A different issue concerns the value of music, to which musical beauty, expressiveness, development, originality and subtlety are thought to contribute. Some claim that music can liberate us from our everyday concerns, or somehow have cognitive value in reinforcing messages or telling us things about mental states or human nature. Finally, questions about music besides Western classical music have been raised recently. With regard to rock music, for example, it has been claimed that it has its own aesthetic that stresses recording, loud volumes, noise, rhythm and beat.


2004 ◽  
Vol 30 ◽  
pp. 260-273
Author(s):  
Irwin Goldstein

Materialists say sensations and other kinds of mental states are physical events. Today, most materialists are neural materialists. They think mental states are neural events or material properties of neural events.Orthodox neural materialists think mental states are neural events or orthodox material properties of neutral events. Orthodox material properties are defining properties of the physical. A defining property of the physical is a type of property that provides a necessary condition for something's being correctly termed ‘physical’ (a conjunction of all defining properties provides a sufficient condition.) Defining properties of the physical include spatial and temporal properties and causal propensities and sensitivities. A particle is an electron, for instance, by having a particular set of spatiotemporal properties and causal sensitivities and powers.


1997 ◽  
Vol 161 ◽  
pp. 267-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thierry Montmerle

AbstractFor life to develop, planets are a necessary condition. Likewise, for planets to form, stars must be surrounded by circumstellar disks, at least some time during their pre-main sequence evolution. Much progress has been made recently in the study of young solar-like stars. In the optical domain, these stars are known as «T Tauri stars». A significant number show IR excess, and other phenomena indirectly suggesting the presence of circumstellar disks. The current wisdom is that there is an evolutionary sequence from protostars to T Tauri stars. This sequence is characterized by the initial presence of disks, with lifetimes ~ 1-10 Myr after the intial collapse of a dense envelope having given birth to a star. While they are present, about 30% of the disks have masses larger than the minimum solar nebula. Their disappearance may correspond to the growth of dust grains, followed by planetesimal and planet formation, but this is not yet demonstrated.


Author(s):  
G.D. Danilatos

The environmental scanning electron microscope (ESEM) has evolved as the natural extension of the scanning electron microscope (SEM), both historically and technologically. ESEM allows the introduction of a gaseous environment in the specimen chamber, whereas SEM operates in vacuum. One of the detection systems in ESEM, namely, the gaseous detection device (GDD) is based on the presence of gas as a detection medium. This might be interpreted as a necessary condition for the ESEM to remain operational and, hence, one might have to change instruments for operation at low or high vacuum. Initially, we may maintain the presence of a conventional secondary electron (E-T) detector in a "stand-by" position to switch on when the vacuum becomes satisfactory for its operation. However, the "rough" or "low vacuum" range of pressure may still be considered as inaccessible by both the GDD and the E-T detector, because the former has presumably very small gain and the latter still breaks down.


2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 271-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simona Sacchi ◽  
Paolo Riva ◽  
Marco Brambilla

Anthropomorphization is the tendency to ascribe humanlike features and mental states, such as free will and consciousness, to nonhuman beings or inanimate agents. Two studies investigated the consequences of the anthropomorphization of nature on people’s willingness to help victims of natural disasters. Study 1 (N = 96) showed that the humanization of nature correlated negatively with willingness to help natural disaster victims. Study 2 (N = 52) tested for causality, showing that the anthropomorphization of nature reduced participants’ intentions to help the victims. Overall, our findings suggest that humanizing nature undermines the tendency to support victims of natural disasters.


2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert G. Cook ◽  
Hara A. Rosen

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert G. Cook ◽  
Muhammad A. Qadri
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