scholarly journals Dogmatism and Ampliative Inference

2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. e42186
Author(s):  
Berit Brogaard
Keyword(s):  
Inferential Justification ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Ampliative Inference

The evidential role of experience in justifying beliefs has been at the center of debate in philosophy in recent years. One view is that experience, or seeming, can confer immediate (defeasible) justification on belief in virtue of its representational phenomenology. Call this view “representational dogmatism.” Another view is that experience confers immediate justification on belief in virtue of its relational phenomenology. Call this view “relational dogmatism.” The goal of this paper is to pit these two versions of dogmatism against each other in terms of their ability to account for ampliative, or non-deductive, inferential justification. I will argue that only the representational view can provide a plausible account of this type of justification.

The Comic Stance

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-72
Author(s):  
Lauren Olin
Keyword(s):  
Systems Theory ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Cognitive Architectures ◽  
General Acceptance ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
The Future ◽  
Intentional Systems

Abstract Despite sustained philosophical attention, no theory of humor claims general acceptance. Drawing on the resources provided by intentional systems theory, this article first outlines an approach to investigating humor based on the idea of a comic stance, then sketches the Dismissal Theory of Humor (DTH) that has resulted from pursuing that approach. According to the DTH, humor manifests in cases where the future-directed significance of anticipatory failures is dismissed. Mirth, on this view, is the reward people get for declining to update predictive representational schemata in ways that maximize their futureoriented value. The theory aims to provide a plausible account of the role of humor in human mental and social life, but it also aims to be empirically vulnerable, and to generate testable predictions about how the comic stance may actually be undergirded by cognitive architectures.

On the Eminent Dignity of the Poor Baptized

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Luc Marion
Keyword(s):  
Proper Role ◽  
The Poor ◽  
Imitation Of Christ ◽  
The World ◽  
In Virtue Of

Marion criticizes the distinction between clerics and laity, which turns the layperson into a militant defender of the faith and ignores the priestly function they already have in virtue of their baptism. It turns clerics into officials dependent on the laity instead of the ones who administer the sacraments. The two kinds of priesthood (baptismal and presbyteral) are linked. We must convert ourselves and the world. The priest calls the assembly together only in the Name of Christ. The priest is in service of the community, helping the baptized to grow into Christ. We become Christian only through imitation of Christ. The proper role of the baptized Christian is to communicate Christ to the world by converting himself.

The Role of Interests in Science

1984 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 59-73
Author(s):  
W. Newton-Smith
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Practical Interest ◽  
Physical Sciences ◽  
Scientific Enterprise ◽  
Interest In Science ◽  
The Social ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
Primary Focus ◽  
In Virtue Of

A series of lectures organized in part by the Society for Applied Philosophy and entitled ‘Philosophy and Practice’ is presumably aimed at displaying the practical implications of philosophical doctrines and/or applying philosophical skills to practical questions. The topic of this paper, the role of interests in science, certainly meets the first condition. For as will be argued there are a number of theses concerning the role of interests in science which have considerable implications for how one should see the scientific enterprise in general and in particular for how one assesses the claim that science ought to be accorded its priviliged position in virtue of its results and/or methods And in view of the respect and resources accorded to science what could be of greater practical interest? It remains the case, however, that my interest may seem the inverse of that of the organizers of this series. For in looking at the role of interest in science, one is examining, so to speak, the extent to which the sphere of the practical determines what goes on in science. One is exploring ways in which the non-scientific impinges on the scientific. While my primary focus will be on the physical sciences, it will be argued that there is a significant difference between them and the social sciences; a difference which renders the social sciences intrinsically liable to penetration from outside. As will be seen, some of the particular arguments for this conclusion make pressing the question: what about philosophy? The answer, it will be concluded, is that philosophy is insulated from external influences to a considerable extent. In that lies both its importance and an explanation as to why much of it has little practical application.

Property in Digital Coins

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.G. Allen
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Property Law ◽  
Conceptual Basis ◽  
Electronic Book ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Satisfactory Account ◽  
Initial Coin Offerings

Abstract Digital coins have burst into mainstream awareness recently, mainly as a result of high-worth ‘Initial Coin Offerings’ (‘ICOs’). The most immediate question in the legal treatment of digital coins is whether they are properly seen as digital ‘commodities’, and/or as ‘securities’, and/or as units of ‘money’. But the conceptual underpinnings of these categories are not clear, nor is it clear how these categories relate to each other; no legal system currently deals adequately with incorporeal objects as objects of property law. This category includes not only digital coins but also some forms of conventional money and securities. Establishing a satisfactory account of their treatment in property law is therefore a necessary first step to incorporating digital coins into private law theory. I argue that this task is best approached on the basis of a plausible ontology of incorporeal objects, including those embodied in paper (i.e. banknotes and conventional securities) and those that exist natively in ‘cyberspace’ (i.e. electronic ‘book-money’, modern securities, and now digital coins). We therefore urgently need to develop a plausible account of a how packets of data can be treated as an object of property rights. Using a comparative analysis of English law and Civilian law (particularly German) concepts of property as an entry point into this complex of problems, I explore the ontology of incorporeal objects and the role of documentation in their creation and maintenance as part of the ‘ontic furniture’ of our economic world. I explore the conceptual basis of property in digital coins in terms of a new category of property. Such a category is long overdue and will be increasingly important in the future.

The Role of Interests in Science

1984 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 59-73
Author(s):  
W. Newton-Smith
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Practical Interest ◽  
Physical Sciences ◽  
Scientific Enterprise ◽  
Interest In Science ◽  
The Social ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
Primary Focus ◽  
In Virtue Of

A series of lectures organized in part by the Society for Applied Philosophy and entitled ‘Philosophy and Practice’ is presumably aimed at displaying the practical implications of philosophical doctrines and/or applying philosophical skills to practical questions. The topic of this paper, the role of interests in science, certainly meets the first condition. For as will be argued there are a number of theses concerning the role of interests in science which have considerable implications for how one should see the scientific enterprise in general and in particular for how one assesses the claim that science ought to be accorded its priviliged position in virtue of its results and/or methods And in view of the respect and resources accorded to science what could be of greater practical interest? It remains the case, however, that my interest may seem the inverse of that of the organizers of this series. For in looking at the role of interest in science, one is examining, so to speak, the extent to which the sphere of the practical determines what goes on in science. One is exploring ways in which the non-scientific impinges on the scientific. While my primary focus will be on the physical sciences, it will be argued that there is a significant difference between them and the social sciences; a difference which renders the social sciences intrinsically liable to penetration from outside. As will be seen, some of the particular arguments for this conclusion make pressing the question: what about philosophy? The answer, it will be concluded, is that philosophy is insulated from external influences to a considerable extent. In that lies both its importance and an explanation as to why much of it has little practical application.

Cognitive Construction Grammar

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans C. Boas
Keyword(s):  
Construction Grammar ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Cognitive Principles ◽  
Organizing Principles ◽  
Cognitive Construction Grammar

This chapter focuses on Cognitive Construction Grammar (CCG), which aims at providing a psychologically plausible account of language by investigating the general cognitive principles that serve to structure the network of language-specific constructions. It traces the foundations of CCG, discusses the major organizing principles and the architecture of CCG, and describes the organization of constructional knowledge in CCG. The chapter also compares CCG with other strands of Construction Grammar to show what ideas they share and where they differ, and looks at the interaction of multiple constructions, the role of networks, and inheritance hierarchies, as well as frequency and productivity from a CCG perspective.

THE ROLE OF EPISTEMIC VIRTUE IN THE REALIZATION OF BASIC GOODS

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 379-395 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Baril
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Popular Opinion ◽  
Basic Goods ◽  
In Virtue Of

ABSTRACTIn this paper, I argue that, contrary to popular opinion, there is good reason to think that the qualities that make people good reasoners also make them better off. I will focus specifically on epistemic virtue: roughly, the kind of character in virtue of which one is excellently oriented towards epistemic goods. I propose that epistemic virtue is importantly implicated in the realization of some of the goods that are widely believed to be instrumental to, or even constitutive of, well-being. Here I focus on one such good: friendship.

The Extent of Our Abilities: The Presence, Salience, and Sociality of Affordances

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Z. Elias
Keyword(s):  
Social Interaction ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Temporal Scales ◽  
Temporal Perspective ◽  
Temporal Dimension ◽  
In Virtue Of

We, in virtue of our sociability and plasticity, are especially open to altering and developing our capacities and abilities, thereby expanding the scope of available affordances. The distinctively dynamic and extensive nature of abilities for human beings, however, raises questions concerning the ontology of affordances, given their relativity to abilities, their being relative to abilities. These questions are particularly pressing since much of the power of the concept comes from the claim that affordances are real, that they exist in some sense. Resolution of these issues, I suggest, involves taking the temporal dimension of abilities and affordances seriously, particularly in terms of interaction across multiple temporal scales. Such a temporal perspective encompasses the modulating role of motivation, as well as questions concerning the presence and salience of affordances. I end by addressing abilities as they extend into, and are extended by, social interaction and coordination, and introduce the notion of joint affordances specifically, in contrast to the sociality of affordances more generally.

scholarly journals An Augmented Buck-Passing Account of Reasons and Value: Scanlon and Crisp on What Stops the Buck

Utilitas ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 490-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
PHILIP COOK
Keyword(s):  
Dual Role ◽  
Formal Property ◽  
Formal Properties ◽  
Buck Passing ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Wrong Kind Of Reasons

Roger Crisp has inspired two important criticisms of Scanlon's buck-passing account of value. I defend buck-passing from the wrong kind of reasons criticism, and the reasons and the good objection. I support Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen's dual role of reasons in refuting the wrong kind of reasons criticism, even where its authors claim it fails. Crisp's reasons and the good objection contends that the property of goodness is buck-passing in virtue of its formality. I argue that Crisp conflates general and formal properties, and that Scanlon is ambiguous about whether the formal property of a reason can stop the buck. Drawing from Wallace, I respond to Crisp's reasons and the good objection by developing an augmented buck-passing account of reasons and value, where the buck is passed consistently from the formal properties of both to the substantive properties of considerations and evaluative attitudes. I end by describing two unresolved problems for buck-passers.

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