Epistemic Circularity

<p>An instance of epistemically circular justification is one in which a justification source successfully justifies the claim that it is a justification source. It is generally thought that this is impossible. However, there is also reason to think that our fundamental evidential sources and theories of justification cannot be justified without circularity. In this thesis I investigate the problem of epistemic circularity in detail. First, I’ll examine a prominent argument for thinking that the justification of our fundamental evidential sources must be circular, and show that it is not decisive. My response employs a pragmatic account of justification, whereby your goals and preferences can make you justified in believing something even when you lack evidence for it. Second, I’ll offer a different argument for thinking that epistemically circular justification is possible.</p>

Epistemic Circularity

<p>An instance of epistemically circular justification is one in which a justification source successfully justifies the claim that it is a justification source. It is generally thought that this is impossible. However, there is also reason to think that our fundamental evidential sources and theories of justification cannot be justified without circularity. In this thesis I investigate the problem of epistemic circularity in detail. First, I’ll examine a prominent argument for thinking that the justification of our fundamental evidential sources must be circular, and show that it is not decisive. My response employs a pragmatic account of justification, whereby your goals and preferences can make you justified in believing something even when you lack evidence for it. Second, I’ll offer a different argument for thinking that epistemically circular justification is possible.</p>

Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition

Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition rejects argument-based attempts to resist radical skepticism and advocates, instead, for noninferential intuition-based commonsense resistance inspired by the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid. The book begins by setting aside closure-based arguments for radical skepticism and focusing on the more fundamental underdetermination arguments, which highlight the problematic gap between our evidence and our beliefs that are based on that evidence despite their truth being underdetermined by it. The rejected argument-based response to skepticism aims to provide good noncircular arguments from the evidence on which we base our ordinary beliefs (e.g. our perceptual and memory beliefs) to the conclusion that those beliefs are true or at least probable. Part I of the book finds all such anti-skeptical arguments wanting. Part II lays out and defends a unique version of the commonsense Reid-inspired response to radical skepticism, with two distinctive features. The first is its self-conscious, explicit, and extensive reliance on epistemic intuitions, which are seemings about the nature and exemplification of epistemic goods (such as justification or knowledge). The second is that it is ecumenical in the sense that it can be endorsed without difficulty by both internalists and externalists in epistemology. Part III of the book responds to objections to the commonsense reliance on epistemic intuitions proposed in Part II, with special attention given to challenges from underdetermination, epistemic circularity, disagreement, and experimental philosophy.

Epistemic Intuition and Underdetermination

After briefly considering (in Section 1) the self-undermining worry that arguments for skepticism about epistemic intuition themselves rely on epistemic intuition, this chapter responds to underdetermination-based arguments for skepticism about epistemic intuition. Section 2 lays out the rationale for underdetermination-based skepticism about epistemic intuition and presents the noninferential anti-skeptic’s response. Section 3 highlights the epistemic circularity that is so obvious in that response and explains why, instead of causing trouble for that response, it provides us with a paradigm case of unproblematic epistemic circularity. Section 4 identifies several worries about the possibility of our having duplicates who are victims of deceptive demons (worries connected with disjunctivism, the New Evil Demon Problem, and the positions defended in Sections 2 and 3), and responds to the alleged problems these worries cause for epistemic intuition.

Easy Knowledge and Epistemic Circularity

This chapter argues that the commonsense intuitionist particularist response to radical skepticism laid out in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight does not fall prey to the Problem of Easy Knowledge, which can also be called the ‘Problem of Epistemic Circularity.’ The core concern here is that one can’t rationally rely on a belief source to justify the belief that that very belief source is trustworthy or reliable because that would be too easy, as well as circular. The chapter concedes that this sort of epistemic circularity is often problematic, yet argues that this is not true in general, but only in certain specified circumstances. It explains how epistemic circularity (which is disparaged largely on the basis of intuitions) can be defended both by arguments and by intuitions. And it uses these defenses to respond to the Problem of Easy Knowledge and Epistemic Circularity and to explain why it seems threatening even though it isn’t.

Bernalar dalam Lingkaran?: Menjawab Problem Sirkularitas Doktrin Kesaksian Internal Roh Kudus

Doktrin kesaksian internal Roh Kudus adalah doktrin yang digunakan oleh John Calvin untuk menjelaskan mengapa orang Kristen dapat memercayai Alkitab sebagai firman Allah. Namun doktrin ini tidak luput dari problem khususnya berkaitan dengan problem penalaran sirkular, subyektivisme, dan dianggap mengabaikan peran argumen dan bukti. Paper ini berupaya menjawab problem-problem tersebut dengan pertama memaparkan natur dan mekanisme kesaksian internal Roh Kudus. Kedua, menjawab problem-problem tersebut dengan menggunakan konsep pengetahuan bertingkat dan mengakui keberadaan sirkularitas epistemik. Dengan bantuan konsep-konsep tersebut penulis menunjukkan bahwa problem-problem tersebut dapat dijawab dengan baik. The doctrine of the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit was used by John Calvin to explain why Christians can believe in the Bible as the word of God. However, this doctrine is free from problems especially related to the problem of circular reasoning, subjectivism, and is considered to ignore evidence and arguments. This paper tries to answer these problems by first discussing the nature and mechanism of the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. Secondly, it attempts to answer these problems by using the concept of multilevel knowledge and acknowledging the existence of epistemic circularity. With the help of these concepts, the author will show that these problems can be answered well.

Husserlian Eidetic Variation and Objectual Understanding as a Basis for an Epistemology of Essence

Vaidya has recently argued that while Husserl’s method for acquiring knowledge of essence through use of our imagination is subject to a vicious epistemic circle, we can still use the method to successfully attain objectual understanding of essence. In this paper, I argue that the Husserlian objectual understanding-based epistemology envisaged by Vaidya suffers from a similar epistemic circularity as its knowledge-based foil. I argue that there is a straight-forward solution to this problem, but then raise three serious problems for an amended version of Vaidya’s proposal and any similar Husserlian epistemology of essence. The paper closes with some general reflections on applying the Husserlian method to the contemporary notion of essence and on the idea of refocusing the epistemology of essence on understanding instead of knowledge.