Weak Members and the Enforcement of EU Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ioannidis
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Weak States ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Eurozone Crisis ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Rich ◽  
The Eu

This chapter focuses on cases where the presumption that all Member States are effective in enforcing their law does not hold: when Member States show structural, persistent, and cross-sector ineffectiveness in enforcing their law. Borrowing from literature on international law as well as insights from the rich research on EU compliance, this chapter develops three main points. The first is that, on some occasions, the EU might face a similar challenge with that of international law when dealing with weak states. To describe such cases of structural ineffectiveness, this chapter develops the concept of ‘weak member’. The second point is that these problems can be captured through the lens of EU constitutional law, and more specifically as Rule of Law problems. The last point is to present some of the measures taken during the Eurozone crisis to respond to this type of problem with regard to Greece.

scholarly journals A Matter of (A)Political Interpretation

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-106
Author(s):  
Davor Petrić
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Legal Scholarship ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Border Dispute ◽  
The Status ◽  
Political Interpretation ◽  
The Eu

This contribution reflects on the EU law side of the story of Slovenia and Croatia’s border dispute. It discusses some of the key parts of the Advocate General’s opinion and the Court of Justice’s judgment in this case, including the issue of the scope of EU law, the status of international law in EU law, the interpretation of international law for the purposes of EU law adjudication, and the rule of law dimensions of the border dispute between the two neighbouring Member States. It also offers some general remarks on the nature of legal scholarship that can be read as a response to some of the academic commentary of this case.

scholarly journals The Rule of Law and the Roll of the Dice. The Uncertain Future of Investor-State Arbitration in the EU

2021 ◽  
pp. 333-359
Author(s):  
Wojciech Sadowski
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Treaty Law ◽  
Energy Charter Treaty ◽  
Uncertain Future ◽  
The Eu

AbstractInvestment treaty law and EU law began to develop in the same era and share some important philosophical and axiological foundations. The pressure on the CEE countries to enter into numerous bilateral investment treaties in late 80s and early 90s, in the context of the EU accession aspirations of the former communist countries, was likely to result, eventually, in a conflict between EU law and investment treaty law. The conflict could have been managed in three different ways, yet the CJEU decided in Achmea to declare an undefined volume of intra-EU arbitrations to be incompatible with EU law. This important judgment, which delivered an outcome desired by the European Commission and a number of Member States, is based on questionable legal reasoning that creates high uncertainty in this area of law. The doubts include the scope of application of Achmea, which is now a highly debatable issue. The CJEU itself saw it necessary to limit the scope of Achmea by declaring in Opinion 1/17 (CETA) that the legal reasoning of Achmea did not apply to investment protection treaties with third countries. The Member States of the EU remain politically divided in their views as to whether Achmea applies to the Energy Charter Treaty. And while the problems with the rule of law and independence of the judiciary in certain Member States continue to grow, Achmea has left an important gap for which there is no substitute in the current architecture of the EU legal system.

The Constitutional Price for International Unilateralism in the European Banking Union

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
pp. 320-360
Author(s):  
Adrian Dumitrescu-Pasecinic
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Institutional Framework ◽  
Voluntary Action ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
The Eu

Abstract In order to enter the Banking Union, non-euro EU Member States must ‘step outside’ the EU legal order and the Union’s institutional framework, and resort to unilateral instruments of public international law. If the intergovernmental method has advanced the alternative project of integration based on voluntary policy, international unilateralism is seen as a similar integration technique based on the voluntary action of non-euro Member States, ie a tool for deeper integration that appears as a variation of intergovernmentalism. This article focuses on the constitutional deficiencies caused by the choice of unilateral instruments in the institutional set-up of a close cooperation arrangement in the Single Supervisory Mechanism. At first sight, leaving the EU legal order and entering the world of international law opens entirely new perspectives for the participating Member States. The possible attraction is escaping the constraining institutional framework of EU law. However, the international law route poses significant constitutional challenges vis-à-vis compatibility with the EU law.

The Jurisprudence of Integration

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Pavlos Eleftheriadis
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
International Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Effective Response ◽  
Member States ◽  
Political Problem ◽  
Political Interpretation ◽  
The Eu

This chapter introduces the central legal and political interpretations of the European Union (EU). The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) suggests a federalist legal account when it speaks of EU law as a ‘new legal order’ and as ‘autonomous’ from international law and the law of the member states. This doctrine has met with resistance by the courts of the member states, which have refused to apply EU law without reference to their domestic constitution. The courts’ views can be seen as either a ‘constitutional’ approach, which we find in Neil MacCormick’s ‘pluralism’ under international law, or in the ‘pluralism’ defended by Mattias Kumm, Neil Walker, and others. But the general legal architecture of the EU is not only a theoretical but also a political problem. These legal interpretations correspond to rival political approaches, namely ‘federalism’, ‘statism’, and a new view proposed in this book ‘internationalism’. The most challenging political view of the EU, articulated for example by the historian Noel Malcolm, believes that it is actually a serious risk to self-government and democracy. Any legal and political interpretation of the treaties supporting the legitimacy of the EU requires that we have an effective response to this democratic challenge. Can the EU be democratically legitimate?

EU LOYALTY AS GOOD FAITH

2015 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 829-874 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geert De Baere ◽  
Timothy Roes
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
German Constitutional Law ◽  
The Eu

AbstractComparing the EU law principle of loyalty with international law good faith and the duty of federal good faith in German constitutional law (Bundestreue), this article contributes to the discussion on the nature of the EU legal order and its relationship to international law more generally by finding that EU loyalty is in essence a specific incarnation of the international law principle that treaties are to be interpreted in good faith. At the same time, it challenges the assumption that international law good faith differs fundamentally from federal good faith. To this end, the article points at historical links between both, and posits that good faith is in essence a principle of constructive interpretation, the strictures of which increase with the level of integration of the legal order in which it is applied.

scholarly journals CJEU Achmea Judgment and What Comes Next. Some Reflections on the Potential Implications of the CJEU Judgment (C-284/16)

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-138
Author(s):  
Przemysław Domagała
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
International Law ◽  
Judicial System ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Practical Solution ◽  
Investment Agreements ◽  
The Eu

In the judgment of 6.03.2018 (Achmea case, C-284/16), CJEU ruled that treaty clauses that allow investor from one of the Member States to bring proceedings against another Member State before an arbitraltribunal outside the EU judicial system are irreconcilable with Articles 267 and 344 TFEU when such tribunal may be called on to interpret or apply EU law. This principle is applicable to EU trade or investment agreements (FTAs and IIAs), since they are part of EU law, and to BITs, FTAs and IIAs, since they contain explicit or implicit referrals to municipal (EU) law. In intra-EU relations, such a conflict of norms must be solved according to customary international law codified in the VCLT. According to this law, TFEU would prevail as lex superior and, in the case of Poland and many other Member States, as lex posterior. In intra-EU relations, TFEU prevails ex proprio vigore, i.e. without the need to terminate intra-EU BITs. However, such termination is highly desirable, not only for reasons of clarity, but also because arbitral tribunals and extra-EU courts are not bounded by the ECJ’s ruling. In the case of agreements with non-Member States, the incompatibilities referred to in the Achmea judgment must be eliminated by renegotiation or formal termination (Article 307 (2) TFEU). In the case of the BITs, the latter seems to be the only practical solution.

scholarly journals EU Values Are Law, after All: Enforcing EU Values through Systemic Infringement Actions by the European Commission and the Member States of the European Union

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim Lane Scheppele ◽  
Dimitry Vladimirovich Kochenov ◽  
Barbara Grabowska-Moroz
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Eu

Abstract Although compliance with the founding values is presumed in its law, the Union is now confronted with persistent disregard of these values in two Member States. If it ceases to be a union of Rule-of-Law-abiding democracies, the European Union (EU) is unthinkable. Purely political mechanisms to safeguard the Rule of Law, such as those in Article 7 Treaty of European Union (TEU), do not work. Worse still, their existence has disguised the fact that the violations of the values of Article 2 TEU are also violations of EU law. The legal mechanisms tried thus far, however, do not work either. The fundamental jurisprudence on judicial independence and irremovability under Article 19(1) TEU is a good start, but it has been unable to change the situation on the ground. Despite ten years of EU attempts at reining in Rule of Law violations and even as backsliding Member States have lost cases at the Court of Justice, illiberal regimes inside the EU have become more consolidated: the EU has been losing through winning. More creative work is needed to find ways to enforce the values of Article 2 TEU more effectively. Taking this insight, we propose to turn the EU into a militant democracy, able to defend its basic principles, by using the traditional tools for the enforcement of EU law in a novel manner. We demonstrate how the familiar infringement actions—both under Article 258 and 259 TFEU—can be adapted as instruments for enforcing EU values by bundling a set of specific violations into a single general infringement action to show how a pattern of unlawful activity rises to the level of being a systemic violation. A systemic violation, because of its general and pervasive nature, in itself threatens basic values above and beyond violations of individual provisions of the acquis. Certified by the Court of Justice, a systemic violation of EU law should call for systemic compliance that would require the Member State to undo the effects of its attacks on the values of Article 2. The use of Article 260 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) to deduct fines from EU funds due to be received by the troubled Member State would provide additional incentives for systemic compliance. We illustrate this proposed militant democratic structure by explaining and critiquing what the Commission and Court together have done to reign in the governments of Hungary and Poland so far and then showing how they can do better.

scholarly journals The Bite, the Bark, and the Howl

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonard Besselink
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Political Order ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Highly Sensitive ◽  
The Eu

This chapter analyses Article 7 TEU on sanctions against Member States for certain potential and actual breaches of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, and the related ‘Rule of Law initiatives’. It argues that the debates over these reveal a twofold boundary issue: that of the legal delimitation of the procedures and powers under Article 7, and that of the fuzzy boundaries of the Member State political orders as distinct from the EU political order. The very identity of the foundational values of the Union and of the Member States makes it impossible to delimit the scope of EU law from that of Member State orders when it comes to guaranteeing these values. This also explains the politically highly sensitive nature of doing so. Thus, this chapter seeks to define the contours of the ensuing problems with a precise legal reconstruction of Article 7 TEU and its development.

scholarly journals “Is This Really What I Voted For?” – On The Legitimacy Of European Integration

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tanel Kerikmäe ◽  
Katrin Nyman-Metcalf ◽  
Ioannis Papageorgiou
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Crucial Issue ◽  
Public International Law ◽  
The Eu

ABSTRACT This paper discusses the problems and dangers of proceeding with European integration without facing a transparent constitutional debate. The crucial issue demanding clarity is whether the current integration in the form of the EU shall be seen within the framework and concepts of public international law or within those of constitutional law. The authors argue that more intensive integration cannot be achieved on the basis of undermining rule of law and democracy by vacillating between different international law or constitutional law models of proceeding without taking any clear standpoint.

scholarly journals Article 260 TFEU Sanctions in Multi-Tiered Member States

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-162
Author(s):  
Werner Vandenbruwaene ◽  
Patricia Popelier ◽  
Christine Janssens
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Vantage Point ◽  
Regional Level ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Multi Level ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Regional Governments

Abstract The question at hand is located at the intersection of EU law and national constitutional law, and aims to answer the following problem: namely, how to mitigate federal concerns in the context of infringement procedures and financial sanctions under art. 260 TFEU. This article approaches this question both from the perspective of the Commission and the Court of Justice, as well as from the vantage point of the central and regional governments involved. After analysing the composition of the financial sanctions, we cover the involvement of subnational entities in the infringements proceedings in six tiered Member States (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK) and the relevant national provisions for the partition of financial sanctions. The conclusions pertain to both the central and regional level and the EU institutions concerned, adhering to the multi-level relationship subjacent to this article.

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