EU LOYALTY AS GOOD FAITH

2015 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 829-874 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geert De Baere ◽  
Timothy Roes

AbstractComparing the EU law principle of loyalty with international law good faith and the duty of federal good faith in German constitutional law (Bundestreue), this article contributes to the discussion on the nature of the EU legal order and its relationship to international law more generally by finding that EU loyalty is in essence a specific incarnation of the international law principle that treaties are to be interpreted in good faith. At the same time, it challenges the assumption that international law good faith differs fundamentally from federal good faith. To this end, the article points at historical links between both, and posits that good faith is in essence a principle of constructive interpretation, the strictures of which increase with the level of integration of the legal order in which it is applied.

Author(s):  
Michael Ioannidis

This chapter focuses on cases where the presumption that all Member States are effective in enforcing their law does not hold: when Member States show structural, persistent, and cross-sector ineffectiveness in enforcing their law. Borrowing from literature on international law as well as insights from the rich research on EU compliance, this chapter develops three main points. The first is that, on some occasions, the EU might face a similar challenge with that of international law when dealing with weak states. To describe such cases of structural ineffectiveness, this chapter develops the concept of ‘weak member’. The second point is that these problems can be captured through the lens of EU constitutional law, and more specifically as Rule of Law problems. The last point is to present some of the measures taken during the Eurozone crisis to respond to this type of problem with regard to Greece.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 321-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joris Larik

EU external relations law is a doubly peculiar field of scholarship that has attracted significant scholarly attention over the last several decades. It is both part of EU law—considered a “new legal order” distinct from international law—and it is concerned with the European Union as a global actor, a “strange animal” in that the EU is neither a state nor a classical international organization.


2019 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
pp. 320-360
Author(s):  
Adrian Dumitrescu-Pasecinic

Abstract In order to enter the Banking Union, non-euro EU Member States must ‘step outside’ the EU legal order and the Union’s institutional framework, and resort to unilateral instruments of public international law. If the intergovernmental method has advanced the alternative project of integration based on voluntary policy, international unilateralism is seen as a similar integration technique based on the voluntary action of non-euro Member States, ie a tool for deeper integration that appears as a variation of intergovernmentalism. This article focuses on the constitutional deficiencies caused by the choice of unilateral instruments in the institutional set-up of a close cooperation arrangement in the Single Supervisory Mechanism. At first sight, leaving the EU legal order and entering the world of international law opens entirely new perspectives for the participating Member States. The possible attraction is escaping the constraining institutional framework of EU law. However, the international law route poses significant constitutional challenges vis-à-vis compatibility with the EU law.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Pavlos Eleftheriadis

This chapter introduces the central legal and political interpretations of the European Union (EU). The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) suggests a federalist legal account when it speaks of EU law as a ‘new legal order’ and as ‘autonomous’ from international law and the law of the member states. This doctrine has met with resistance by the courts of the member states, which have refused to apply EU law without reference to their domestic constitution. The courts’ views can be seen as either a ‘constitutional’ approach, which we find in Neil MacCormick’s ‘pluralism’ under international law, or in the ‘pluralism’ defended by Mattias Kumm, Neil Walker, and others. But the general legal architecture of the EU is not only a theoretical but also a political problem. These legal interpretations correspond to rival political approaches, namely ‘federalism’, ‘statism’, and a new view proposed in this book ‘internationalism’. The most challenging political view of the EU, articulated for example by the historian Noel Malcolm, believes that it is actually a serious risk to self-government and democracy. Any legal and political interpretation of the treaties supporting the legitimacy of the EU requires that we have an effective response to this democratic challenge. Can the EU be democratically legitimate?


Author(s):  
Luca Prete

The enforcement of EU law on non-compliant national authorities has, at its heart, infringement proceedings brought pursuant to Articles 258 to 260 TFEU. That focus is embedded in the scheme of the EU Treaties. In that regard, infringement proceedings are a particular feature of the EU legal order. As the Court of Justice stated in one of its first cases, ‘it is a procedure far exceeding the rules heretofore recognized in classical international law, to ensure that obligations of States are fulfilled’. Indeed, under the rules of public international law, there is no obligation to settle disputes or to establish formal and legal procedures for dispute resolution, which, where they exist, always depend on the consent of the parties concerned. By contrast, the jurisdiction of the Court in cases of EU law infringements by Member States is compulsory and constitutes a corollary to membership in the European Union.


Author(s):  
Koen Lenaerts ◽  
José A. Gutiérrez-Fons ◽  
Stanislas Adam

Two different dynamics govern the autonomy of the European Union (EU) legal order. On the one hand, autonomy seeks to define what EU law is not, i.e. it is not ordinary international law. Positively, on the other, autonomy seeks to define what EU law is, i.e. a legal order that has the capacity to operate as a self-referential system of norms that is both coherent and complete. Yet the concept of autonomy of the EU legal order in no way conveys the message that the EU and its law are euro-centric and that the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘Court of Justice’) seeks to insulate EU law from external influences by building walls that prevent the migration of legal ideas. Autonomy rather enables the Court of Justice to strike the right balance between the need to preserve the values on which the EU is founded and openness to other legal orders. The autonomy of the EU legal order is thus part of the very DNA of that legal order as it allows the EU to find its own constitutional space whilst interacting in a cooperative way with its Member States and the wider world.


Author(s):  
Jan Klabbers

Ever since the early 1970s, the question as to the precise status and effects to be accorded to international norms within the EU legal order has given rise to puzzlement, controversy, and debate. Some claim that the EU is, in the wonderful German phrase, völkerrechtsfreundlich: it is thought that the EU has a friendly and accommodating position towards international law, marred only by the generally acknowledged exception concerning WTO law. Others maintain that, as a general matter, the position of WTO law actually reflects the general practice: WTO law is not the exception, but the general rule. Yet others perceive a temporal development: starting from a friendly disposition towards international law, the EU has become, over time, less accommodating. And at least one author posits something close to the reverse, suggesting that the EU is actually increasingly receptive to international law, the latter increasingly being interwoven in EU law.


Author(s):  
Pavlos Eleftheriadis

This book offers a legal and political theory of the European Union. Many political and legal philosophers compare the EU to a federal union. They believe that its basic laws should be subject to the standards of constitutional law. They thus find it lacking or incomplete. This book offers a rival theory. If one looks more closely at the treaties and the precedents of the European courts, one sees that the substance of EU law is international, not constitutional. Just like international law, it applies primarily to the relations between states. It binds domestic institutions directly only when the local constitutions allow it. The member states have democratically chosen to adapt their constitutional arrangements in order to share legislative and executive powers with their partners. The legal architecture of the European Union is thus best understood under a theory of dualism and not pluralism. According to this internationalist view, EU law is part of the law of nations and its distinction from domestic law is a matter of substance, not form. This arrangement is supported by a cosmopolitan theory of international justice, which we may call progressive internationalism. The EU is a union of democratic peoples, that freely organize their interdependence on the basis of principles of equality and reciprocity. Its central principles are not the principles of a constitution, but cosmopolitan principles of accountability, liberty, and fairness,


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