The League of Nations and the United States

Author(s):  
Charlie Laderman

Although the League of Nations was the first permanent organization established with the purpose of maintaining international peace, it built on the work of a series of 19th-century intergovernmental institutions. The destructiveness of World War I led American and British statesmen to champion a league as a means of maintaining postwar global order. In the United States, Woodrow Wilson followed his predecessors, Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, in advocating American membership of an international peace league, although Wilson’s vision for reforming global affairs was more radical. In Britain, public opinion had begun to coalesce in favor of a league from the outset of the war, though David Lloyd George and many of his Cabinet colleagues were initially skeptical of its benefits. However, Lloyd George was determined to establish an alliance with the United States and warmed to the league idea when Jan Christian Smuts presented a blueprint for an organization that served that end. The creation of the League was a predominantly British and American affair. Yet Wilson was unable to convince Americans to commit themselves to membership in the new organization. The Franco-British-dominated League enjoyed some early successes. Its high point was reached when Europe was infused with the “Spirit of Locarno” in the mid-1920s and the United States played an economically crucial, if politically constrained, role in advancing Continental peace. This tenuous basis for international order collapsed as a result of the economic chaos of the early 1930s, as the League proved incapable of containing the ambitions of revisionist powers in Europe and Asia. Despite its ultimate limitations as a peacekeeping body, recent scholarship has emphasized the League’s relative successes in stabilizing new states, safeguarding minorities, managing the evolution of colonies into notionally sovereign states, and policing transnational trafficking; in doing so, it paved the way for the creation of the United Nations.

1985 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 325-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. Thompson

Woodrow Wilson was the first American President to leave the Western Hemisphere during his period of office, and, as befitted him, the circumstances in which he did so were neither casual nor frivolous. He went to Europe in late 1918 to take part in the peace conference following a war that the United States had played a crucial part in bringing to a decisive end. His aim was to secure a peace that accorded with the proposals he had set out in his Fourteen Points address of January 1918 and in other speeches — a peace that would be based upon justice and thus secure consent, that would embody liberal principles(the self-determination of peoples as far as practicable, the prohibition of discriminatory trade barriers), and that would be maintained by a new international organization in which the United States, breaking its tradition of isolation, would take part — a league of nations that would provide a general guarantee of “political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.”The symbolism of this dramatic moment, with the American prophet coming to bring redemption to the Old World, imprinted on the minds of contemporaries an image of Wilson which has affected most subsequent historiography. Viewing events from Vienna, that special victim of the First World War, Sigmund Freud found “the figure of the American President, as it rose above the horizon of Europeans, from the first unsympathetic, and… this aversion increased in the course of years the more I learned about him and the more severely we suffered from the consequences of his intrusion into our destiny.”


1995 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-567 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter J. Schraeder

In October1884, the major European colonial powers of the era were invited to a conference in Berlin by the German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck.1The United States also attended the proceedings as an observer nation, and its representative, John A. Kasson, signed the Berlin Convention, one of the primary purposes of which was to regulate escalating imperial conflict by officially delineating the territorial boundaries of colonial possessions. Although warfare between colonial armies in Africa during World War I underscored the failure of negotiators to avoid yet another global military conflict, the Berlin conference none the less consecrated the creation of formal European empires and ‘spheres of interest’ throughout the continent. Except for the unique cases of Ethiopia and Liberia, independent Africa eventually ceased to exist.


2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-101
Author(s):  
Michael Patrick Cullinane

As Woodrow Wilson traveled across the Atlantic to negotiate the peace after World War I, Theodore Roosevelt died in Long Island. His passing launched a wave of commemoration in the United States that did not go unrivaled in Europe. Favorable tributes inundated the European press and coursed through the rhetoric of political speeches. This article examines the sentiment of Allied nations toward Roosevelt and argues that his posthumous image came to symbolize American intervention in the war and, subsequently, the reservations with the Treaty of Versailles, both endearing positions to the Allies that fueled tributes. Historians have long depicted Woodrow Wilson's arrival in Europe as the most celebrated reception of an American visitor, but Roosevelt's death and memory shared equal pomp in 1919 and endured long after Wilson departed. Observing this epochal moment in world history from the unique perspective of Roosevelt's passing extends the already intricate view of transnational relations.


2019 ◽  
pp. 140-168
Author(s):  
Charlie Laderman

This chapter re-examines the American conflict over its world role after World War I and reinterprets the evolution of ideas on the purpose of the League of Nations in both Britain and the United States. It explains how Wilson’s attempt to offer a solution to the Armenian question through an American mandate became entangled in a wider debate over America’s future world role. It reveals why leading British statesman also looked to the United States to solve the Armenian question through assuming mandates for Armenia and the municipal district of Constantinople. And it reveals how Turkish and Armenian leaders influenced the mandate debate, forcing Americans to confront the complexities of pacifying the post-Ottoman Near East.


2013 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 255-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia F. Irwin

The involvement of the United States in World War I, from April 1917 to November 1918, marked a high point in the history of American internationalist thought and engagement. During those nineteen months, President Woodrow Wilson and his administration called on Americans to aid European civilians and to support Wilson's plans for a peacetime League of Nations, defining both as civic obligations; many responded positively. The postwar years, however, saw a significant popular backlash against such cosmopolitan expectations. In 1920, Congress failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and rejected U.S. participation in the League. A growing chorus for 100% Americanism and immigration restriction, meanwhile, offered evidence of a U.S. public that was becoming more insular, more withdrawn from the world. Yet such trends were never universal. As scholars have begun to acknowledge, many Americans remained outward looking in their worldviews throughout the period, seeing engagement with and compassion for the international community as vital to ensuring world peace.


1984 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 13-17
Author(s):  
George H. Quester

The teaching of international politics within the United States has been buffeted about a great deal in the past decade, reflecting shifting trends in social science analysis, reflecting also some major rethinkings and “moments of truth” about America's role in the world.The end of World War II had seen a widespread acceptance of Realpolitik analysis, as exemplified in the writings of Hans Morgenthau, generally responding to the unprecedented degree of United States participation in world affairs in the resistance to Hitler's Germany. This new realistic interpretation contrasted itself with an original, more idealistic, liberal position attributed to Americans in general for the earlier and more naive times before 1939, an idealism attributed in an extreme form to Woodrow Wilson in his approach to the outcome of World War I.


2010 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-16
Author(s):  
Mitra M. Abbaspour

Both portrait and landscape, historical scene and contemporary monument, and, ultimately, both engraving and photograph, this image contains the keys to a significant story from modern Armenian cultural history. In the years following World War I hundreds of Armenians immigrated to the United States, where through the creation of objects such as this picture, they reconstituted their community, emphasizing the longevity of their history, their unity as a minority culture, and their identity as a diaspora.


1959 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-37
Author(s):  
M. S. Rajan

The United States has played a dominant role in the establishment of international organizations since World War I, especially with respect to the League of Nations and the UN. However, the United States is also largely responsible for some vital limitations on the functioning of these organizations. One, perhaps the most important, is the subject of this study.


2015 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. E6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard P. Menger ◽  
Christopher M. Storey ◽  
Bharat Guthikonda ◽  
Symeon Missios ◽  
Anil Nanda ◽  
...  

World War I catapulted the United States from traditional isolationism to international involvement in a major European conflict. Woodrow Wilson envisaged a permanent American imprint on democracy in world affairs through participation in the League of Nations. Amid these defining events, Wilson suffered a major ischemic stroke on October 2, 1919, which left him incapacitated. What was probably his fourth and most devastating stroke was diagnosed and treated by his friend and personal physician, Admiral Cary Grayson. Grayson, who had tremendous personal and professional loyalty to Wilson, kept the severity of the stroke hidden from Congress, the American people, and even the president himself. During a cabinet briefing, Grayson formally refused to sign a document of disability and was reluctant to address the subject of presidential succession. Wilson was essentially incapacitated and hemiplegic, yet he remained an active president and all messages were relayed directly through his wife, Edith. Patient-physician confidentiality superseded national security amid the backdrop of friendship and political power on the eve of a pivotal juncture in the history of American foreign policy. It was in part because of the absence of Woodrow Wilson’s vocal and unwavering support that the United States did not join the League of Nations and distanced itself from the international stage. The League of Nations would later prove powerless without American support and was unable to thwart the rise and advance of Adolf Hitler. Only after World War II did the United States assume its global leadership role and realize Wilson’s visionary, yet contentious, groundwork for a Pax Americana. The authors describe Woodrow Wilson’s stroke, the historical implications of his health decline, and its impact on United States foreign policy.


2021 ◽  
pp. 153-192
Author(s):  
Sebastian Rosato

This chapter examines Franco-German and U.S.-Japanese relations in the early interwar period (1919-30). The chapter begins by drawing on the primary and secondary historical record to evaluate how key French and German decision makers thought about each other’s intentions, focusing on these episodes: the negotiation, signature, and aftermath of the Treaty of Versailles; the onset, development, and resolution of the Ruhr Crisis; and the Locarno era. Were they confident that their counterparts had benign intentions—that is, did they trust each other—as asserted by intentions optimists? Or were they uncertain about each other’s intentions, which is to say that they mistrusted each other, as suggested by intentions pessimism? Having shown that Paris and Berlin were far from confident that the other side had benign intentions throughout the early interwar period, the chapter then describes the shape of the resulting Franco-German security competition. The second half of the chapter repeats the analysis performed in the first half, this time with respect to the United States and Japan, focusing on the following episodes: the aftermath of World War I; the creation and operation of the Washington Treaty system; and the three years between the Geneva and London Naval conferences.


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