2. How can we speak of what does not exist?

Author(s):  
Michael Beaney

Statements that purportedly refer to something that does not exist, whether fictional or not, have been especially problematic in the history of philosophy. ‘How can we speak of what does not exist?’ suggests that in order to understand existential statements, we need to recall Frege’s claim that number statements are assertions about concepts. Existential statements are really just a type of number statement. When we make an existential claim, we are not attributing a first-level concept to an object, but a second-level concept to a first-level concept. The work of Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) is also discussed along with the Russell Paradox and his Theory of Descriptions.

2021 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 1331-1362
Author(s):  
Alexander Maar

Father Frederick Copleston is best known for his carefully crafted works History of Philosophy and Thomas Aquinas. Copleston’s most notable metaphysical thesis is his interpretation of the argument from contingency, which he sees as the superior choice for theists. He draws on Aquinas and distinguishes between causa fieri and causa esse to argue that God is a higher order (vertical) cause of contingent causal series (horizontal). Copleston presents God not as a temporal first cause, but an ontologically ultimate cause necessary to explain a contingent universe. His contribution changed the way we read Aquinas. Copleston’s willingness to debate his thesis with different philosophical perspectives is illustrated by his acceptance to discuss God’s existence with Bertrand Russell, in 1948. This BBC radio debate epitomises the dispute between theists and atheists from the 1940s onwards. I undertake to expound and comment Copleston’s contribution to metaphysics, present relevant parts of the debate and provide criticism.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Camille Akmut

Bertrand Russell had little love for Pascal – this should be no secret :In A History of Western Philosophy, Nietzsche became the ‘anti-Pascal’.A role too perfect for Nietzsche whose relationships with the latter werecomplex (“I don’t read Pascal, I love him...”, a regular companion).


Author(s):  
Galen Strawson ◽  
Galen Strawson

John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves—yet it is widely thought to be wrong. This book argues that in fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point. The book argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of the word “person” as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like “human being.” In actuality, Locke uses “person” primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. This point is familiar to some philosophers, but its full consequences have not been worked out, partly because of a further error about what Locke means by the word “consciousness.” When Locke claims that your personal identity is a matter of the actions that you are conscious of, he means the actions that you experience as your own in some fundamental and immediate manner. Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.


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