The distinctive status of international arbitration agreements in English private international law?

This Case Note critically discusses the Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Enka v Chubb [2020] EWCA Civ 574, where it held that (i) the doctrine of forum non conveniens (FNC) can never apply where an English court is asked to determine if a London arbitration agreement should be enforced by injunction, and that (ii) the ‘separability’ of an arbitration clause from the contract containing it entailed that, absent an express choice of law for it, there was a ‘strong presumption’ that the parties implicitly chose the seat law as its proper law. In doing so, the Court abandoned its previous approach in Sulamérica v Enesa, and indirectly cast doubt on its recent suggestion in Kabab-ji v KFG that ‘implied choices’ of law arguably involved the implication of a term into the arbitration agreement on ‘business efficacy’ grounds. Further, the Court appeared not to acknowledge that, outwith the arbitration context, (i) ‘FNC waiver’ clauses and exclusive jurisdiction agreements do not categorically foreclose FNC, and that (ii) ‘implied choices’ of law should not be casually inferred nowadays. The Court’s analysis in Enka was distinctly arbitration-centric: it was minded to emphasize the non-derogability of the seat courts’ supervisory role, and the ‘separability’ of an arbitration agreement from the contractual document containing it. Enka is an intriguing example of how international arbitration doctrine, particularly as regards arbitration agreements, can materially diverge from cognate principles of private international law. Nevertheless, we question whether international arbitration agreements are truly distinctive enough to justify such differences in treatment. Our assessment is that the answer is probably ‘no’.