Repression, ‘terror’ and the rule of law in England during the decade of the French Revolution

This paper pretends to explain the origins of the French Revolution, in particular in regards to its connection with the main proponents of the French Enlightenment. It argues that the Enlightenment movement was rather heterogeneous, shaped by many different thinkers with often incompatible views. The merits of Jean Jacques Rousseau in regards to conservation and education are described, while equivalently criticizing his rather collectivist ideas and his disputable views on women. It is argued that even if during the main period of the Enlightenment movement, liberal thinkers such as Montesquieu, Turgot, Lafayette and Condorcet had defined political theories based on individual freedom and competition, they were possibly “too far ahead of times” to significantly shape the French Revolution. Independently from the positive aspects of the Enlightenment movement, the actual French Revolution was often collectivist and nationalist and led to a violent phase – the ‘Reign of Terror’. Thus, this analysis allows us to understand the complexity and diversity of the Enlightenment movement and its relation to the actual French Revolution. Consequently, the revolution’s collectivist, nationalist and violent phase must be seen critically, also showing us that the implementation of democratic processes can bear risks, as the ‘majority rule’ can differ quite significantly to the concept of the ‘Rule of Law’.

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Judicial Independence – French and European Perspectives

osteuropa recht ◽

10.5771/0030-6444-2018-4-570 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 64 (4) ◽

pp. 570-582

Author(s):

Emmanuel Cartier

Keyword(s):

French Revolution ◽

Rule Of Law ◽

Judicial Independence ◽

View Point ◽

Legal Tradition ◽

The Rule Of Law ◽

Constitutional Principle ◽

Narrow View ◽

Broad Complex ◽

The Eu

Judicial independence within the framework of the rule of law is a broad, complex and controversial subject, which is especially true of France, because of the country’s particular attitude to justice since the French Revolution, and even before this critical and fundamental period. The first part of this article deals, on a broad constitutional scale, with the configuration of judicial independence, its guarantees (material and organic) and its interaction with the rule of law in the constitutions of the member states of the EU. The main purpose is to draw an objective map of the situation from a pure formal and textual (and therefore a slightly partial and narrow) view point. The second part of this contribution considers the specificity of the independence of the French judiciary in relation to the French constitutional principle of the rule of law, which is called the “Etat de Droite” in the French legal tradition.

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The Legacy Of Magna Carta And The Rule Of Law In The Republic Of Macedonia

SEEU Review ◽

10.1515/seeur-2015-0023 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 11 (1) ◽

pp. 197-205

Author(s):

Vesna Stefanovska

Keyword(s):

French Revolution ◽

Rule Of Law ◽

National Level ◽

The Rule Of Law ◽

Magna Carta ◽

Democratic Freedom ◽

The Republic ◽

The Individual ◽

International Instruments ◽

International Conventions

Abstract The rules as we know today in modern societies have their base in the Magna Carta from 1215. In that time people declared that the rights of the king and nobles must be limited and that was the first step toward as we know today “democracy”. The rights incorporated in the Magna Carta defined the limits what a state can do and also set boundaries in order to achieve equality between the state and the individual. The rights proclaimed with Magna Carta found their path in the French Revolution from 1789 as “Liberty, Equality and Fraternity” became symbol of democratic freedom and afterwards gave value in the conventions and other international instruments. The main purpose that was achieved with Magna Carta from today’s perspective is that the rules have been implanted in the conscience of people, so they learn to obey and practice them. The Magna Carta rights are integral part of international conventions and on that way they have been taken from the states on national level so they become inevitable incorporated segment of the constitution and the laws of states. Those rights have achieved their purpose, because 800 years after their proclamation, some of them are still on force and have been provided in the constitutions of many countries including the Western Balkan countries. The rights that derived from Magna Carta concerning the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, equality before the law and prohibition of discrimination are integral part of the Constitution of Macedonia which makes efforts for their implementation into practice – because contrary, words will be just words on paper and nothing else.

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Postsecular revolution: religion after the end of history

Review of International Studies ◽

10.1017/s0260210512000484 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 38 (5) ◽

pp. 1079-1097 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

MARIANO BARBATO

Keyword(s):

Public Sphere ◽

French Revolution ◽

Rule Of Law ◽

Liberal Democracy ◽

Arab World ◽

The Rule Of Law ◽

End Of History ◽

Catching Up ◽

The End Of History ◽

Insight Into

AbstractThis article claims that the revolutions in the Arab world foster insight into more than the spread of liberalism. Fukuyama's end of history has not just reached the Muslim world faster than expected. These revolutions show that strong religion and liberal democracy are compatible: they are postsecular revolutions. As already the revolutions of 1989 proved in some respect, in contrast to the secular ideals of the French Revolution, revolution and religion can go hand in hand in a postsecular way. Praying and making revolution does not need to end in a religious autocracy as 1979 in Iran. Religious citizens stood up praying for democracy and the rule of law against secular regimes which legitimised themselves as a bulwark against sinister forces of religion. Analysing the revolutions of 1989, Jürgen Habermas speaks of ‘catching-up revolutions’ which brought nothing new to the course of history. Yet after 9/11 he started to develop his idea of a postsecular society in which secular and religious citizens are equally entitled to make their arguments in a public sphere. Criticising the early Habermas with the later, the article argues that the postsecular revolutions of 1989 and 2011 are preparing the ground for a postsecular democracy.

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