scholarly journals The Facets of the Enlightenment Movement from a Libertarian Perspective:

Author(s):  
Patrick Reimers

This paper pretends to explain the origins of the French Revolution, in particular in regards to its connection with the main proponents of the French Enlightenment. It argues that the Enlightenment movement was rather heterogeneous, shaped by many different thinkers with often incompatible views. The merits of Jean Jacques Rousseau in regards to conservation and education are described, while equivalently criticizing his rather collectivist ideas and his disputable views on women. It is argued that even if during the main period of the Enlightenment movement, liberal thinkers such as Montesquieu, Turgot, Lafayette and Condorcet had defined political theories based on individual freedom and competition, they were possibly “too far ahead of times” to significantly shape the French Revolution. Independently from the positive aspects of the Enlightenment movement, the actual French Revolution was often collectivist and nationalist and led to a violent phase – the ‘Reign of Terror’. Thus, this analysis allows us to understand the complexity and diversity of the Enlightenment movement and its relation to the actual French Revolution. Consequently, the revolution’s collectivist, nationalist and violent phase must be seen critically, also showing us that the implementation of democratic processes can bear risks, as the ‘majority rule’ can differ quite significantly to the concept of the ‘Rule of Law’.

Author(s):  
Charles Townshend

What are the origins of terrorism? ‘The reign of terror’ explains that the notion of terrorism, or terror, came from the French Revolution. The terror transformed the Revolution from a liberating to a destructive force. Those who instigated the terror had to find justification for their violent killing. Their motivation provides a key to the distinctive nature of modern terrorism. The revolutionaries may have seemed to act as crusaders, but the Reign of Terror was informed by the Enlightenment assumption that human agency can change the social order. The French Revolution’s use of violence created a model for the application of terrorizing force by state actors that lasted two centuries.


2000 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
CISSIE FAIRCHILDS

On 8 Brumaire, year II (29 October 1793), the Convention decreed that freedom of dress was a basic human right: ‘Everyone is free to wear whatever clothing and accessories of his sex that he finds pleasing.’ This was an odd decree in many ways. It decreed as a right something we take for granted, the freedom to wear what we choose, and it was passed during the Terror, when individual rights were routinely curtailed. It also contradicted itself, for if its first article guaranteed freedom of dress, its second stated that all previous laws on dress remained in force, and these included one which impinged on individual freedom: the requirement that all French citizens wear a red, white and blue cockade in public.


2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (01) ◽  
Author(s):  
Günter ZÖLLER

The essay focuses Kant’s engagement with Plato at the beginning of the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason, which presents a crucial but often overlooked feature of Kant’s magnum opus. In particular, the essay examines Kant’s positive pronouncements on the “Platonic republic” (Platonische Republik) in Book One of the Transcendental Dialectic by placing them in the twofold context of the first Critique’s affirmative retake on Plato’s Forms (Ideen) and its original views on juridico-political matters. More specifically, the essay aims to show that Kant’s prime position in legal and political philosophy, as contained in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), involves a normative conception of civic life that places the societal exercise of individual freedom under universal laws. Section 1 explores the extent of affinity between Plato and Kant as arch-representatives of ancient and modern idealism. Section 2 traces the transition from Platonic dogmatism to Kantian criticism in the theory of ideas. Section 3 presents Kant’s appropriation of the idea of the “Platonic republic” for purposes of a specifically modern republican account of the rule of law under conditions of freedom.


Author(s):  
Viriato Soromenho-Marques ◽  

In this paper the philosophical foundations of the first Portuguese Constitution are submitted to critical analysis. Drafted in the aftermath of the 1820 Revolution, the Constitution of 1822 is deeply determined by contradictory tensions and forces. We may see in it the trace of the freedom trends developed in the Enlightenment period and led to practical terms in the dramatic battleground of the French Revolution. Nevertheless, the Portuguese Constitution of 1822 reflect also the energetic resistance from the conservative sectors and values of the Portuguese society and also the coming influence of the Restoration Age political philosophy, aimed to fight the rationalistic paradigm of natural right constitutional theories.


2021 ◽  
pp. 7-65
Author(s):  
John Skorupski

Two great revolutions set the stage for late modern ethics: the French Revolution and the philosophical revolution of Kant. This chapter studies the events and conflicts of ideas in the French Revolution and its aftermath in France. It gives a narrative account of the Revolution from 1789 to 1804. Three broad ethical stances are distinguished: the feudal-Catholic ethic of the monarch and his allies, the impartial individualism of the Enlightenment, and the Rousseauian radical-democracy of the Jacobins. Under the violent political conflicts between these views lies a resilient philosophical conflict: between impartial individualism and a generic stance which this study identifies as ‘eudaimonistic holism’. The feudal-Catholic ethic and radical-democracy are two very different forms of it. Hegelian ethics will turn out to be a third.


1984 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 521-535 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. R. Cristi

abstractAccording to Hayek the rule of law constitutes the foundation of liberalism's political and legal theory. General and abstract laws, as opposed to concrete measures, protect individual freedom from prerogative and arbitrariness (normativism versus decisionism). Hayek maintains that Carl Schmitt's decisionism explains his attacks on liberalism and the prominent role he played in support of Hitler's regime. Two general observations should shorten the distance that Hayek seeks to establish between his posture and that of Schmitt. Firstly, Schmitt's critique is primarily aimed against the tendency that neutralizes the state and makes it vulnerable to democratic pressures. Secondly, Hayek's normativism is seen to contain a decisionist potential.


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