13. Ombudsmen

Author(s):  
Timothy Endicott

This chapter examines ombudsmen and other forms of investigation of the working of government, and the ways in which they can resolve disputes and improve administration. The ombudsmen’s role has four key features: (1) it is independent; (2) it investigates a complaint; (3) it looks for injustice caused by maladministration; and (4) it makes a report. The chapter explains the ombudsman process, the Parliamentary Ombudsman, local government ombudsmen, the effects of ombudsmen’s reports, judicial review of ombudsmen, the European Ombudsman, the Equality and Human Rights Commission, and the Inquiries Act 2005. The chapter also explains the law on judicial review of ombudsman decisions and judicial review of the way in which public authorities respond to ombudsman reports, and argues that the judicial process has very little to offer in improving the operation of ombudsman schemes.

2021 ◽  
pp. 500-546
Author(s):  
Timothy Endicott

This chapter examines ombudsmen and other facilities for investigation of the working of government, and the ways in which they can resolve disputes and improve administration. The ombudsmen’s role has four key features: (1) it is independent; (2) it investigates a complaint; (3) it looks for injustice caused by maladministration; and (4) it makes a report. The chapter explains the ombudsman process, the Parliamentary Ombudsman, local government ombudsmen, and the effects of ombudsmen’s reports. The chapter also explains the law on judicial review of ombudsman decisions and judicial review of the way in which public authorities respond to ombudsman reports, and argues that the judicial process has very little to offer in improving the operation of ombudsman schemes. The role of inquiries is also explained, with discussion of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, the Inquiries Act 2005, and public authorities’ duties to inquire under the common law and the European Convention on Human Rights.


2005 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 863-880
Author(s):  
Sir Gordon Slynn

This article outlines the difficulties which were felt to exist in the prerogative orders of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition in the United Kingdom, despite important developments which had taken place in their use. It describes in detail the recommendations of the Law Commission and the changes introduced both by Rules of Court and legislation. The former procedures are replaced by an application for judicial review, though the basis upon which relief is granted remains substantially the same. Recent cases show the way in which the new procedure has developed. Distinctions are drawn between the test to be applied on the application for leave and on the final hearing, and between the proceeding by way of judicial review to challenge the acts of public authorities and actions where purely private rights are claimed. This article shows the way in which the possibility of exceptions to this latter distinction has been established and suggests that the ambit of the new procedure is still in course of development.


2021 ◽  
pp. 428-464
Author(s):  
Timothy Endicott

This chapter examines standing—the entitlement to be heard by a court. No judicial process of any kind may proceed without it. In an ordinary claim, the claimant’s standing is based on his assertion of grounds for his claim to a remedy. In a claim for judicial review, the claimant does not need to assert a right to a remedy, but must have a ‘sufficient interest’ in the matter in dispute. The discussion covers campaign litigation, costs in campaign litigation, standing in an ordinary claim for a declaration, standing in Human Rights Act proceedings, standing for public authorities, and standing to intervene.


Author(s):  
Duncan Fairgrieve ◽  
Dan Squires QC

The police are subject to a range of different legal controls. They have a general duty to uphold the law, and breach of this duty can, in principle, be enforced by way of judicial review proceedings brought by members of the public. If, in the course of enforcing the law, the police detain, arrest, or assault an individual without lawful justification, they can be held liable for the torts of false imprisonment or trespass to the person, and they may also be held liable for the tort of misfeasance in public office if they act maliciously and unlawfully in the purported performance of their duties. as well as statutory torts specifically aimed at the police. The Human Rights Act 1998 provides further significant additions to the claims that can be brought against the police, and these are considered further in chapter 7. Claimants have also sought to establish that the police, like other public authorities, can be held liable for the tort of negligence, and it is such claims that are considered in this chapter.


Author(s):  
Timothy Endicott

This chapter examines standing—the entitlement to be heard by a court. No judicial process of any kind may proceed without it. In an ordinary claim, the claimant’s standing is based on his assertion of grounds for his claim to a remedy. In a claim for judicial review, the claimant does not assert a right to a remedy, but must have a ‘sufficient interest’ in the matter. The discussion covers campaign litigation, costs in campaign litigation, standing in an ordinary claim for a declaration, standing in Human Rights Act proceedings, standing before the European Court of Justice, standing for public authorities, and standing to intervene.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 474
Author(s):  
Elisabet . ◽  
Cut Memi

One of the authorities of the Constitutional Court governed by the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945 was the examining of laws against the contitution or judicial review. Inside the regulations which governing the implementation of this authority, the Constitutional Court only acts as a negative legislator, namely canceling or reinforcing a norm tested by the Petitioner. But in practice, the Constitutional Court has changed its role to become a positive legislator, who is forming a new legal norm, which is the authority of legislators. The Constitutional Court should not be able to form a new legal norm because there is no legal basis which regulate that. But Constitutional Court can form a new legal norm in some urgent circumstances, relating to Human Rights, and preventing legal vacuum. In addition, the establishment of laws by lawmakers that require a long process and time. This is compelling Constitutional Court to make substitute norm before the law was established by the legislators. In the Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 46/PUU-XVI/2016, the Court actually wants to establish a new legal norm, but because the articles in the petitioned have criminal sanctions, and if the Constitutional Court approves the petition, the Constitutional Court has formulated a new criminal act that can only be formed by the lawmaker. Whereas in the Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 21/PUU-XII/2014, the Constitutional Court established a new norm because in the article a quo there were no criminal sanctions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-225
Author(s):  
V.V. MOVCHAN

The article reveals the theoretical aspects of administrative legal proceedings, as one of the forms of the exercise of judicial power, the features and significance of the administrative judicial process in the mechanism of protecting the rights and freedoms of man and citizen, the analysis is given of the constitutional foundations of the human rights function of the judiciary, its essence and content, procedural actions. The author reveals the historical aspects of the formation and development of judicial protection in Russia, oreign experience and models of administrative justice are considered, the importance of administrative proceedings in the implementation of the human rights function of the judiciary in the Russian Federation when considering disputes with the participation of public authorities and citizens and the exercise of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of citizens is revealed. The author substantiates the advantages of the judicial administrative process as a procedural form of implementation of the human rights function of the judiciary and the implementation of the constitutional right to judicial protection, analyzes the reform of the judicial system of the judicial system, the creation of courts of appeal and cassation in the system of arbitration and general jurisdiction, substantiates the conclusion that the reform of the system of courts of general jurisdiction created organizational and judicial framework for the specialization of judges and court proceedings, the system of institutional intra-system control of the legality and validity of judicial acts, institutionally and functionally ensured the implementation of the human rights function of the judiciary and the availability of judicial protection in the system of courts of general jurisdiction.


2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 146-175
Author(s):  
Hadley Arkes

The city of Cincinnati, we know, can be an engaging place, but federal judge Arthur Spiegel also found, in the mid-'90s, that it could be quite a vexing place. The city council of Cincinnati had passed what was called the Human Rights Ordinance of 1992, which barred virtually all species of discrimination—including discrimination on the basis of “Appalachian origin.” But the bill also encompassed a bar on discrimination based on “sexual orientation.” This kind of bill, in other places, had been turned into a club to be used against evangelical Christians who might refuse, on moral grounds, to rent space in their homes to gay or lesbian couples. And so a movement arose in Cincinnati, modeled on a similar movement in Colorado, to override the ordinance passed by the council: this would not be a referendum merely to repeal the law, but a move to amend the charter of the municipal government and remove, from the hands of the local legislature, the authority to pass bills of this kind. In effect, this was an attempt to override an ordinary statute by changing the constitution of the local government. The amendment did not seek to make homosexual acts the grounds for criminal prosecutions; it sought, rather, to bar any attempt to make gay and lesbian orientation the ground for special advantages, quotas, or preferential “minority status” in the law. The framers of the amendment objected to the tendency to treat gays and lesbians on the same plane as groups that have suffered discrimination based on race, religion, or gender. The proposal, known as Issue 3, drew wide support and passed in a referendum in 1993. It was, of course, challenged in the courts, which is why it found its way into the hands of Judge Spiegel.


2018 ◽  
Vol 54 ◽  
pp. 02006
Author(s):  
Riris Ardhanariswari ◽  
Muhammad Fauzan ◽  
Ahmad Komari

The Constitutional Court is one of the perpetrators of judicial power, in addition to the Supreme Court as referred to in Article 24 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution. The Constitutional Court is also bound to the general principle of an independent judicial power, free from the influence of other institutions in enforcing law and justice. The Constitutional Court is the first and last level judicial body, or it can be said that it is the only judicial body whose decisions are final and binding. The existence of the Constitutional Court is at the same time to maintain the implementation of a stable state government and is also a correction to the experience of constitutional life in the past caused by multiple interpretations of the constitution. Judicial review towards the constitution is one of the authorities of the Constitutional Court that attracted attention. This shows that there has also been a shift in the doctrine of the parliamentary supremacy towards the doctrine of the supremacy of the constitution. The law was previously inviolable, but now the existence of a law is questionable in its alignment with the Constitution. The authority to examine the Law towards the Constitution is the authority of the Constitutional Court as the guardian of the constitution. This authority is carried out to safeguard the provisions of the Act so that it does not conflict with the constitution and / or impair the constitutional rights of citizens. This shows that the judicial review towards the Constitution carried out by the Constitutional Court is basically also to provide protection for human rights.


1992 ◽  
Vol 17 (01) ◽  
pp. 89-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Feldman ◽  
Mark Gould

In a recent issue of this journal (Volume 15, Number 4, Fall 1990), Susan Sterett examined the role of the Law Commission in the development of English administrative law. She suggested that the Commission mimicked a “peak association” and adopted an “idiom of legalism” in order to justify its reform proposals. This comment disagrees with Sterett on three grounds. First, the role and constitutional position of the Commission is far more complex than Sterett suggests, and this affects the way in which the Commission works. Second, judges and academic lawyers were central to the reform of substantive principles of judicial review in the 1960s and 1970s, making it unnecessary for the Law Commission to act in this field. Finally, it is wrong to ignore the fact that much administrative law occurs outside the judicial review procedure.


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