Police

Author(s):  
Duncan Fairgrieve ◽  
Dan Squires QC

The police are subject to a range of different legal controls. They have a general duty to uphold the law, and breach of this duty can, in principle, be enforced by way of judicial review proceedings brought by members of the public. If, in the course of enforcing the law, the police detain, arrest, or assault an individual without lawful justification, they can be held liable for the torts of false imprisonment or trespass to the person, and they may also be held liable for the tort of misfeasance in public office if they act maliciously and unlawfully in the purported performance of their duties. as well as statutory torts specifically aimed at the police. The Human Rights Act 1998 provides further significant additions to the claims that can be brought against the police, and these are considered further in chapter 7. Claimants have also sought to establish that the police, like other public authorities, can be held liable for the tort of negligence, and it is such claims that are considered in this chapter.

2021 ◽  
pp. 652-679
Author(s):  
Lisa Webley ◽  
Harriet Samuels

Titles in the Complete series combine extracts from a wide range of primary materials with clear explanatory text to provide readers with a complete introductory resource. This chapter discusses the remedies granted by the court. If a claimant successfully establishes that the public authority has acted in contravention of one of the grounds of review, then the court may grant a remedy. The purpose of a remedy is to tell the public authority what it has to do to comply with the judgment and to ensure, as far as possible, that it obeys the courts’ decision. There are two main types of remedies available in judicial review cases: ordinary remedies (injunction, declaration, and damages) and prerogative remedies (quashing order, prohibiting order, and mandatory order). The chapter also discusses situations that may cause the court to refuse a remedy and the courts’ powers to grant a remedy under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998), including a declaration of incompatibility in accordance with section 4 HRA 1998.


2021 ◽  
pp. 428-464
Author(s):  
Timothy Endicott

This chapter examines standing—the entitlement to be heard by a court. No judicial process of any kind may proceed without it. In an ordinary claim, the claimant’s standing is based on his assertion of grounds for his claim to a remedy. In a claim for judicial review, the claimant does not need to assert a right to a remedy, but must have a ‘sufficient interest’ in the matter in dispute. The discussion covers campaign litigation, costs in campaign litigation, standing in an ordinary claim for a declaration, standing in Human Rights Act proceedings, standing for public authorities, and standing to intervene.


Author(s):  
Lisa Webley ◽  
Harriet Samuels

Titles in the Complete series combine extracts from a wide range of primary materials with clear explanatory text to provide readers with a complete introductory resource. This chapter discusses the bodies subject to judicial review and who can make claims for judicial review. An action for judicial review can be brought only against a body exercising a public function. If public authorities are carrying out a private function, they are not subject to judicial review unless there is a public law element. Private bodies are, generally, not subject to judicial review unless it can be shown that they are carrying out a public function, such as administering a statutory scheme. If the judicial review concerns human rights, then the claim must be brought against a public authority. The Human Rights Act 1998 creates two kinds of public authorities: core public authorities and functional public authorities. Core public authorities are public authorities, such as government departments and the police force. Functional public authorities have private and public functions, but only their public functions are subject to the Act. The rules of standing in judicial review cases determine whether individuals or groups are permitted to challenge a decision of a public body. An individual or organization may bring a claim for judicial review only with the permission of the courts, which means that standing restricts the people and organizations that may bring a judicial review claim.


1999 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Bamforth

THE Human Rights Act 1998 applies only to “public authorities”. This article begins by examining the Act's definition of a “public authority” and how this will interact with existing distinctions between public and private law in domestic judicial review and EU law. It is then argued that the Act may, through two different routes, have a limited horizontal impact between private bodies – although certain technical obstacles will need to be overcome. The article considers, finally, the operation between private bodies of the requirement that legislation be interpreted as far as possible in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights.


2021 ◽  
pp. 479-516
Author(s):  
Lisa Webley ◽  
Harriet Samuels

Titles in the Complete series combine extracts from a wide range of primary materials with clear explanatory text to provide readers with a complete introductory resource. This chapter discusses the bodies subject to judicial review and who can make claims for judicial review. An action for judicial review can be brought only against a body exercising a public function. If public authorities are carrying out a private function, they are not subject to judicial review, unless there is a public law element. Private bodies are, generally, not subject to judicial review unless it can be shown that they are carrying out a public function, such as administering a statutory scheme. If the judicial review concerns human rights, then the claim must be brought against a public authority. The Human Rights Act 1998 creates two kinds of public authorities: core public authorities and functional public authorities. Core public authorities are public authorities, such as government departments and the police force. Functional public authorities have private and public functions, but only their public functions are subject to the Act. The rules of standing in judicial review cases determine whether individuals or groups are permitted to challenge a decision of a public body. An individual or organization may bring a claim for judicial review only with the permission of the courts, which means that standing restricts the people and organizations that may bring a judicial review claim.


Author(s):  
Timothy Endicott

This chapter examines standing—the entitlement to be heard by a court. No judicial process of any kind may proceed without it. In an ordinary claim, the claimant’s standing is based on his assertion of grounds for his claim to a remedy. In a claim for judicial review, the claimant does not assert a right to a remedy, but must have a ‘sufficient interest’ in the matter. The discussion covers campaign litigation, costs in campaign litigation, standing in an ordinary claim for a declaration, standing in Human Rights Act proceedings, standing before the European Court of Justice, standing for public authorities, and standing to intervene.


Author(s):  
Lisa Webley ◽  
Harriet Samuels

Titles in the Complete series combine extracts from a wide range of primary materials with clear explanatory text to provide readers with a complete introductory resource. This chapter discusses the remedies granted by the court. If a claimant successfully establishes that the public authority has acted in contravention of one of the grounds of review, then the court may grant a remedy. The purpose of a remedy is to tell the public authority what it has to do to comply with the judgment and to ensure, as far as possible, that it obeys the courts’ decision. There are two main types of remedies available in judicial review cases: ordinary remedies (injunction, declaration, and damages) and prerogative remedies (quashing order, prohibiting order, and mandatory order). The chapter also discusses situations that may cause the court to refuse a remedy and the courts’ powers to grant a remedy under the Human Rights Act 1998.


Author(s):  
Duncan Fairgrieve ◽  
Dan Squires QC

This book focuses primarily upon claims brought against public authorities for the tort of negligence. Where a public authority causes harm to an individual, either deliberately or carelessly, there may also be other remedies available to the injured party. The present chapter considers some of the more important alternative remedies, though perhaps the most significant alternative now available are claims brought under the Human Rights Act 1998, which are considered separately in Chapter 7. In this chapter we examine the torts of misfeasance in public office and breach of statutory duty as well as judicial review proceedings and complaints to the Ombudsmen.


Author(s):  
Mark Lunney ◽  
Donal Nolan ◽  
Ken Oliphant

This chapter introduces the tort of negligence. It first discusses the formulation of a general duty of care, highlighting the case of Donoghue v Stevenson, which established the pre-eminent role of the ‘duty of care’ concept in the tort of negligence. The chapter then turns to the role of the duty of care concept in modern negligence law, before considering the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on the law of negligence.


2007 ◽  
Vol 66 (3) ◽  
pp. 559-573 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Palmer

The House of Lords decision in YL v. Birmingham City Council considers the issue of what is a public authority under the Human Rights Act 1998. The question is a critical one as the Convention rights, contained in the Human Rights Act, are directly enforceable only against public authorities. The issue of whether a body is a public authority has proved highly controversial. The hiving-off of many traditional governmental functions through policies such as privatisation, outsourcing and projects under the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) has led to a blurring of the traditionally understood public-private distinction. The changed nature in the way that public services are delivered has led to sharply divergent views among the judiciary about which functions are those of a public nature for the purposes of the Human Rights Act. This is evident in the YL judgment itself: a split decision, with two dissenting judgements. The division in the House reflects different understandings of the operation of the Human Rights Act, the public-private distinction and, perhaps more fundamentally, competing ideological stances.


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