7. The Rule of Law; the Separation of Powers

Author(s):  
Richard Clements ◽  
Philip Jones
2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-398
Author(s):  
David Parra Gómez

Democracy is an instrument at the service of a noble purpose: to ensure the freedom and equality of all citizens by guaranteeing the civil, political and social rights contained in constitutional texts. Among the great principles on which this instrument rests is the division of powers, which consists, substantially, in the fact that power is not concentrated, but that the various functions of the State are exercised by different bodies, which, moreover, control each other. Well, the increasingly aggressive interference of the Executive and, to a lesser extent, the Legislative in material spheres that should be reserved exclusively for the Judiciary, violates this principle and, for this reason, distorts the idea of democracy, an alarming trend that, for some time now, are observed in European Union countries such as Hungary, Poland and Spain. Preventing the alarming degradation of European democracy, of which these three countries are an example, requires not only more than necessary institutional reforms to ensure respect for these principles and prevent the arbitrariness of the public authorities, but also a media network and an education system that explains and promotes these values and principles, that is, one that makes citizens aware of and defend constitutionalism. Keywords: Rule of law; Democracy; Separation of powers; judicial independence; Europe.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Asher Gabriel Emanuel

<p>A proposed Bilateral Arbitration Treaty would subject international commercial disputes between enterprises in signatory states’ jurisdictions to arbitration unless the parties agreed to the contrary. This marks a substantial departure from conventional understandings of arbitration as based on the consent of the parties. More importantly, the policy would modify the jurisdiction of the courts, removing a large number of disputes to offshore tribunals subject to minimal judicial oversight. This paper explores the constitutional propriety of such a policy, with particular attention paid to the principles of the separation of powers, the rule of law, public provision of essential State functions, open justice, and democracy. These constitutional principles would be subverted if the policy were to operate within the existing regulatory framework for arbitration. The paper makes recommendations for possible modifications to the policy that would make it a better fit with the constitution.</p>


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter M. Shane

The George W. Bush administration's use of signing statements embodied a disturbingly thin and formalist view of the rule of law that goes hand-in-hand with its vision of the separation of powers. Its signing statement practice was notable both for the extremity of the constitutional vision that these statements typically asserted—especially with regard to the so-called "unitary executive”—and with regard to their sheer volume, unmatched in the entire history of the executive. To understand the latter phenomenon, the Bush signing statements need to be understood not just as an expression of a constitutional philosophy, but also as an effort to institutionalize through faux law a highly presidential ethos as a fundamental element of the spirit with which the government conducts business.


Author(s):  
Neil MacCormick

This lecture discusses judicial independence. It notes that the increase in concern over judicial independence was due to recent developments in Scotland, England and Wales. The constitutional changes also led to new relationships between ministers and judges, which in turn has led to governmental declarations to respect the rule of law and judicial independence. The lecture also stresses the importance of considering and re-asserting the principles that justify judicial independence, as well as the underlying concept of separation of powers.


Author(s):  
Helen Fenwick ◽  
Gavin Phillipson ◽  
Alexander Williams

Author(s):  
Stuart Sime

This chapter considers the modern scope and limitations on the use of the court’s inherent jurisdiction in common law jurisdictions. It considers the underlying juridical basis for the jurisdiction, and the underlying theories, namely that residuary powers were vested in the High Court in England and Wales by the Judicature Acts, and that all courts have inherent powers to prevent abuse of process. It considers the ramifications of the distinction between inherent jurisdiction and inherent powers. Changes in the legal landscape since the seminal articles by Master Jacob and Professor Dockray, including the codification of civil procedure in many common law jurisdictions, and modern understanding of the rule of law and the separation of powers, are considered. It is argued that while existing applications of the inherent jurisdiction should be retained, it is no longer acceptable for the English High Court, and equivalent courts in other jurisdictions, to generate new procedural law by resorting to the inherent jurisdiction.


Author(s):  
Glosemeyer Iris ◽  
Shamiri Najib Abdul-Rehman ◽  
Würth Anna

This chapter examines constitutional developments in Yemen. It covers Yemeni constitutional history before unification, the fate of the 1991 Constitution, and the Constitution of 2001. It argues that despite the relative political continuity (in the sense that there have not been successful military coups or significant elite changes in decades), constitutionalism in the country may be characterized as being two-fold. First, numerous constitutional articles are ambiguous and amenable to adverse interpretations because they leave too much of the constitutional rights to be defined by laws, thereby undermining the effectiveness of the said articles. The same applies to ordinary parliamentary laws, for they refer many important details to executive regulations, by-laws, ministerial resolutions, or Islamic jurisprudence. Second, while there has been a tradition of constitutionalist thinking at least since the 1940s, central elements of constitutionalism are missing. Checks and balances are weak, and the rule of law is far from being reality. Separation of powers is not even constitutionally fully guaranteed, much less applied in practice.


Author(s):  
Charles Manga Fombad

One reason why dictatorships flourished in Africa until the 1990s was that constitutions concentrated excessive powers in presidents. The democratic revival of the 1990s led to the introduction of new or substantially revised constitutions in a number of countries that for the first time sought to promote constitutionalism, good governance, and respect for the rule of law. A key innovation was the introduction of provisions providing for separation of powers. However, in many cases the reintroduction of multipartyism did not lead to thorough constitutional reform, setting the scene for a subsequent struggle between opposition parties, civil society, and the government, over the rule of law. This reflects the complex politics of constitutionalism in Africa over the last 60 years. In this context, it is important to note that most of the constitutions introduced at independence had provided for some degree of separation of powers, but the provisions relating to this were often vaguely worded and quickly undermined. Despite this, the doctrine of separation of powers has a long history, and the abundant literature on it shows that there is no general agreement on what it means or what its contemporary relevance is. Of the three main models of separation of powers, the American one, which comes closest to a “pure” system of separation of powers, and the British, which involves an extensive fusion of powers, have influenced developments in anglophone Africa. The French model, which combines elements of the British and American models but in which the executive predominates over the other two branches, has influenced developments in all civilian jurisdictions in Africa, particularly those in francophone Africa. The common denominator among the models is the desire to prevent tyrannical and arbitrary government by separating powers but doing so in a manner that allows for limited interference through checks and balances on the principle that le pouvoir arrête le pouvoir. The combined Anglo-American (common law) and French (civil law) models received during the colonial period remain applicable today, but despite its adoption in the 1990s, the effectiveness of the doctrine of separation of powers in limiting governmental abuse has been curtailed by the excessive powers African presidents still enjoy and the control they exercise over dominant parties in legislatures. South Africa in its 1996 Constitution, followed by Kenya in 2010 and Zimbabwe in 2013, entrenched a number of hybrid institutions of accountability that have the potential not only to complement the checks and balances provided by the traditional triad but also to act where it is unable or unwilling to do so. The advent of these institutions has given the doctrine of separation of powers renewed potency and relevance in advancing Africa’s faltering constitutionalism project.


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