The Administrative Presidency, Waivers, and the Affordable Care Act

Within the American system of shared power among institutions, the executive branch has played an increasingly prominent policy role relative to Congress. The vast administrative discretion wielded by the executive branch has elevated the power of the president. Republican and Democratic presidents alike have employed an arsenal of administrative tools to pursue their policy goals: high-level appointments, administrative rule making, executive orders, proclamations, memoranda, guidance documents, directives, dear colleague letters, signing statements, reorganizations, funding decisions, and more. Presidents Obama and Trump employed most of these tools in an effort to shape the implementation and outcomes of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) during its first decade. This article focuses on the Obama and Trump administrations' use of comprehensive waivers to shape ACA implementation. The Obama administration had mixed success using waivers to convince Republican states to expand Medicaid. Compared to Obama, the Trump administration has found it harder to accomplish its policy goals through waivers, but if the courts support the Trump administration's work requirement and 1332 waiver initiatives, it would enable the president to use waivers to achieve an ever broader set of goals, including program retrenchment.

Presidential action and the Supreme Court: The case of signing statements

Recent attention to presidential action recognizes the legal and constitutional questions surrounding the controversial use of many of these powers. Yet, scholarly research on executive policymaking tends to ignore the role of the courts, instead focusing on presidential–congressional relations. I develop a formal theory of the president’s decision to issue a signing statement in the face of constraints from the Supreme Court. The model produces several novel predictions. First, I predict that the president is more likely to issue a signing statement when he is ideologically aligned with the Court. Second, contrary to previous literature, the president is more likely to issue a statement when his preferences are also aligned with Congress. Finally, when reviewing legislation that is constitutionally challenged, I predict that the Court is more likely to rule in favor of the president’s position when he has issued a signing statement.

Signed Under Protest: A Database of Presidential Signing Statements, 2001-2009

This paper updates our 2007 compilation of Bush 43 Administration signing statements that object on constitutional grounds to one or more provisions of the laws President Bush was signing. It offers what is now a complete compilation for both the first and second Bush 43 Administrations.

Presidential Signing Statements and the Rule of Law as an “Unstructured Institution"

The George W. Bush administration's use of signing statements embodied a disturbingly thin and formalist view of the rule of law that goes hand-in-hand with its vision of the separation of powers. Its signing statement practice was notable both for the extremity of the constitutional vision that these statements typically asserted—especially with regard to the so-called "unitary executive”—and with regard to their sheer volume, unmatched in the entire history of the executive. To understand the latter phenomenon, the Bush signing statements need to be understood not just as an expression of a constitutional philosophy, but also as an effort to institutionalize through faux law a highly presidential ethos as a fundamental element of the spirit with which the government conducts business.

Executive Opportunism, Presidential Signing Statements, and the Separation of Powers

8 Journal of Legal Analysis 95-119 (2016)Executive discretion over policy outcomes is an inevitable feature of our political system. However, in recent years, the President has sought to expand his discretion through a variety of controversial and legally questionable tactics. Through a series of simple separation of powers models, we study one such tactic, employed by both Democratic and Republican presidents: the use of signing statements, which purport to have status in the interpretation of statutory meaning. Our models also show that signing statements upset the constitutional vision of lawmaking and, in a wide range of cases, exacerbate legislative gridlock. We argue that courts should not legally credit signing statements; we conclude by discussing executive opportunism broadly.

Signing Statements and Presidentializing Legislative History

Presidents often attach statements to the bills they sign into law, purporting to celebrate, construe, or object to provisions in the statute. Though long a feature of U.S. lawmaking, the President has avowedly attempted to use these signing statements as tool of strategic influence over judicial decisionmaking since the 1980s — as a way of creating “presidential legislative history” to supplement and, at times, supplant the traditional congressional legislative history conventionally used by the courts to interpret statutes. In this Article, we examine a novel dataset of judicial opinion citations to presidential signing statements to conduct the most comprehensive empirical examination of how courts have received presidential legislative history to date. Three main findings emerge from this analysis. First, contrary to the pervasive (and legitimate) fears in the literature on signing statements, courts rarely cite signing statements in their decisions. Second, in the aggregate, when courts cite signing statements, they cite them in predictably partisan ways, with judges citing Presidents’ signing statements from their own political parties more often than those of the opposing parties. This effect, however, is driven entirely by the behavior of Republican-appointed appellate jurists. Third, courts predominately employ signing statements to buttress aligned statutory text and conventional sources of legislative history, and seemingly never rely on them to override contrary plain statutory text or even unified traditional legislative history. This suggests that signing statements have low rank among interpretative tools and courts primarily use them to complement rather than substitute for congressional legislative history. In this sense, Presidents have largely failed to establish an alternative corpus of valid interpretive material.