Some Brief Remarks on the Controversial Relationship Between the Judiciary and Politics in Italy

The relationship between the judiciary and the political sphere and the dilemma over whether the judiciary has been a victim of politics, or whether politics has been a victim of the judiciary, have been hot topics for some time in Italy. Since a major scandal engulfed the High Council of the Judiciary, the courts have become the principal focus of the reform efforts of the Draghi Government, which took office in February 2021. The contribution briefly illustrates the figure of the Judicial Power within the Division of Powers and the evolution of the judge’s role within this system. Following a brief premise on the evolution of the role of judges during the last two centuries, the principle of the independence of the judiciary in the Italian Constitution will be outlined before final comments on the controversial relationship between the judiciary and politics.

Can the EU be a federal democracy? Assessing the horizontal and vertical dimension of the EU government from comparative perspective

The European Union remains an ambivalent polity. This uncertainty complicates the assessment of its democratic and federal quality. Drawing on comparative federalism research can contribute not only to making sense of whether, or rather which kind of federalism the EU has developed. It can also enable addressing such a compounded, but necessary inquiry into the federal and democratic character of the EU and how to ascertain which type of democratic government for which type of federal union may be appropriate. The article first elaborates a framework to assess the dimensions of federal and democratic government, drawing on comparative federalism research to delineate basic types of federal democracy. Here the democratic dimension of government is taken as referring primarily to the horizontal division of powers (among ‘branches’) of government, the federal dimension to the vertical division of powers (among ‘levels’) of governments. The framework is applied to the government of the EU in order to gauge its own type(s) of division of power arrangements and the interlinkage between them. Finally, the discussion reflects on whether or rather how the EU could comprise a federal democracy, especially in light of recent crisis challenges and subsequent institutional developments in EU governance.

Constitutional Design of Electoral Governance in Federal States

This article explores the constitutional politics of electoral governance in federations by focusing on the role of election commissions, drawing mainly on examples from Asia. All democracies face the challenge of insulating electoral governance from interference and capture. Compared to unitary states, federations confront the additional dilemma of how to disperse authority over electoral governance across multiple orders of government. Federal democracies must decide whether electoral governance should be a matter for the center or the states. I argue that the basic choice is between what I will call the ‘unitary model’ and the ‘division of powers model.’ The main institution of electoral governance is the electoral management body or ‘EMB.’ In the unitary model, a central EMB administers both national and state-level elections. In the ‘division of powers model’, both a central and state-level EMBs exist, with the state commissions administering elections in the component units of the federation. In federal democracies generally, but especially in Asia, the allure of the unitary model has been strong. The article draws on the example of the Constituent Assembly in India to illustrate what is at stake in how federal constitutions allocate authority over electoral governance.

Local Governments

The US Constitution never mentions “city,” “county,” or “township,” not even “local” or “municipal” governments. It concerns itself only with sovereign entities. Because local governments “cannot claim to be sovereigns” and because whatever power a local government has tends to flow from its state, that sounds like the end of the matter. But local governments still exercise sovereign powers, including law enforcement, eminent domain, education, taxing, zoning, and other indispensable “attributes of sovereignty.” Even if the US Constitution does not mention cities by name and even if cities cannot claim sovereign status, the federal charter still has ample consequences for municipal governments. This chapter takes vertical separation of powers one step further, to federalism within federalism. It explains the division of powers between state and local governments and chronicles disputes that have arisen between them. If, in modern America, like-minded people increasingly gravitate to similar states, the same is true within states, whether in cities, suburbs, or rural areas. Home rule and other local allocations of power sometimes allow people in these communities to express their distinct political preferences and live under them, too.

South Korea’s trade policy imperatives: the impact of COVID-19 pandemic

The article analyses the goals and imperatives of the Republic of Korea’s trade policy before the COVID-19 pandemic and taking into account its consequences. The RoK's trade policy aims to synchronize the interests of the state, conglomerates and small and medium-sized enterprises. For this purpose, a system of division of powers in the field of trade policy and diplomacy has been designed, which has proven to be very effective. The COVID-19 situation, which has exacerbated the growing trend of protectionism in international trade, highlighted the chronic structural problems of trade in the Republic of Korea of trade in the area of geographical and commodity structure – despite the positive dynamics of the country's exports. The challenge of countering protectionism, coupled with the need to diversify the commodity and geographic structure of exports, implies two areas of work: strengthening an industrial structure capable of producing competitive goods and expanding the network of free trade agreements. The need to address logistical problems, digitalization, and the trend towards decarbonization forces Korea to rely more heavily on the idea of promoting free trade. The country's leadership continues to criticize protectionism, guided by the idea of a balanced use of bilateral and multilateral instruments of liberalization.

THE JUDICIAL POWER LIMITATION OF COMMERCIAL COURTS COMPETENCY IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES

One of the important instruments in a state of law is the existence of an independent judiciary, whether it is based on the doctrine of separation of powers, the notion of a state based on law or democracy. An independent judicial power is not absolute in the sense that it is free to lead to arbitrariness so that there must be restrictions on that power and freedom. The approach method is used a normative juridical approach. The results of the study found that the limitations of judicial power were based on the constitutional basis, namely Article 1 paragraph 3 of the 1945 Constitution, Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution and Article 24 A of the 1945 Constitution. From the concept of separation or division of powers, compose an independent judicial power which is exercised by a Supreme Court and judicial bodies under it and a Constitutional Court. The commercial court as a sub-system within the judicial power is a special court under the general judiciary that has different competencies from other general courts. The implementation of the limitation of judicial power in the competence of the commercial court to realize an independent judicial power is normatively spread out in various laws.

Crisis of the Rule of Law in Europe: The Cases of Hungary, Poland and Spain

Democracy is an instrument at the service of a noble purpose: to ensure the freedom and equality of all citizens by guaranteeing the civil, political and social rights contained in constitutional texts. Among the great principles on which this instrument rests is the division of powers, which consists, substantially, in the fact that power is not concentrated, but that the various functions of the State are exercised by different bodies, which, moreover, control each other. Well, the increasingly aggressive interference of the Executive and, to a lesser extent, the Legislative in material spheres that should be reserved exclusively for the Judiciary, violates this principle and, for this reason, distorts the idea of democracy, an alarming trend that, for some time now, are observed in European Union countries such as Hungary, Poland and Spain. Preventing the alarming degradation of European democracy, of which these three countries are an example, requires not only more than necessary institutional reforms to ensure respect for these principles and prevent the arbitrariness of the public authorities, but also a media network and an education system that explains and promotes these values and principles, that is, one that makes citizens aware of and defend constitutionalism. Keywords: Rule of law; Democracy; Separation of powers; judicial independence; Europe.

9. Directors and secretary

This chapter considers the law relating to company officers. This is a combination of statute, common law, and regulations under a company’s articles of association. The discussions cover the division of powers within a company; appointment of directors, managing directors, alternate directors, and shadow directors; retirement of directors; removal of directors from office; powers of directors; directors’ duties; statutory controls on directors; the directors and protection of outsiders; and the company secretary.

The principle of rule of law and independence of the judiciary in Myanmar

Aim. This research aims to discuss the importance of the principle of rule of law in protecting the judiciary’s role, especially the independence of constitutional adjudication and its functions. Methods. The study applies the case study approach and comparative method to investigate the constitutional court systems of some countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and their independence. Results and conclusion. The resultsreveal a lack of the judiciary’s independence, even among the top branches that are trying to implement democracy in Myanmar. The judiciary is under the control of the executive and legislature branches as their members belong to political parties. Moreover, a constitutional court is established with the members who are elected and nominated by the legislature and executive. Sometimes there can be conflicts when constitutional law does not mention the division of powers among governmental organisations like Myanmar, which results from the impractical functions of the Constitutional Tribunal of Myanmar. Cognitive value. This research highlights possible ways to solve the constitutional issues among the three great branches. This initiative is in the interest of Myanmar citizens and citizens of all nations as these are international issues.

CONTROL FUNCTION OF PARLIAMENT AND PRINCIPLE OF DIVISION OF POWERS

The article analyzes using the normative and systematic methods, as well as analysis and synthesis, the content of the statements of the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic «On Regulations of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic», decisions of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Kyrgyz Republic and the works of legal scholars. The article is devoted to the study of the postulate that the principle of division of powers has a deep theoretical basis, which has been developed since existence of institution of state and is aimed at identifying clear boundaries of authority between individual branches of government in order to build their structure so that they serve society. The author came to the conclusion that parliamentary control is in direct connection with the principle of division of powers, in this system it serves and acts as element of mutual control of branches of government. The judiciary today also unequivocally determines inadmissibility of overarching function, the priority role of legislative branch over other parts of government. Parliamentary control is in direct connection with the principle of division of powers, in this system it serves and acts as an element of mutual control of branches of government. According to the author, presence of such control in practice constantly leads to idea of the priority role of legislative branch, which leads to weakening of principle of division of powers. However, it should be noted the implementation of control powers is not aimed at determining the priority of legislative branch in system of division of powers; parliamentary control only organizationally implements of existing powers of parliament.