4 The Nature of International Obligations Regarding Transit of Energy: from Bilateral to Indivisible Obligations

Author(s):  
Azaria Danae

Chapter 4 classifies treaty obligations concerning transit with a view to determining which state is injured under the law of international responsibility and can invoke responsibility including by recourse to countermeasures against the responsible transit state. The question posed is to whom is each obligation owed. The analysis in this chapter also assists in determining which treaty party may have recourse to means available in the treaty where the treaty does not contain sufficiently express rules on standing, a matter which is analysed in Chapter 6. The analysis illustrates the polyphony of primary rules vis-à-vis their nature, and argues that bilateralism is not the only model in this area of international law (either in form or in substance). Rather, a number of treaties create collectively owed obligations: some erga omnes partes and some interdependent..

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (2020) ◽  
pp. 186-202
Author(s):  
Ion GÂLEA ◽  

The study examines possible defences that States could invoke in order to justify or excuse measures designed to respond to the COVID-19 crisis, which prima facie might not be in conformity with certain international obligations. The study examines only defences available in general international law – beside certain exceptions that might be provided by the clauses of the respective treaties. Two grounds for suspending international obligations, stemming from the law of treaties – impossibility of performance and rebus sic stantibus – and three circumstances precluding wrongfulness, stemming from the law of international responsibility – force majeure, distress and state of necessity – are subject to examination. The study argues that, even if “common sense” might draw the public opinion towards the plausibility of invoking force majeure, impossibility of performance or fundamental change of circumstances, such a conclusion does not reflect general international law. In reality, the “best candidate” as a justification or excuse is distress, while the “second best candidate” might be represented by the state of necessity.


2021 ◽  
pp. 117-132
Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis

The law of international responsibility sets out the legal consequences arising from a breach by a State of its international obligations. It should be distinguished from ‘primary rules’ of international law, which lay down international obligations. International responsibility arises when a certain act or omission is wrongful, ie it is attributed to a State and it amounts to a violation of its ‘primary’ obligations. The international responsibility may be excused under certain strict circumstances, such as consent or necessity. Otherwise, the responsible State should cease the wrongful conduct and, in case of damage, it should provide reparation to the injured State, in the form of restitution, compensation, and satisfaction.


Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis

The law of international responsibility sets out the legal consequences arising from a breach by a State of its international obligations. It should be distinguished from ‘primary rules’ of international law, which lay down international obligations. International responsibility arises when a certain act or omission is wrongful, i.e. it is attributed to a State and it amounts to a violation of its ‘primary’ obligations. The international responsibility may be excused under certain strict circumstances, like consent or necessity. Otherwise, the responsible State should cease the wrongful conduct and in case of damage, it should provide reparation to the injured State, in the form of restitution, compensation, and satisfaction.


Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis

The law of international responsibility sets out the legal consequences arising from a breach by a State of its international obligations. It should be distinguished from ‘primary rules’ of international law, which lay down international obligations. International responsibility arises when a certain act or omission is wrongful, i.e. it is attributed to a State and it amounts to a violation of its ‘primary’ obligations. The international responsibility may be excused under certain strict circumstances, like consent or necessity. Otherwise, the responsible State should cease the wrongful conduct and in case of damage, it should provide reparation to the injured State, in the form of restitution, compensation, and satisfaction.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-285 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Bustamante

This paper replies to the criticisms raised by Eric Scarffe and Thomas Christiano against Dworkin’s philosophy of international law. While the former argues that Dworkin’s philosophy of international law boils down into some form of political realism, the latter upholds that Dworkin’s attempt to ground the legitimacy of international law on the states’ duty to improve their own legitimacy is insufficient to establish a solid foundation for international obligations. In my response to these critics, I hold that they are based on an uncharitable and implausible reading of Dworkin’s theory of international law, since Dworkin’s theses about the law, whether we are considering “municipal” or “international” law, only make sense if they are understood in an interpretive way. This is, I submit, the only way to avoid turning Dworkin’s assumption of the “unity of value” into an implausible metaphysical theory of natural law. Once we adopt Dworkin’s interpretive attitude, it becomes clear that the route taken by Dworkin in “A New Philosophy for International Law” was the only route that remained available for his interpretive account of political legitimacy and the foundations of law.


Author(s):  
Azaria Danae

Chapter 5 addresses unilateral treaty law responses available to treaty parties against breaches of transit obligations therein, and examines whether the exceptio non adimpleti contractus has a separate existence to the rule concerning responses to material breaches under the law of treaties. It illustrates that there may be special rules in treaties that displace treaty law responses under customary international law. The analysis distinguishes treaty law responses (and the exceptio non adimpleti contractus) from countermeasures. It demonstrates that even though unilateral responses under the law of treaties may be available to treaty parties other than the defaulting transit treaty party in response to a material breach of the treaty establishing transit of energy obligations (or non-performance may as a matter of treaty interpretation be allowed by virtue of the exceptio), these do not overlap and do not exclude countermeasures under the law of international responsibility.


2018 ◽  
pp. 399-409
Author(s):  
Alison Kesby

This chapter uses the object and concept of a chain to examine international refugee law which is shown to be a chain of shifting hue and state of repair. At certain points along its length its interwoven links of gold retain the echo of their humanitarian ideal, and at others its gaps and corrosion come into view, jar, and unsettle. Seen in one light, we see international refugee law as a prized area of international law: the means by which some of the world’s most vulnerable may obtain a recognized legal status and associated rights. In another, its weaknesses become all too apparent, whether the discrepancy between states’ international obligations and their implementation thereof (eg non-refoulement) or the constraints and limits of the Refugee Convention. Issues discussed include the stasis and dynamism of the law, gaps in protection, and ‘burden sharing’ among states.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenzo Gasbarri

This paper examines the legal nature of the ‘rules of international organizations’ as defined by the International Law Commission in its works on the law of treaties and on international responsibility. Part 1 introduces the debate with an example concerning the nature of un Security Council anti-terrorism resolutions. Part 2 challenges the four theories of the rules envisaged by scholarship. Part 3 is an attempt to examine the characteristics of the legal system produced by international organizations taking advantage of analytical jurisprudence, developing a theory of their legal nature defined as ‘dual legality’. Part 4 concludes by appraising the effects of the dual legality looking at the law of treaties, international responsibility and invalidity for ultra vires acts.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
André Nollkaemper ◽  
Jean d’Aspremont ◽  
Christiane Ahlborn ◽  
Berenice Boutin ◽  
Nataša Nedeski ◽  
...  

Abstract It is common in international practice that several states and/or international organizations contribute together to the indivisible injury of a third party. Examples thereof are aplenty in relation to climate change and other environmental disasters, joint military activities and cooperative actions aimed at stemming migration. Such situations are hardly captured by the existing rules of the law of international responsibility. In particular, the work of the International Law Commission, which is widely considered to provide authoritative guidance for legal questions of international responsibility, has little to offer. As a result, it is often very difficult, according to the existing rules of the law of international responsibility, to share responsibility and apportion reparation between the states and/or international organizations that contribute together to the indivisible injury of a third party. The Guiding Principles on Shared Responsibility in International Law seek to provide guidance to judges, practitioners and researchers when confronted with legal questions of shared responsibility of states and international organizations for their contribution to an indivisible injury of third parties. The Guiding Principles identify the conditions of shared responsibility (including questions of multiple attribution of conduct), the consequences of shared responsibility (notably, the possibility of joint and several liability) and the modes of implementation of shared responsibility. The Guiding Principles are of an interpretive nature. They build on the existing rules of the law of international responsibility and sometimes offer novel interpretations thereof. They also expand on those existing rules, backed by authoritative practice and scholarship, to address complex questions of shared responsibility.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document