New Personalistic Philosophy Based on Hans Eduard Hengstenberg’s Interpretation of Max Scheler's System

The article discusses the possibility of a new personalistic anthropology rooted in philosophia perennis and modern phenomenology, based on the thoughts of German anthropologist Hans Eduard Hengstenberg. Unlike Wojtyła and Stein, who did not create a new synthesis based on Husserl’s or Scheler’s phenomenology and the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas, Hengstenberg was able to create an original concept of the human person involving metaphysical and phenomenological inspirations. It is personalism, based on the phenomenological theory of a spiritual act (Scheler) and the metaphysical theory of constitution (Plato, St. Augustine). According to Hengstenberg, the possibility of a new personalistic philosophy starts with a phenomenological analysis of three basic attitudes of human behavior: consensual to the object of cognition and emotion, contrary to the object of cognition and emotion, and utilitarian. The metaphysical heart of Hengstenberg’s personalism forms the theory of the metaphysical constitution of the spirit, body and personalistic principle.

Euclid’s Kinds and (Their) Attributes

Relying upon a very close reading of all of the definitions given in Euclid’s Elements, I argue that this mathematical treatise contains a philosophical treatment of mathematical objects. Specifically, I show that Euclid draws elaborate metaphysical distinctions between (i) substances and non-substantial attributes of substances, (ii) different kinds of substance, and (iii) different kinds of non-substance. While the general metaphysical theory adopted in the Elements resembles that of Aristotle in many respects, Euclid does not employ Aristotle’s terminology, or indeed, any philosophical terminology at all. Instead, Euclid systematically uses different types of definition to distinguish between metaphysically different kinds of mathematical object.

Metaphysics and the Standard Interpretation

Frege is celebrated as an arch-Platonist and an arch-realist. He is renowned for claiming that truths of arithmetic are eternally true and independent of us, our judgments, and our thought; that there is a “third realm” containing nonphysical objects that are not ideas. In this chapter it is argued that, to sustain the view that Frege means these renowned claims as statements of metaphysical doctrines, it is necessary to reject most of his claims about the unsaturatedness of functions. It is widely believed that these claims should be rejected, since they give rise to apparently insuperable problems. In this chapter, however, it is argued that the problems result, not from Frege’s claims about unsaturatedness but, rather, the view that they are meant to form part of a metaphysical theory. Properly understood, Frege has no problem with the concept horse.

Ontological Categorizations and Selection Biases in Cosmology: The Case of Extra Galactic Objects

One of the innovative approaches in contemporary philosophical ontology consists in the assumption of a plurality of ontologies based on different metaphysical presuppositions. Such presuppositions involve, among others, the identification of relevant properties for the objects of our domain as a guiding principle in uncovering what it is to be considered intrinsic and what could be the mere effect of selection preferences based on objective or subjective criteria. A remarkable example of the application of a background metaphysical theory in astrophysics is the problem of selection biases in detecting cosmological objects, such as supernovae, galaxies and gamma-ray bursts. We will show that it is valuable to be aware of the importance of uncovering this type of background theory to better understand selection effects and to promote a novel approach in scientific research.

The Dynamic Theory of Time and Time Travel to the Past

I argue that time travel to the past is impossible, given a certain metaphysical theory, namely, The Dynamic Theory of Time. I first spell out my particular way of capturing the difference between The Dynamic Theory of Time and its rival, The Static Theory of Time. Next I offer four different arguments for the conclusion that The Dynamic Theory is inconsistent with the possibility of time travel to the past. Then I argue that, even if I am wrong about this, it will still be true that The Dynamic Theory entails that you should not want to travel back to the past. Finally, I conclude by considering a puzzle that arises for those who believe that time travel to the past is metaphysically impossible: What exactly are we thinking about when we seem to be thinking about traveling back in time? For it certainly does not feel like we are thinking about something that is metaphysically impossible.

Prinsip Hidup Kawruh Begja dalam Perspektif Anton Bakker

<p><em>This article outline aims to understand the principle of life in this kind of Javanese society based on Anton Bakker’s metaphysical theory. Describes the position of the Javanese as being there among other creators in a structure of reality. Javanese people in this context are assumed to have metaphysics, namely placing themselves as subjects as well as objects of metaphysics, and occupying a position as a being for themselves as well as being for others. The principle of kawruh thus is more dominant showing mental aspects in the form of the soul but, it is emphasized again that the soul and the body remain a unity of reality inseparable with their respective roles. The Javanese do not merely look at reality through their own perspective, but also look at the physical reality of the world outside themselves, then see the range of connectedness between themselves and the reality outside themselves.</em><em></em></p>

The growth of knowledge through the resource-based view

Purpose The resource-based view (RBV) has not previously been conceptualized as a theoretical framework encompassing metaphysical and empirical perspectives. The purpose of this paper is to logically analyze the evolutionary process of the RBV, triggered by “rigidity.” It attempts to clarify the significance and limitations of the RBV. Design/methodology/approach Based on Popper’s methodological model of the growth of knowledge, the study analyzed and evaluated the evolution of the RBV. Findings The RBV has evolved in three phases. The sub-problems have changed through empirical testing on the basis of one metaphysical problem and one metaphysical theory. Thus, the evolution may indicate progress within one framework. However, during phase 3, the ambiguity of concept may inhibit the growth of knowledge. For further progress, it is necessary to overcome the vulnerability of the RBV’s metaphysical statements. Research limitations/implications This paper shows the possibility of the growth of knowledge within the RBV framework and for a new framework to emerge due to its limitations. It should contribute both theoretically and practically to the field of strategic management. Originality/value Popper’s model was used to examine a previously neglected topic, namely, the growth of knowledge in the evolution of the RBV. Moreover, considering “rigidity” as corresponding to a process of error elimination is a novel approach, clearly revealing the dynamism of the RBV’s evolution.

Reality, fundamentality, grounding (and cognate notions)

The notion of grounding is one of the central notions in the debates concerning ontological dependence in contemporary metaphysics and metametaphysics. In this paper we have carried out a comparative analysis of grounding, supervenience, reality, fundamentality, and cognate notions, and we have demonstrated what their role should be in the context of neo-Aristotelian hierarchical ontologies and the project of metaphysical foundationalism. We have also sketched out some basic outlines of what Kit Fine calls ?the pure logic of ground? by establishing certain formal desiderata which grounding ought to meet in order to successfully carry out its specific ontologico- explanatory role. It is finally shown that grounding suffers from similar problems and shortcomings as supervenience, and that a satisfactory solution of those problems cannot be found by looking to metaphysical primitivism according to which grounding is a sui generis, primitive and unanalysable notion which is nonetheless essential for metaphysics. Even though grounding might turn out to be an ?essentially contested concept?, in the end we suggest how the aforementioned problems might be met by means of holistic considerations of grounding within the broader context of the entire (meta)metaphysical theory.

Predication, Intentionality and Relative Essentialism

Relative essentialism is the novel metaphysical theory that there can be multiple objects occupying the same space at the same time each with its own de re modal truths. Relative essentialism is motivated by Davidson’s semantics and his denial that nature itself is divided into a privileged domain of objects. Relative essentialism was first presented by Samuel C. Wheeler. I argue that Wheeler’s approach to the Davidsonian program needs to be elaborated in terms of various types of preconceptual intentional relations. This elaboration is already largely implicit in Davidson’s own later work and in Wheeler’s relaunching of Davidsonian metaphysics. More specifically, I argue that relative essentialism is ultimately founded not on predication narrowly construed but on intentionality broadly construed. Following Wheeler’s suggestion, comparisons are made between relative essentialism and work within the phenomenological tradition.