International Solidarity and the Global Compact on Refugees: What Role for the African Union and the European Union?

On the 70th anniversary of the UN Refugee Convention, this article examines the concept of solidarity and explains its relevance today, through the lens of the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR). While stressing the potential as well as the challenges for thorough implementation of the solidarity mechanisms established by the GCR, the article argues that regional organizations may contribute to meeting the GCR objectives. This is particularly urgent for regions that are most affected by migratory flows. In proposing new ways of approaching the concept of solidarity, the article suggests that the African Union strengthen mechanisms other than the physical sharing of refugees, including pooling resources to support states experiencing large influxes of refugees. In addition to a system of financial support for refugee protection, the article also recommends that the European Union ensures safe channels for arrivals and a more robust resettlement programme, to help realize the GCR objectives.

What Is Political about Asylum?

This chapter defends a new account of who counts as a refugee. It argues that a refugee is not only someone who cannot lead a minimally decent life in her state of citizenship but also someone who lacks the prospect of leading a minimally decent life because her state of citizenship denies her the means for protecting and promoting her interests and makes the kind of political engagement required for bringing about change unduly costly. This new definition is in line with the spirit of the original Refugee Convention. On the one hand, it explains why citizens in liberal democratic states do not count as refugees despite being currently unable to promote and protect all the interests required for a minimally decent life. On the other hand, it explains why citizens of failed persecutory states should count as refugees even before their government has directly targeted them.

The Living Conditions of Syrian Asylum Seekers in Jordan's Governorates Outside Camps and the Motives to Immigrate to Europe

Since the Syrian crisis began ten years ago, 5.6 million Syrians have been forced to flee to neighboring countries. Jordan is not a member of the 1951 Geneva Refugee convention, so Syrians are treated as asylum seekers rather than refugees. This study explores Syrian asylum seekers’ experiences and challenges in Jordan, including the sectors of housing, education, healthcare services, and employment to understand why they are motivated to seek asylum in Europe. Through semi-structured interviews with 30 Syrian asylum seekers living in four Jordanian governorates outside camps, the goal is to elucidate the drivers that motivate them to seek asylum in Europe. The findings emphasize the importance of education and work permits both of which are considered major push factors or drivers for immigration. The narratives provide a contextual understanding of the immigration crisis from the voices of the refugees themselves, which in turn will contribute to the knowledge base of immigration literature and enhance the support for the Syrian asylum seekers in the host community of Jordan.

Excluding Undeserving Claimants: New Zealand's Interpretation of Art 1F(c) Refugee Convention

<p>This paper reviews New Zealand judicial interpretation of the “acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations” as stated in art 1F(c) Refugee Convention, in the light of subsequent foreign jurisprudence. Article 1F excludes claimants from gaining refugee status under the Convention if there are “serious reasons for considering” they have committed a proscribed act. The ambiguous ambit of art 1F(c) had attracted little jurisprudence before the New Zealand authority’s 1995 decision in Refugee Appeal 2338/94. However, art 1F(c) jurisprudence has significantly increased in the face of new global issues such as terrorism, and an expanding United Nations mandate. This paper aims to aid future New Zealand courts in art 1F(c) cases, by assessing Refugee Appeal 2338/94 in light of the Canadian Supreme Court decision in Pushpanathan v Canada and the United Kingdom Supreme Court decision in Al Sirri and DD v Secretary of State for the Home Department.</p>

Excluding Undeserving Claimants: New Zealand's Interpretation of Art 1F(c) Refugee Convention

<p>This paper reviews New Zealand judicial interpretation of the “acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations” as stated in art 1F(c) Refugee Convention, in the light of subsequent foreign jurisprudence. Article 1F excludes claimants from gaining refugee status under the Convention if there are “serious reasons for considering” they have committed a proscribed act. The ambiguous ambit of art 1F(c) had attracted little jurisprudence before the New Zealand authority’s 1995 decision in Refugee Appeal 2338/94. However, art 1F(c) jurisprudence has significantly increased in the face of new global issues such as terrorism, and an expanding United Nations mandate. This paper aims to aid future New Zealand courts in art 1F(c) cases, by assessing Refugee Appeal 2338/94 in light of the Canadian Supreme Court decision in Pushpanathan v Canada and the United Kingdom Supreme Court decision in Al Sirri and DD v Secretary of State for the Home Department.</p>

Non-refoulement and national security: A comparative study of UK, Canada and New Zealand

<p>“International law generally rejects deportation to torture, even where national security interests are at stake.” ¹ There had been a fierce debate when Hassan Ahmed Shaqlane, a Somalian refugee who was sentenced to an 8-year prison term for rape and kidnapping, won his appeal against deportation, upheld by the Deportation Review Tribunal.² Controversy arose again when Al Baiiaty, an Iraqi resettlement refugee was convicted of sexual violation by rape for the fourth time. With the Court of Appeal’s noting that Mr Al Baiiaty poses a serious risk to the community³, the then Minister of Immigration called for a report on the deportation issues raised by the case.⁴ Deportation to torture may deprive a refugee of the right to liberty, security and perhaps life⁵, which is against many states’ domestic laws and international instruments such as the International Conant on Civil and Political Rights⁶ and the Convention against Torture⁷. It has been said that even if Article 33 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees does not categorically reject deportation to torture on its face, it should not be used to deny rights that other legal interments make available to everyone.⁸ It is highly questionable, however, under this broad obligation, if a refugee poses a significant threat to the protecting country’s national security, what action can a state take to protect its own national security and its own people. Are provision in the Refugee Convention, the ICCPR and the CAT absolute, binding and non derogable? If so, can a state derogate from its international obligation to refoule a refugee to potential torture to protect its national security? On what grounds then, can a state derogate from it? This paper will consider these questions. By doing so, this paper will first outline the international obligations, provided by the Refugee Convention, the ICCPR and the CAT, what is an international norm and states’ derogation rights in these provisions. The paper then looks at the courts in Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand’s approach in Suresh, EN⁹ and Zaoui¹⁰ when deporting a person who poses threat to national security can lead to torture and arbitrarily deprivation of life and the deportation potentially violates an international obligation or a state’s constitution. The paper will explain their approaches in relation to the different positions of their international obligations. The paper submits its concerns for some specific provisions in the Refugee Convention and the issues in exercising the absolute rights provided by the ICCPR and the CAT, as well as the ECHR. The paper finally submits its preferable approach after observing states’ practice and comparative study of the three approaches.</p>

Non-refoulement and national security: A comparative study of UK, Canada and New Zealand

<p>“International law generally rejects deportation to torture, even where national security interests are at stake.” ¹ There had been a fierce debate when Hassan Ahmed Shaqlane, a Somalian refugee who was sentenced to an 8-year prison term for rape and kidnapping, won his appeal against deportation, upheld by the Deportation Review Tribunal.² Controversy arose again when Al Baiiaty, an Iraqi resettlement refugee was convicted of sexual violation by rape for the fourth time. With the Court of Appeal’s noting that Mr Al Baiiaty poses a serious risk to the community³, the then Minister of Immigration called for a report on the deportation issues raised by the case.⁴ Deportation to torture may deprive a refugee of the right to liberty, security and perhaps life⁵, which is against many states’ domestic laws and international instruments such as the International Conant on Civil and Political Rights⁶ and the Convention against Torture⁷. It has been said that even if Article 33 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees does not categorically reject deportation to torture on its face, it should not be used to deny rights that other legal interments make available to everyone.⁸ It is highly questionable, however, under this broad obligation, if a refugee poses a significant threat to the protecting country’s national security, what action can a state take to protect its own national security and its own people. Are provision in the Refugee Convention, the ICCPR and the CAT absolute, binding and non derogable? If so, can a state derogate from its international obligation to refoule a refugee to potential torture to protect its national security? On what grounds then, can a state derogate from it? This paper will consider these questions. By doing so, this paper will first outline the international obligations, provided by the Refugee Convention, the ICCPR and the CAT, what is an international norm and states’ derogation rights in these provisions. The paper then looks at the courts in Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand’s approach in Suresh, EN⁹ and Zaoui¹⁰ when deporting a person who poses threat to national security can lead to torture and arbitrarily deprivation of life and the deportation potentially violates an international obligation or a state’s constitution. The paper will explain their approaches in relation to the different positions of their international obligations. The paper submits its concerns for some specific provisions in the Refugee Convention and the issues in exercising the absolute rights provided by the ICCPR and the CAT, as well as the ECHR. The paper finally submits its preferable approach after observing states’ practice and comparative study of the three approaches.</p>

THE RESPONSIBILITY IN PROTECTING THE ROHINGYA REFUGEES IN ACEH PROVINCE, INDONESIA: AN INTERNATIONAL REFUGEES LAW PERSPECTIVE

The coast of western Indonesia (Aceh province) has been the entrance for Rohingya refugees since 2012. At the beginning of 2020, the Rohingya refugees continued to arrive, although some of them have been resettled and transferred to the third countries. The Indonesian government rejected a large number of Rohingya refugees because there were no lex specialis in the Indonesian immigration arrangement related to asylum seekers and refugees. Historically, Indonesia was a country with commitment and experiences in dealing with refugees, however to date, Indonesia refused to become a party to the 1951 International Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol on Refugees. Hence, there is no legal standards of the refugee management in Indonesia, and thus it complicates the management of the incoming Rohingyas. Responding to such issue, the government has issued the Presidential Regulation Number 125 of 2016 concerning the foreign refugee management to provide a temporary legal standard for all forms of refugee protection in Indonesia. However, such regulation has yet to comprehensively settled the management of the Rohingya people in Indonesia, particularly in Aceh province. This paper strongly advocates the Indonesian government to ratify the 1951 International Refugee Convention as to protect and settle the refugee under the non-refoulment principle which is fundamentally referred to humanitarian values.

Refugees or Illegal Immigrants: The Problem of the Group in Refugee Protection

ABSTRACT This research excavates the case of Jewish refugees in Cyprus between 1946 and 1948. I argue that this case is formative of the development not just of the refugee, but—perhaps more interestingly—of the concept of “illegal immigration,” which relies on the constructed impossibility of group-based refugee protection. I contend that there is a paradox residing at the heart of the 1951 Refugee Convention definition of a refugee that produces the refugee as a singular victim while supporting the very conditions that create that victimhood—that is, persecution targeted at an identity group where the persecution is motivated by the shared identity (defined in the Refugee Convention by race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion). As the architecture of international human rights was built, the refugee definition was drafted in a way that embedded group-based exclusion in the design of the definition. I exemplify this through the case of Jewish refugees attempting to reach British Mandate Palestine in the 1940s, who were intercepted and detained in Cyprus. The case is worthy of attention because it exposes the absence of group protection in the refugee definition and the effect of that absence: a group is constituted as a threat and cannot be defined collectively as refugees. Instead, they become “illegal immigrants.” This case study of Jewish detention in Cyprus provides a key empirical example of oppression residing inside a historically liberal movement and in the resulting conditions of refugee protection.

Connecting the Obligation Gap: Indonesia’s Non-Refoulement Responsibility Beyond the 1951 Refugee Convention

This article explains the extent to which Indonesia has international obligations to comply with the non-refoulement principle in the absence of ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention. While Presidential Regulation No. 125 of 2016 concerning the Treatment of Refugees provides the general impression that Indonesia respects the non-refoulement principle, there is no specific text within Indonesian law and policy that regulates the matter. This article argues that Indonesia is legally bound by non-refoulement obligations under international human rights treaties to which it is a party, as well as under customary international law. It examines the extent of Indonesia’s non-refoulement obligations under the Convention Against Torture, the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and customary international law. It concludes that the Presidential Regulation was a missed opportunity for Indonesia to reinforce its non-refoulement obligations, as illustrated by the recent treatment of Rohingya asylum seekers near Aceh.