Sources of International Environmental Law

Author(s):  
Catherine Redgwell

This chapter considers the applicability to environmental problems of the traditional sources of international law, using as the starting point the formal sources enumerated in Article 38 of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute. It notes that leading treatises on international environmental law (IEL) and the account of the formal sources of IEL will likely start along the traditional positivist lines of Article 38. This chapter adheres to this practice to an extent—by discussing treaties, customary international law, and general principles. However, the discussion also moves on to, amongst other things, innovative methods of law creation, the dynamic evolution of environmental treaty texts, and the specific role played by soft law in the development and application of international environmental norms. The chapter concludes that, nonetheless, as a branch of general international law, the sources of international environmental law are the same.

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 ◽  
pp. 33-37
Author(s):  
Rüdiger Wolfrum

The Order of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of January 23, 2020 on the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar) might form a preliminary starting point for this brief address. The Order confirms that public international law defines through international treaties, customary international law, and general principles legally binding commitments and rights of states. As a matter of consequence, based upon those norms, judgments, orders, and awards of international courts and tribunals are legally binding on the parties to the dispute in question to the extent the adjudicating body has jurisdiction.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 641-668 ◽  
Author(s):  
MASSIMO LANDO

AbstractIn 2009, the International Court of Justice introduced plausibility as a requirement for indicating provisional measures under Article 41 of its Statute. Upon its introduction, plausibility was conceived as a test to establish that the rights asserted by applicant states might exist under international law. However, the Court subsequently developed the plausibility test into a higher standard, which requires the Court also to assess that the alleged conduct of the respondent state might breach that applicant state's asserted rights. This development has important implications for provisional measures proceedings before the Court. First, one could distinguish two aspects of plausibility, legal and factual. Second, plausibility has different functions in requests for provisional measures depending on whether the applicant state asserts rights arising under a treaty or under customary international law. Third, the Court's enquiry into plausibility could overlap with the enquiry into prima facie jurisdiction ratione materiae, although these two requirements conceivably entail different thresholds. Fourth, plausibility in provisional measures indicated in interpretation proceedings could be seen to be different from plausibility in provisional measures indicated in ordinary contentious proceedings.


2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (3) ◽  
pp. 632-638
Author(s):  
Filippo Fontanelli

In August 2012, the First Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation (Supreme Court or Court), the highest Italian domestic court, issued a judgment upholding Germany’s sovereign immunity from civil claims brought by Italian war crime victims against Paul Albers and eight others in the Italian courts (Albers). In so doing, the Court overruled its own earlier decisions and also reversed the judgment of April 20, 2011, by the Italian Military Court of Appeal (Military Court), which had upheld such claims relating to war crimes committed by German forces in Italy during World War II. With this ruling, the Court of Cassation put an end to its decade long effort to find an exception to the well-known rule of customary international law providing for sovereign immunity from foreign civil jurisdiction for actsjure imperii. Thisrevirementresulted from the Court’s decision to give effect to the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) inGermany v. Italy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-76
Author(s):  
Marco Longobardo

Abstract This article explores the role of counsel before the International Court of Justice, taking into account their tasks under the Statute of the Court and the legal value of their pleadings in international law. Pleadings of counsel constitute State practice for the formation of customary international law and treaty interpretation, and they are attributable to the litigating State under the law on State responsibility. Accordingly, in principle, counsel present the views of the litigating State, which in practice approves in advance the pleadings. This consideration is relevant in discussing the role of counsel assisting States in politically sensitive cases, where there is no necessary correspondence between the views of the States and those of their counsel. Especially when less powerful States are parties to the relevant disputes, the availability of competent counsel in politically sensitive cases should not be discouraged since it advances the legitimacy of the international judicial function.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Franziska Liebelt

<p>Third state intervention before international institutions originated in international arbitration around 1875 and has been included in the statute of the International Court since the foundation of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and is therefore no new phenomenon. Today, most systems of international dispute settlement provide for the possibility of third state intervention. Nevertheless intervention before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has been used by states sparsely and seems underdeveloped. The statute of the ICJ provides for two ways of intervention in its arts 62 and 63. There have been few applications under these provisions. Looking at the court’s orders in these few cases, the court seems to have adopted a restrictive approach towards allowing applications to intervene. This paper looks at the institution of intervention in the area of international environmental law disputes. There have been two relevant disputes of this kind before the ICJ: the Nuclear Tests litigation and the recent litigation of Whaling in the Antarctic. Both of these cases dealt with the question of state obligations towards the protection of the environment. The applications to intervene in Nuclear Tests failed for reasons that will be explained in more detail below. New Zealand’s application to intervene in Whaling in the Antarctic was authorized by the ICJ on the 6 February 2013 under art 63 of the Statute of the ICJ. The case is exceptional in that it is only the second time the ICJ allowed intervention under art 63. Both cases demonstrate that there are environmental issues that concern more than only the nations that are parties to the dispute. They indicate that intervention plays a particularly strong role in environmental issues because these issues by their nature often affect more than just two states. This paper analyses how the shared environmental concern of the international community might lead to an extension of intervention before the ICJ. It further more looks at the issues that arose before the court in connection with the intervention in Whaling in the Antarctic and how these issues were dealt with.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 704-739
Author(s):  
Xuexia Liao

Abstract This article revisits the package deal nature of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) and its implications for determining customary international law. A survey of the case law illustrates that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has not given particular weight to the fact that the LOSC was negotiated and accepted as a package deal. Nevertheless, the ICJ’s declaration that Article 121, paragraph 3 of the LOSC is a customary rule tends to be based on a ‘package deal approach’, which focuses on the textual and logical links between the paragraphs that manifest an ‘indivisible régime’. By exploring the difficulties of determining the customary status of Article 76(2)–(7) concerning the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, which may arise in the pending Nicaragua v. Colombia II case, this article calls for a cautious attitude towards determination of customary rules from the LOSC.


1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 764-765
Author(s):  
Bernard H. Oxman ◽  
Stefan A. Riesenfeld

In Re Aquarone. 101 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 838 (1997).Conseil d'Etat (Assemblée), June 6, 1997.In this case, the French Council of State, sitting in its most authoritative formation, had to pass on a petition by Stanislav Aquarone for review of a judgment of the administrative court of appeal of Lyon, dismissing his request for annulment of die imposition by France of income taxes on his retirement pension for the years 1981-1986, paid by the United Nations. In a carefully crafted opinion, the highest administrative court of France rejected die petition and die claim of immunity from taxation of his retirement pay by Aquarone, a former Registrar of the International Court of Justice and an Australian national now living in Gordes, France.


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marija Đorđeska

Abstract Article 38, para.1, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) defines customary international law as evidence of general practice accepted as law, understood as State practice and opinio juris. However, by identifying certain norms as an international custom without referring to the traditional evidence of State practice and opinio juris, international courts and tribunals are contributing to the formation of customary international law. This paper presents an analysis of how the International Court of Justice contributes to the formation of customary international law by relying on the draft articles of the International Law Commission (ILC). Th e International Court of Justice, in “deciding in accordance with international law”, also authoritatively declares what the current international law is, while the International Law Commission, although constituted of highly qualified publicists from various States, is drafting only non-binding international instruments. By relying on the ILC draft articles and declaring them to be reflecting customary international law-although the draft articles may not be necessary the expression of the States’ practice and their opinio juris, the ICJ creates and generates the creation of customary international law. Interestingly, the ICJ tends to rely mostly on ILC draft articles that refer to the jurisprudence of either the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) or the ICJ itself. Th e paper presents research of approximately 70 ICJ decisions and individual opinions that cite to the work of the ILC. The author notes the evolution of the relationship between the ICJ and the ILC through three different time periods, and presents the findings on how, when and why the ICJ relies on the ILC draft articles. In addition, the author gives examples in which the ICJ rejected the reliance on the ILC’s work, mainly due to the divergent interpretation on the specific area of international law. The ICJ, by relying on the ILC draft articles that in turn refer to the jurisprudence of the ICJ or PCIJ, is not only generating norms of customary international law, but is also reaffirming the importance of its (and PCIJ’s) jurisprudence for the future of international law. Although ICJ decisions are binding only between the parties to the dispute (Art.59 ICJ Statute), the clarification of whether a norm is customary or not, affects the international community of States. Noting the present reluctance of States to adopt treaties, and- hence their potentially decreasing role in international law-making, this research offers an insight into an alternative venue of international law-making. As the international community, and the ILC itself, is regaining interest in the sources of international law, this paper aims to identify the mechanisms of international law-making, the understanding of which will contribute to international law’s needed predictability and a more uniform and reliable interpretation of international law.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rossana Deplano, PhD

On 30 May 2016, the International Law Commission (‘ilc’) adopted a set of 16 Draft Conclusions providing a methodology on how to identify customary international law. Although largely based on the two elements approach set forth in article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the ilc study pushes the boundaries of the formal sources of international law beyond the realm of state practice by recognising that the practice of international organizations (‘ios’) as such may be constitutive of custom. This article critically examines the ilc Draft Conclusions concerning the role of ios in the process of custom creation. It examines the concept of resolution adopted by the ilc and assesses the coherence of the interpretive methodology devised by the ilc using the un General Assembly resolutions as a case study. The findings show that the Draft Conclusions fall short of expectation in providing authoritative guidance to scholars and practitioners alike.


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