Part III UK Derivatives, Money, and Debt Markets, 9 London Stock Exchange: Regulation of the Main Market and Alternative Investment Market (AIM)

Author(s):  
Schneider Sean M

This chapter focuses on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), which took its origins from the early days of trading in London's coffee houses. It talks about John Castaing, who began issuing a list of stock and commodity prices called “The Course of the Exchange and other things” in 1698 at Jonathan's Coffee House. It also mentions that trading occurred on an informal and unregulated basis until the aftermath of the South Sea Bubble, in which afterwards a new “Stock Exchange” was established in 1773. This chapter talks about the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) that includes the bulk of the UK's current regulatory framework, the statutory basis for the regulation of the LSE. It points out the exemption of investment exchanges, such as the LSE, from the “General Prohibition” on the undertaking of financial services activities when they are subject to a recognition order by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).

Company Law ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 498-521
Author(s):  
Lee Roach

This chapter studies the sources of securities regulation, the rules relating to offering shares to the public, the various UK stock exchanges, and the process by which securities are listed. There are several types of public offer, including offers for subscription, offers for sale, placings, and rights issues. The London Stock Exchange is the principal UK stock exchange, and its two principal markets are the Main Market and the Alternative Investment Market. The principal domestic rules relating to public offers of shares are found in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, the Listing Rules, the Prospectus Rules, and the Disclosure and Transparency Rules. Companies that offer securities to the public or seek to admit securities to a UK regulated market must first publish a prospectus. Meanwhile, listed companies must comply with a range of continuing obligations for as long as their securities remain listed.


Author(s):  
Spangler Timothy

This chapter explains how the admission to listing of private investment funds on a recognized exchange can provide a means to address the governance challenge. It first considers the regulatory functions of securities exchanges before turning to the Irish Stock Exchange (ISE), taking into account three areas relevant to the governance challenge faced by private investment funds: general obligations of disclosure, notification of interests and key developments, and communications with unitholders. It then examines how an ISE listing can provide a potential market-oriented solution to the governance challenge. It also discusses listing-related developments at the London Stock Exchange, Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive depositories, and limitations on the effectiveness of exchange listings.


2004 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashley Burrowes ◽  
Kevin Jones

This investigation into the performance of Initial Public Offerings on the new Alternative Investment Market reveals that the expected high level of underpricing, that is usually associated with the risky nature of small, young and growing companies, is not supported by the evidence in this study. Raw and market adjusted figures reveal that IPOs listed on AIM at the London Stock Exchange appear to be only conservatively mispriced when contrasted to main board IPO listings in the US, UK and other countries. Due diligence listing requirements could be offsetting the otherwise risky nature of these small, young and growing companies. Finally AIM is discussed in terms of meeting its own targets and its ability to attract international listings.


Author(s):  
Ian Phimister

This chapter, by Ian Phimister, examines the global financial dynamics of the southern African and “Westralian” gold-mining share manias of the 1890s. Examination of both mining share markets suggests that, contrary to the conventional portrait painted of gold rushes, the defining picture is less one of prospectors rushing to pan for gold or peg claims than it is one of company promoters scurrying to fleece investors. The most frenzied activity was on the floor of the London Stock Exchange, not on the South African Highveld or the dry, dusty plains of Western Australia. More minted gold was found in London and the Home Counties than mined gold was located in Southern Africa or Western Australia. It is an exercise that once again questions the efficiency of late Victorian capital markets, even as it points to the consequences of the “portal of globalization” opened by finance.


Author(s):  
Walker George ◽  
Purves Robert ◽  
Blair Michael

This chapter examines the regulatory framework for listing and public offers in the UK, with a particular focus on the Prospectus Directive regime that was first adopted by the European Union in November 2003 and implemented in the UK from 1 July 2005. The Prospectus Directive regime regulates information disclosure in connection with a public offer or admission to listing on a regulated market in the EU. The chapter first provides an overview of the evolution of the Prospectus Directive regime before discussing its implementation in the UK. It then considers when a prospectus is required and what it must contain and describes the listing regime in the UK, which combines admission to the ‘Official List’ with admission to trading on one of the markets of the London Stock Exchange. The chapter also explains the UK listing requirements and the ongoing obligations faced by issuers admitted to listing and trading.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-339
Author(s):  
Juan Flores Zendejas

This article analyses the reasons why most Latin American governments frequently defaulted on their debts during the nineteenth century. Contrary to previous works, which focused on domestic factors, I argue that supply-side factors were equally important. The regulatory framework at the London Stock Exchange prevented defaulting governments from having access to the capital market. Therefore, the implicit incentive for underwriting banks and governments was to accelerate negotiations with bondholders, particularly during periods of high liquidity. Frequently, however, settlements were short-lived. In contrast, certain merchant banks opted to delay or refuse a settlement if they judged that the risk of a renewed default was too high. In such cases, even if negotiations were extended, the final agreements were more often respected, allowing governments to improve their repayment record.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document