Kant on Perceptual Content

Mind ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 125 (497) ◽  
pp. 95-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin McLear
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Content

Remembering from the Outside

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher McCarroll
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Perceptual Content ◽  
Visual Perspective ◽  
Personal Memory ◽  
External Observer ◽  
Cognitive Domains ◽  
Past Event ◽  
Observer Perspective ◽  
Ways Of Thinking ◽  
Original Event

When recalling events that one personally experienced, one often visualizes the remembered scene as one originally saw it: from an internal visual perspective. Sometimes, however, one sees oneself in the remembered scene: from an external “observer perspective.” In such cases one remembers from-the-outside. This book is about such memories. Remembering from-the-outside is a common yet curious case of personal memory: one views oneself from a perspective one seemingly could not have had at the time of the original event. How can past events be recalled from a detached perspective? How is it that the self is observed? And how can we account for the self-presence of such memories? Indeed, can there be genuine memories recalled from-the-outside? If memory preserves past perceptual content then how can one see oneself from-the-outside in memory? This book disentangles the puzzles posed by remembering from-the-outside. The book develops a dual-faceted approach for thinking about memory, which acknowledges constructive and reconstructive processes at encoding and at retrieval, and it uses this approach to defend the possibility of genuine memories being recalled from-the-outside. In so doing it also elucidates the nature of such memories and sheds light on the nature of personal memory. The book argues that field and observer perspectives are different ways of thinking about a particular past event. Further, by exploring the ways we have of getting outside of ourselves in memory and other cognitive domains, the book sheds light on the nature of our perspectival minds.

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Middle Ages ◽  
Ancient Philosophy ◽  
Perceptual Content ◽  
Current Work ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
Original Essays ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Middle Ages

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy provides, twice each year, a collection of the best current work in the field of ancient philosophy. Each volume features original essays that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of themes and problems in all periods of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, from the beginnings to the threshold of the Middle Ages. From its first volume in 1983, OSAP has been a highly influential venue for work in the field, and has often featured essays of substantial length as well as critical essays on books of distinctive importance. Volume LIII contains: an article on several of Zeno of Elea’s paradoxes and the nihilist interpretation of Eudemus of Rhodes; an article on the coherence of Thrasymachus’ challenge in Plato’s Republic book 1; another on Plato’s treatment of perceptual content in the Theaetetus and the Phaedo; an article on why Aristotle thinks that hypotheses are material causes of conclusions, and another on why he denies shame is a virtue; and a book review of a new edition of a work possibly by Apuleius and Middle Platonist political philosophy.

In Defense of Perceptual Content

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanna Schellenberg
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Representational Content ◽  
Perceptual Content ◽  
Explanatory Role ◽  
Relational Understanding ◽  
The Way

Chapter 5 takes a step back and traces the way in which excessive demands on the notion of perceptual content invite an austere relationalist account of perception. It argues that any account that acknowledges the role of discriminatory, selective capacities in perception must acknowledge that perceptual states have representational content. The chapter shows that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with representationalism. Most objections to the thesis that perceptual experience has representational content apply only to austere representationalist accounts, that is, accounts on which perceptual relations to the environment play no explanatory role. By arguing that perceptual relations and perceptual content are mutually dependent the chapter shows how Fregean particularism can avoid the pitfalls of both austere representationalism and austere relationalism. With relationalists, Fregean particularism argues that perception is constitutively relational, but with representationalists it argues that it is constitutively representational.

Beautiful red squares

2003 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Van Gulick
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Content

AbstractThe reflectance types that Byrne & Hilbert identify with colors count as types only in a way that is more dependent on, and more relative to color perceivers, than their account suggests. Their account of perceptual content may be overly focused on input conditions and distal causes.

scholarly journals Changing what you see by changing what you know: the role of attention

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Lupyan
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Content ◽  
Current Evidence ◽  
Cognitive State ◽  
Perceptual Process ◽  
Cognitive Influences ◽  
Cognitive States ◽  
Visual Hierarchy ◽  
Visual Inputs ◽  
Perceptual Representations ◽  
Perceptual Systems

Attending is a cognitive process that incorporates a person’s knowledge, goals, and expectations. What we perceive when we attend to one thing is different from what we perceive when we attend to something else. Yet, it is often argued that attentional effects do not count as evidence that perception is influenced by cognition. I investigate two arguments often given to justify excluding attention. The first is arguing that attention is a post-perceptual process reflecting selection between fully constructed perceptual representations. The second is arguing that attention as a pre-perceptual process that simply changes the input to encapsulated perceptual systems. Both of these arguments are highly problematic. Although some attentional effects can indeed be construed as post-perceptual, others operate by changing perceptual content across the entire visual hierarchy. Although there is a natural analogy between spatial attention and a change of input, the analogy falls apart when we consider other forms of attention. After dispelling these arguments, I make a case for thinking of attention not as a confound, but as one of the mechanisms by which cognitive states affect perception by going through cases in which the same or similar visual inputs are perceived differently depending on the observer’s cognitive state, and instances where cuing an observer using language affects what one sees. Lastly, I provide two compelling counter-examples to the critique that although cognitive influences on perception can be demonstrated in the laboratory, it is impossible to really experience them for oneself in a phenomenologically compelling way. Taken together, the current evidence strongly supports the thesis that what we know routinely influences what we see, that the same sensory input can be perceived differently depending on the current cognitive state of the viewer, and that phenomenologically salient demonstrations are possible if certain conditions are met.

scholarly journals Perceptual Content, Not Physiological Signals, Determines Perceived Duration When Viewing Dynamic, Natural Scenes

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marta Suárez-Pinilla ◽  
Kyriacos Nikiforou ◽  
Zafeirios Fountas ◽  
Anil K. Seth ◽  
Warrick Roseboom
Keyword(s):  
Time Perception ◽  
Physiological Signals ◽  
Perceptual Content ◽  
Natural Scenes ◽  
Neural Basis ◽  
Recent Proposal ◽  
Physiological Factors ◽  
Physiological Processes ◽  
Scene Content ◽  
Perceived Duration

The neural basis of time perception remains unknown. A prominent account is the pacemaker-accumulator model, wherein regular ticks of some physiological or neural pacemaker are read out as time. Putative candidates for the pacemaker have been suggested in physiological processes (heartbeat), or dopaminergic mid-brain neurons, whose activity has been associated with spontaneous blinking. However, such proposals have difficulty accounting for observations that time perception varies systematically with perceptual content. We examined physiological influences on human duration estimates for naturalistic videos between 1–64 seconds using cardiac and eye recordings. Duration estimates were biased by the amount of change in scene content. Contrary to previous claims, heart rate, and blinking were not related to duration estimates. Our results support a recent proposal that tracking change in perceptual classification networks provides a basis for human time perception, and suggest that previous assertions of the importance of physiological factors should be tempered.

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