scholarly journals More of me! Less of me!: Reflexive Imperativism about Affective Phenomenal Character

Mind ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 128 (512) ◽  
pp. 1013-1044 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Barlassina ◽  
Max Khan Hayward
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Intentional Content ◽  
First Order ◽  
The Right ◽  
In Virtue Of

AbstractExperiences like pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenal character: they feel pleasant or unpleasant. Imperativism proposes to explain affective phenomenal character by appeal to imperative content, a kind of intentional content that directs rather than describes. We argue that imperativism is on the right track, but has been developed in the wrong way. There are two varieties of imperativism on the market: first-order and higher-order. We show that neither is successful, and offer in their place a new theory: reflexive imperativism. Our proposal is that an experience P feels pleasant in virtue of being (at least partly) constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content (1), while an experience U feels unpleasant in virtue of being (at least partly) constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content (2): More of P!Less of U!If you need a slogan: experiences have affective phenomenal character in virtue of commanding us Get more of me! Get less of me!

scholarly journals Relational Imperativism about Affective Valence

2021 ◽  
pp. 341-370
Author(s):  
Antti Kauppinen
Keyword(s):  
Opportunity Cost ◽  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Intentional Content ◽  
Affective Valence ◽  
Affective Experiences ◽  
In Virtue Of

Affective experiences motivate and rationalize behaviour in virtue of feeling good or bad, or their valence. It has become popular to explain such phenomenal character with intentional content. Rejecting evaluativism and extending earlier imperativist accounts of pain, I argue that when experiences feel bad, they both represent things as being in a certain way and tell us to see to it that they will no longer be that way. Such commands have subjective authority by virtue of linking up with a relevant background concern. The imperative content explains but doesn’t constitute world-directed motivation. It also rationalizes action indirectly, by giving rise to an affective seeming that represents the situation as calling for the authoritatively commanded behaviour. One experience feels worse than another if its content tells us to bear a higher opportunity cost to comply with the command. Finally, experience-directed motivation is contingent on our being attitudinally (dis)pleased with the character of our experience.

scholarly journals Higher-order awareness, misrepresentation and function

2012 ◽  
Vol 367 (1594) ◽  
pp. 1424-1438 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Rosenthal
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Striking Difference ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
First Order ◽  
Cognitive States ◽  
Considerable Benefit ◽  
And Function ◽  
Psychological Processing ◽  
In Virtue Of

Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and metacognition involve higher-order psychological states, they have little more in common. One thing they do share is the possibility of misrepresentation; just as metacognitive processing can misrepresent one's cognitive states and abilities, so the HOA in virtue of which one's mental states are conscious can, and sometimes does, misdescribe those states. A striking difference between the two, however, has to do with utility for psychological processing. Metacognition has considerable benefit for psychological processing; in contrast, it is unlikely that there is much, if any, utility to mental states' being conscious over and above the utility those states have when they are not conscious.

scholarly journals The regular state in higher order gravity

2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (23) ◽  
pp. 1650130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Spiros Cotsakis ◽  
Seifedine Kadry ◽  
Dimitrios Trachilis
Keyword(s):  
Evolution Equations ◽  
Power Series Expansion ◽  
Type System ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Initial Value ◽  
First Order ◽  
Higher Order Gravity ◽  
Build Time ◽  
The Right ◽  
Formal Power

We consider the higher-order gravity theory derived from the quadratic Lagrangian [Formula: see text] in vacuum as a first-order (ADM-type) system with constraints, and build time developments of solutions of an initial value formulation of the theory. We show that all such solutions, if analytic, contain the right number of free functions to qualify as general solutions of the theory. We further show that any regular analytic solution which satisfies the constraints and the evolution equations can be given in the form of an asymptotic formal power series expansion.

Leibniz on Phenomenal Consciousness

Vivarium ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 52 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 333-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Barth
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Representational Content ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Middle Ground ◽  
First Order ◽  
Cognitive Operations ◽  
Contemporary Standard ◽  
Order Reflection

The main aim of this paper is to show that we can extract an elaborate account of phenomenal consciousness from Leibniz’s (1646-1716) writings. Against a prevalent view, which attributes a higher-order reflection account of phenomenal consciousness to Leibniz, it is argued that we should understand Leibniz as holding a first-order conception of it. In this conception, the consciousness aspect of phenomenal consciousness is explained in terms of a specific type of attention. This type of attention, in turn, is accounted for in terms of cognitive appetites aiming at knowledge about a represented object by means of initiating cognitive operations on representational content. Furthermore, against the view that Leibniz holds a reifying account, it is argued that Leibniz accepts an epistemic account of phenomenal character. According to this view, the phenomenal character of phenomenally conscious states rests on the confusing effect of imperfect acts of attention directed towards representational contents. Holding this view, Leibniz finds fruitful middle ground between contemporary standard positions like higher-order theories, representationalist conceptions, and qualia accounts of phenomenal consciousness. His position possesses resources to meet several objections these standard accounts are confronted with.

Dual systems for all: Higher-order, role-based relational reasoning as a uniquely derived feature of human cognition

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Povinelli ◽  
Gabrielle C. Glorioso ◽  
Shannon L. Kuznar ◽  
Mateja Pavlic
Keyword(s):  
Temporal Reasoning ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Important Case ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Relational Reasoning ◽  
Dual Systems ◽  
First Order ◽  
Reasoning System ◽  
Role Based

Abstract Hoerl and McCormack demonstrate that although animals possess a sophisticated temporal updating system, there is no evidence that they also possess a temporal reasoning system. This important case study is directly related to the broader claim that although animals are manifestly capable of first-order (perceptually-based) relational reasoning, they lack the capacity for higher-order, role-based relational reasoning. We argue this distinction applies to all domains of cognition.

Challenging the Multidimensional Conception of Perceived Person-Environment Fit

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Julian M. Etzel ◽  
Gabriel Nagy
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
University Students ◽  
Educational Outcomes ◽  
Factor Model ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Substantial Proportion ◽  
Unique Variance ◽  
First Order ◽  
Person Environment Fit ◽  
Order Factor

Abstract. In the current study, we examined the viability of a multidimensional conception of perceived person-environment (P-E) fit in higher education. We introduce an optimized 12-item measure that distinguishes between four content dimensions of perceived P-E fit: interest-contents (I-C) fit, needs-supplies (N-S) fit, demands-abilities (D-A) fit, and values-culture (V-C) fit. The central aim of our study was to examine whether the relationships between different P-E fit dimensions and educational outcomes can be accounted for by a higher-order factor that captures the shared features of the four fit dimensions. Relying on a large sample of university students in Germany, we found that students distinguish between the proposed fit dimensions. The respective first-order factors shared a substantial proportion of variance and conformed to a higher-order factor model. Using a newly developed factor extension procedure, we found that the relationships between the first-order factors and most outcomes were not fully accounted for by the higher-order factor. Rather, with the exception of V-C fit, all specific P-E fit factors that represent the first-order factors’ unique variance showed reliable and theoretically plausible relationships with different outcomes. These findings support the viability of a multidimensional conceptualization of P-E fit and the validity of our adapted instrument.

Computational Models for Multilayered Composite Shells with Application to Tires

1996 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. M. Kulikov
Keyword(s):  
Type Theory ◽  
Computational Models ◽  
Geometrical Nonlinearity ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Stress Strain ◽  
Strain Fields ◽  
First Order ◽  
Timoshenko Type ◽  
Joint Influence ◽  
Discrete Layer

Abstract This paper focuses on four tire computational models based on two-dimensional shear deformation theories, namely, the first-order Timoshenko-type theory, the higher-order Timoshenko-type theory, the first-order discrete-layer theory, and the higher-order discrete-layer theory. The joint influence of anisotropy, geometrical nonlinearity, and laminated material response on the tire stress-strain fields is examined. The comparative analysis of stresses and strains of the cord-rubber tire on the basis of these four shell computational models is given. Results show that neglecting the effect of anisotropy leads to an incorrect description of the stress-strain fields even in bias-ply tires.

Dual Aspect Theory

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Normal Variation ◽  
Perceptual Representations ◽  
Order Representation ◽  
Management Conflicts ◽  
Higher Order Theory

Carruthers proposes a subtle dispositionalist rendition of higher order theory regarding phenomenal character. The theory would distinguish unconscious movement management from conscious attitude management as perceptual processes. Each process takes perceptual representations as inputs. A representation subject to attitude management is apt to induce a higher order representation of itself that secures a self-referential aspect of its content supposedly determinative of phenomenal character. Unfortunately, the account requires a problematic cognitive ambiguity while failing to explain why attitude, but not movement, management, determines character. Moreover, normal variation in attitudinal management conflicts with the constancy typical of phenomenal character. And although an agent denied perceptual access to a scene about which she is otherwise well informed would suffer no phenomenal character, dispositionalist theory entails otherwise. Such problems, together with the results of the previous chapters, suggest that, whether cloaked under intentionalism or higher order theory, representationalism mistakes content for character.

Higher Order Theory

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Cognitive State ◽  
Unconscious Perception ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
Order State

Rosenthal's rendition of representationalism denies intentionalism. His higher order theory instead asserts that a perceptual state's phenomenal character is set by that state's being related to, because represented by, another, but higher order, cognitive state. The theory arises from the doubtful supposition of unconscious perception and mistakenly construes intrinsic phenomenal character extrinsically, as one state's serving as the content of another. Yet it remains mysterious how and why a higher order state might be so potent as to determine phenomenal character at all. Better to resist higher order theory’s embrace of dubious unconscious perceptual states and account for states so-called simply in terms of humdrum mnemonic malfeasance. Moreover, since the suspect theory allows higher order misrepresentation, it implies sufferance of impossible phenomenal character. Equally problematic, representationalism pitched at the higher order entails the existence of bogus phenomenal character when upstairs states represent downstairs nonperceptual states.

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