scholarly journals Equal Opportunities in Newcomb’s Problem and Elsewhere

Mind ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 129 (515) ◽  
pp. 867-886
Author(s):  
Arif Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Decision Problem ◽  
Causal Decision Theory ◽  
Decision Problems ◽  
Equal Opportunities ◽  
Evidential Decision Theory ◽  
Main Claim ◽  
Newcomb’S Problem ◽  
Causal Decision ◽  
Evidential Decision

Abstract The paper discusses Ian Wells’s recent argument (Wells 2019) that there is a decision problem in which followers of Evidential Decision Theory end up poorer than followers of Causal Decision Theory despite having the same opportunities for money. It defends Evidential Decision Theory against Wells’s argument, on the following grounds. (i) Wells's has not presented a decision problem in which his main claim is true. (ii) Four possible decision problems can be generated from his central example, in each of which followers of Evidential Decision Theory do at least as well as followers of Causal Decision Theory (but the former typically have better opportunities for money). (iii) There is another case in which followers of Causal Decision Theory have the same opportunities for making money but end up worse than followers of Evidential Decision Theory.

Newcomb University: A play in one act

Analysis ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 80 (2) ◽  
pp. 212-221
Author(s):  
Adam Elga
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Causal Decision Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Evidential Decision Theory ◽  
Newcomb’S Problem ◽  
Causal Decision ◽  
Evidential Decision ◽  
One Act

Abstract Counter-intuitive consequences of both causal decision theory and evidential decision theory are dramatized. Each of those theories is thereby put under some pressure to supply an error theory to explain away intuitions that seem to favour the other. Because trouble is stirred up for both sides, complacency about Newcomb’s problem is discouraged.

Diagnostic Preliminaries to Applying a Theory of Decision

SATS ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariam Thalos
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Formal Theory ◽  
Causal Decision Theory ◽  
End User ◽  
Evidential Decision Theory ◽  
Causal Decision ◽  
Good Advice ◽  
Evidential Decision

AbstractDecision theory cannot be a purely formal theory, free of all metaphysical assumptions and ascertainments. It must instead rely upon the end user for the wisdom it takes to prime the decision formalism – with principles and assumptions about the metaphysics of the application context – so that the formalism in its turn can generate good advice. Appreciating this idea is fundamental to understanding the true rivalry between evidential decision theory (EDT) and causal decision theory (CDT) in specific cases. I shall argue that no decision theory can deliver a verdict unless assumptions are made about the

Cheating Death in Damascus

2020 ◽  
Vol 117 (5) ◽  
pp. 237-266
Author(s):  
Benjamin A. Levinstein ◽  
Nate Soares ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Decision Function ◽  
Causal Decision Theory ◽  
Mathematical Function ◽  
Rational Action ◽  
Evidential Decision Theory ◽  
Causal Decision ◽  
Physical Action ◽  
Evidential Decision ◽  
Optimal Action

Evidential Decision Theory (EDT) and Causal Decision Theory (CDT) are the leading contenders as theories of rational action, but both face counterexamples. We present some new counterexamples, including one in which the optimal action is causally dominated. We also present a novel decision theory, Functional Decision Theory (FDT), which simultaneously solves both sets of counterexamples. Instead of considering which physical action of theirs would give rise to the best outcomes, FDT agents consider which output of their decision function would give rise to the best outcome. This theory relies on a notion of subjunctive dependence, where multiple implementations of the same mathematical function are considered (even counterfactually) to have identical results for logical rather than causal reasons. Taking these subjunctive dependencies into account allows FDT agents to outperform CDT and EDT agents in, for example, the presence of accurate predictors.

scholarly journals Newcomb dilemma in development management

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Zsolt Ziegler
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Electric Motor ◽  
Causal Decision Theory ◽  
Strategic Decisions ◽  
Evidential Decision Theory ◽  
Development Management ◽  
Causal Decision ◽  
Evidential Decision ◽  
General Schema ◽  
Rational Reasoning

Newcomb dilemmas show a discrepancy in our rational reasoning, as made clear by comparing Evidential Decision Theory with Causal Decision Theory. In this paper, I look at three versions of the dilemma: the original, highly technical and abstract one plus two more mundane cases. I also account for the general schema of the dilemma possibly appearing in macroeconomic situations. Ahmed (2014) aims to provide a solution for macroeconomic cases that opens room for forming a development management Newcomb dilemma – an imaginary case of electric motor competition between Toyota and Tesla. I argue that Ahmed’s solution may solve the macroeconomic Newcomb dilemma, but it cannot be applied to the development management dilemma. If I am right, similar Newcomb situations could be cropping up regularly in development management, leading to seemingly insoluble strategic decisions having to be made. This may create an inevitable pitfall for development management.

Another Attempt to Put Sleeping Beauty to Rest

2009 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
pp. 25-39
Author(s):  
Robert Stalnaker
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Sleeping Beauty ◽  
Standard Formulation ◽  
Evidential Decision Theory ◽  
Newcomb’S Problem ◽  
The Real ◽  
Common Framework ◽  
Evidential Decision ◽  
Alternative Responses ◽  
Competing Responses

Sleeping Beauty has become like Newcomb's problem used to be: a puzzle where both intuitions and arguments cluster around two competing responses. In both cases, the real interest is in the frameworks that are constructed to treat the problem: causal vs. evidential decision theory in the case of Newcomb's problem, and different accounts of essentially indexical or self-locating belief in the case of Sleeping Beauty. Many of the arguments about Sleeping Beauty have been carried out in a common framework for representing self-locating belief, with alternative responses agreeing about the presuppositions of that framework. I want to question some of these presuppositions and to set the problem up in a way that is only subtly different from the standard formulation, but different in a way that I think is important.

Evidential Decision Theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arif Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Decision Theory ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Evidential Decision Theory ◽  
Radical Theory ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Evidential Decision ◽  
Theoretic Foundations

Evidential Decision Theory is a radical theory of rational decision-making. It recommends that instead of thinking about what your decisions *cause*, you should think about what they *reveal*. This Element explains in simple terms why thinking in this way makes a big difference, and argues that doing so makes for *better* decisions. An appendix gives an intuitive explanation of the measure-theoretic foundations of Evidential Decision Theory.

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