Criminal Law Basics and the Willful Ignorance Doctrine

2019 ◽  
pp. 7-26
Author(s):  
Alexander Sarch

Chapter 1 sets the stage. The author’s starting point is the willful ignorance doctrine, since it is the source from which the author will eventually extract his general theory of equal culpability mental state imputation. After explaining core criminal law concepts (particularly the mens rea concepts), the author introduces the willful ignorance doctrine, its history, and the normative claim it is premised on—namely, the equal culpability thesis. Situating this doctrine in the broader criminal law context reveals the questions to be tackled in the book, and the chapter ends by indicating the sorts of answers the author will go on to develop.

2019 ◽  
pp. 139-172
Author(s):  
Alexander Sarch

This chapter aims to defend a general theory of equal-culpability-based imputation of mental states in the criminal law. The willful ignorance doctrine is one example of an equal culpability mens rea imputation principle. After all, what grounds imputing knowledge to a willfully ignorant actor is that her conduct is as culpable as the analogous knowing conduct. Chapters 3 and 4 examined the scope of this imputation principle. But deeper worries linger. Even if equal culpability is necessary for this mode of imputing knowledge to the willfully ignorant, does it provide sufficient justification for such imputation? This chapter confronts two of the deeper objections that remain. One is pressing for practitioners within an existing legal framework (courts and litigants). But it admits of straightforward answers. The other is a harder normative problem for those who make law. Why should lawmakers take equal culpability to be a legitimate basis for imputing missing mental states? Answering this challenge requires a general theory of equal culpability imputation, which it is the aim of this chapter to provide. This theory will then serve as the basis for the remaining chapters in the book.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Herring

Mens rea is the legal term used to describe the element of a criminal offence that relates to the defendant’s mental state. Different crimes have different mentes reae: some require intention, others recklessness, negligence, or knowledge. Some crimes do not require proof of any mental state of the defendant. This chapter considers the following concepts that are used throughout criminal law: (a) intention, (b) recklessness, (c) negligence, and (d) knowledge.


Author(s):  
Mischa Allen

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions. Each book includes typical questions, diagram answer plans, suggested answers, author commentary, and advice on study skills. This chapter presents sample exam questions on the elements of crime and suggested answers. The traditional starting point for the study of criminal law is the constituents of a criminal offence. These are the fundamental principles of criminal liability: actus reus (often referred to as the prohibited conduct, but more accurately described as the external elements of the offence) and mens rea (often referred to as the mental element, but more accurately described as the fault element). They include the distinction between acts and omissions, causation, and the different levels of fault (intention, recklessness and negligence).


Author(s):  
Mischa Allen

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions. Each book includes typical questions, diagram answer plans, suggested answers, and author commentary. This chapter presents sample exam questions on the elements of crime and suggested answers. The traditional starting point for the study of criminal law is the constituents of a criminal offence. These are the fundamental principles of criminal liability: actus reus (often referred to as the prohibited conduct, but more accurately described as the external elements of the offence) and mens rea (often referred to as the mental element, but more accurately described as the fault element). They include the distinction between acts and omissions, causation, and the different levels of fault (intention, recklessness and negligence).


2020 ◽  
pp. 87-116
Author(s):  
Michael S. Moore

In addition to action, responsibility in morality and in the criminal law requires that a certain mental state accompany that action. In criminal law this is termed the requirement of mens rea, or “guilty mind.” The mens rea requirements of the criminal law and of morality are built entirely out of the concepts of intention and belief. These concepts are charted in some detail, both with respect to their nature and with respect to the content they must have to give an accused a “guilty mind.” The demands made on psychology by such use of intention and belief in the criminal law are also charted, particularly demands on the precision with which the brain sciences can ascertain the content of such mental states.


Criminal Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 129-209
Author(s):  
Jonathan Herring

Mens rea is the legal term used to describe the element of a criminal offence that relates to the defendant’s mental state. Different crimes have different mentes reae: some require intention, others recklessness, negligence, or knowledge. Some crimes do not require proof of any mental state of the defendant. This chapter considers the following concepts that are used throughout criminal law: (a) intention; (b) recklessness; (c) negligence; and (d) knowledge.


Author(s):  
A P Simester

This chapter discusses criminal law’s structure and working doctrines, offering some preliminary remarks about how the major legal doctrines relate to the principles identified in the previous chapter. In terms of the basic framework, it is conventional these days for common lawyers to divide up the law of crimes into three rather broad groupings: actus reus (the so-called ‘external’ or ‘physical’ elements of the crime); mens rea (the defendant’s mental state or, sometimes, the lack of it); and defences. The master question for criminal liability then becomes one of concurrence—is there a moment in time at which the actus reus and mens rea requirements of the offence are simultaneously satisfied, and there are no defences available? However, this threefold division is not clean, and the contents of each part are not independent of one another. The chapter presents a rough structural sketch of the criminal law.


Author(s):  
Mischa Allen

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions. Each book includes typical questions, diagram answer plans, suggested answers, author commentary and advice on study skills. This chapter presents sample exam questions on the elements of crime and suggested answers. The traditional starting point for the study of criminal law is the constituents of a criminal offence. These are the fundamental principles of criminal liability: actus reus (often referred to as the prohibited conduct, but more accurately described as the external elements of the offence) and mens rea (often referred to as the mental element, but more accurately described as the fault element). They include the distinction between acts and omissions, causation, and the different levels of fault (intention, recklessness and negligence).


Author(s):  
Guy Ben-David

How should the criminal law treat a person who did not pay any attention to the existence of attendant circumstances noted in the definition of an offense? This mental state of lack of attention to the existence of the attendant circumstance is analogous to the existence of a void in the actor’s consciousness, and has therefore been awarded the name “cognitive void.” Because the criminal law is founded on cognitive theory that offers a binary concept to establish an accused’s state of mind depending on the existence or absence of cognition, it is difficult to impose criminal liability on an actor who acted out of a cognitive void. The purpose of this Article is to discuss the difficulty that it engenders and the attempts to solve this difficulty. The Article presents the proposed thesis, suggesting that different states of cognitive void should be examined in accordance with the extent of culpability that they represent. Therefore, the Article calls for the abandonment of the prevalent basic assumption that sees cognitive void as a state indicating lack of subjective mens rea, and suggests replacing it with a normative approach that would recognize cognitive void as a multidimensional term covering a range of different mental states.


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