The Good of Consequentialized Deontology

2018 ◽  
pp. 115-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monika Betzler ◽  
Jörg Schroth
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Deontological Theory ◽  
Consequentialist Theory

This chapter critically discusses the hitherto most radical and ambitious proposal for accommodating consequentialism with our commonsense moral intuitions. According to this proposal, which has been most forcefully developed by Douglas Portmore, it is possible to consequentialize every plausible deontological moral theory, i.e., to translate a deontological theory into a consequentialist theory that yields exactly the same moral verdicts as the original deontological theory. The hoped for result of this move is a moral theory that (i) retains the compelling idea of consequentialism, (ii) has no counterintuitive moral implications, and (iii) avoids the paradox of deontology. After describing some of the details of the consequentializing procedure the chapter mounts several objections that lead to the conclusion that the consequentializing project cannot achieve any of its goals.

Is Philosophy Relevant to Applied Ethics?

2006 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 369-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Rorty
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Applied Ethics ◽  
Moral Progress ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Fields Of Study ◽  
Literature And Theology

Abstract:If, like Hegel and Dewey, one takes a historicist, anti-Platonist view of moral progress, one will be dubious about the idea that moral theory can be more than the systematization of the widely-shared moral intuitions of a certain time and place. One will follow Shelley, Dewey, and Patricia Werhane in emphasizing the role of the imagination in making moral progress possible. Taking this stance will lead one to conclude that although philosophy is indeed relevant to applied ethics, it is not more relevant than many other fields of study (such as history, law, political science, anthropology, literature, and theology).

What is Consequentialism? A Reply to Howard-Snyder

Utilitas ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 342-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Reason ◽  
Consequentialist Theory ◽  
Moral Theories

If there is a moral reason for A to do X, and if A cannot do X without doing Y, and if doing Y will enable A to do X, then there is a moral reason for A to do Y. This principle is plausible but mysterious, so it needs to be explained. It can be explained by necessary enabler consequentialism, but not by other consequentialisms or any deontological moral theory. Or so I argue. Frances Howard-Snyder objects that this argument fails to establish consequentialism as understood by ‘most philosophers’, because it fails to establish agent-neutrality. I respond by distinguishing consequentialism, which need not be agent-neutral, from utilitarianism, which claims agent-neutrality. Howard-Snyder also presents a schema for a non-consequentialist theory that is supposed to explain moral substitutability. I respond that her explanation cannot be completed without introducing incoherence into deontological moral theories.

scholarly journals Kant and Consequentialism in Context: The SecondCritique’s Response to Pistorius

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael H. Walschots
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Fundamental Difference ◽  
Moral Appraisal ◽  
Consequentialist Theory ◽  
Kant's Ethics

AbstractCommentators disagree about the extent to which Kant’s ethics is compatible with consequentialism. A question that has not yet been asked is whether Kant had a view of his own regarding the fundamental difference between his ethical theory and a broadly consequentialist one. In this paper I argue that Kant does have such a view. I illustrate this by discussing his response to a well-known objection to his moral theory, namely that Kant offers an implicitly consequentialist theory of moral appraisal. This objection was most famously raised by Mill and Schopenhauer, but also during Kant’s time by Pistorius and Tittel. I show that Kant’s response to this objection in the second Critique illustrates that he sees the fundamental difference between his moral theory and a broadly consequentialist one to be one that concerns methodology.

The Broad Structure of Buddhist Ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 18-28
Author(s):  
Jay L. Garfield
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Theory ◽  
Buddhist Ethics ◽  
Ethical Thought ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Moral Phenomenology ◽  
Deontological Theory ◽  
Consequentialist Theory ◽  
Broad Structure ◽  
The Way

This chapter argues that Buddhist ethics does not fit into any of the standard Western metaethical theories. It is neither an instance of a virtue theory, nor of a deontological theory, nor of a consequentialist theory. It is closer to a sentimentalist theory, but different from those as well. Instead, it defends a reading of Buddhist ethics as a moral phenomenology and as particularist, utilizing casuistic reasoning. That is, Buddhist ethics is concerned primarily with the transformation of experience, of the way we perceive ourselves and other moral agents and patients. This chapter also argues that the metaphor of path structures Buddhist ethical thought.

Folk-economic beliefs as moral intuitions

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Malhotra
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Economic Beliefs ◽  
Evolutionary Explanations

AbstractAlthough Boyer & Petersen's (B&P's) cataloguing of and evolutionary explanations for folk-economic beliefs is important and valuable, the authors fail to connect their theories to existing explanations for why people do not think like economists. For instance, people often have moral intuitions akin to principles of fairness and justice that conflict with utilitarian approaches to resource allocation.

Critique of Callicott's Biosocial Moral Theory

2007 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Hadley
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory
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