Experiences of Duration and Cognitive Penetrability
This chapter considers the cognitive penetrability of our experiences of the durations of everyday events. It defends an account of subjective duration based in contemporary psychological and neurobiological research. It shows its philosophical adequacy by demonstrating its utility in explaining the phenomenology of duration experiences. The chapter then considers whether cognitive penetrability is a problem for these experiences. It argues that, to the contrary, the problem presupposes a relationship between perception and belief that duration perceptions and beliefs do not exhibit. Instead, the assignment of epistemic features to particular processing stages appears to answer to pragmatic needs, not psychological facts.
1994 ◽
Vol 33
(6)
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pp. 771-781
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2011 ◽
Vol 158
(3)
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pp. 477-492
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2019 ◽
pp. 85-158
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2014 ◽
Vol 1
(1)
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pp. 1-12
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