Patterns of Difference and Dominance

Author(s):  
Anthea Roberts

This chapter examines three implications of these patterns of difference and dominance for the wider field of international law. First, although most legal academies and law schools remain relatively nationalized, there are outliers that are significantly more internationalized than their counterparts. Different academies also evidence different strengths and areas that are ripe for future development. Second, the existence of distinct national or regional communities of international lawyers may result in substantial disconnects developing within the field, such as in debates about Crimea and the South China Sea. Third, some of the patterns of dominance that emerge in the academies and textbooks are replicated elsewhere in the field, including privileging sources and actors from Western states in general, and from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in particular. Choice of language and the emergence of English as the lingua franca play particularly important roles in this privileging process.

Author(s):  
Ahdar Rex ◽  
Leigh Ian

This chapter first considers the broad nature of ‘religious freedom’. It then outlines the various systems of constitutional protection for religious liberty in different nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and so on, as well as the guarantees in international law for religious rights. Next, it explores the difficult question of how one defines ‘religion’ for the purpose of recognizing religious liberty.


Author(s):  
Ashley S. Deeks

The lack of certainty about the precise status of various intelligence activities in international law fosters conditions under which states can choose—and have chosen—different paths through the thicket. This chapter compares how certain states’ intelligence communities (ICs) approach their international law obligations. The United Kingdom asserts that its IC’s activities comply with international law. The United States, in contrast, implies that certain IC actions may violate international law, though it avoids specific public statements about such deviations. This chapter identifies and analyzes the problems and benefits posed by the competing approaches and offers lessons about the capacity of international law to constrain core national security activities.


Author(s):  
Elizabeth Varner

The 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1954 Hague Convention) remains the leading treaty on the treatment of cultural heritage during armed conflict and occupation. After several decades of relative dormancy, eleven States have joined the 1954 Hague Convention in the last decade, including two major military powers: the United States and the United Kingdom. In addition to the 1954 Hague Convention, a host of laws touch on the protection of cultural property in armed conflict, as well as those under customary international law. Nonetheless, there are disagreements in interpretations of States’ obligations toward cultural property during armed conflict stemming from a variety of factors. These factors can include: whether States are Parties to the instrument that conveys the obligation or if the obligation is one of customary international law, which itself is often contested; the individual State’s interpretation; interpretation by tribunals; and a plethora of other factors. Given these discrepancies in interpretation, a review of States’ military manuals is useful to see if they shed any light on the State’s interpretation of their obligations toward cultural property under the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and international obligations in LOAC more generally. This chapter will analyze and compare the military manuals of the United States and the United Kingdom to determine how they elucidate several key issues in the protection of cultural property during armed conflict, such as the definition of ‘cultural property’, requirements for ‘respect’, the doctrine of military necessity, and laws applicable in non-international armed conflicts.


2014 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith McNamara ◽  
Catherine Campbell ◽  
Evan Hamman

Law schools in Australia and the United Kingdom are increasingly adopting clinical legal education (CLE) as an important part of their curriculum.  Models of CLE are emerging in those jurisdictions which draw on local experience and the strong tradition of CLE and community lawyering in the United States. The purpose of this article is to examine the pedagogy that underlies CLE and to consider how it can be applied to newly emerging models of CLE.


1999 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 583-595
Author(s):  
Juan M. Amaya-Castro

Libya filed two separate applications on 3 March 1992. In the applications, Libya contended that it had not been possible to settle this dispute by negotiations and that the parties unable to agree on the organization of an arbitration to hear the matter. It accordingly submitted the disputes to the Court on the basis of Article 14(1) of the Montreal Convention. Libya refers in the applications to the charging of two Libyan nationals, by the Lord Advocate of Scotland, and by a Grand Jury of the United States, respectively, with having caused a bomb to be placed aboard a Pan-am flight, which bomb subsequently exploded, causing the aeroplane to crash. Libya contends that the United Kingdom and the United States, respectively, by rejecting the Libyan efforts to resolve the matter within the framework of international law, including the Montreal Convention, are pressuring it into surrendering the two Libyan nationals for trial. In this connection, Libya refers to Article 1 of the Montreal Convention, according to which the charge constitutes an offence, and to the several other articles of that Convention which are relevant to Libya's alleged right to jurisdiction over the matter and the prosecution thereof. Libya alleges that these obligations are breached by the United Kingdom and the United States respectively.


2000 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 855-872
Author(s):  
Rosanne van Alebeek ◽  
Ursula E.A. Weitzel

Libya filed two separate applications on 3 March 1992. In the applications, Libya contended that it had not been possible to settle this dispute by negotiations and that the parties unable to agree on the organization of an arbitration to hear the matter. It accordingly submitted the disputes to the Court on the basis of Article 14, paragraph 1, of the Montreal Convention. Libya refers in the applications to the charging of two Libyan nationals, by the Lord Advocate of Scotland, and by a Grand Jury of the United States, respectively, with having caused a bomb to be placed aboard a Pan-am flight, which bomb subsequently exploded, causing the aeroplane to crash. Libya contends that the United Kingdom and the United States, respectively, by rejecting the Libyan efforts to resolve the matter within the framework of international law, including the Montreal Convention, are pressuring it into surrendering the two Libyan nationals for trial. In this connection, Libya refers to Article 1 of the Montreal Convention, according to which the charge constitutes an offence, and to the several other articles of that Convention which are relevant to Libya's alleged right to jurisdiction over the matter and the prosecution thereof. Libya alleges that these obligations are breached by the United Kingdom and the United States respectively.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document