How to evaluate the catastrophic risks and the possible responses to them

Author(s):  
Richard A. Posner

To deal in a systematic way with the catastrophic risks identified in chapter 1 requires first assessing them and then devising and implementing sensible responses. Assessment involves first of all collecting the technical data necessary to gauge, so far as that may be possible, the probability of particular risks, the purely physical consequences if the risks materialize (questions of value are for later), and the feasibility of various measures for reducing either the risks or the magnitude of the consequences by various amounts. The next step in the assessment stage is to embed the data in a cost-benefit analysis of the alternative responses to the risk. I am not proposing that cost-benefit analysis, at least as it is understood by economists, should be the decision procedure for responding to the catastrophic risks. But it is an indispensable step in rational decision making in this as in other areas of government regulation. Effective responses to most catastrophic risks are likely to be extremely costly, and it would be mad to adopt such responses without an effort to estimate the costs and benefits. No government is going to deploy a system of surveillance and attack for preventing asteroid collisions without a sense of what the system is likely to cost and what the expected benefits (roughly, the costs of asteroid collisions that the system would prevent multiplied by the probabilities of such collisions) are likely to be relative to the costs and benefits both of alternative systems and of doing nothing. The “precautionary principle” (“better safe than sorry”) popular in Europe and among Greens generally is not a satisfactory alternative to cost-benefit analysis, if only because of its sponginess—if it is an alternative at all. In its more tempered versions, the principle is indistinguishable from cost-benefit analysis with risk aversion assumed. Risk aversion, as we know, entails that extra weight be given the downside of uncertain prospects. In effect it magnifies certain costs, but it does not thereby overthrow cost-benefit analysis, as some advocates of the precautionary principle may believe.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeroen Hopster

A challenge faced by defenders of the precautionary principle is to clarify when the evidence that a harmful event might occur suffices to regard this prospect as a real possibility. Plausible versions of the principle must articulate some epistemic threshold, or de minimis requirement, which specifies when precautionary measures are justified. Critics have argued that formulating such a threshold is problematic in the context of the precautionary principle. First, this is because the precautionary principle appears to be ambiguous about the distinction between risk and uncertainty: should the principle merely be invoked when evidential probabilities are absent, or also when probabilities have low epistemic credentials? Secondly, defenders of the precautionary principle face an aggregation puzzle: in judging whether or not the de minimis requirement has been met, how should first-order evidential probabilities and their second-order epistemic standing be aggregated? This article argues that the ambiguity can be resolved, and the epistemological puzzle can be solved. Focusing on decisions in the context of climate uncertainty, I advance a version of the precautionary principle that serves as a plausible decision rule, to be adopted in situations where its main alternative – cost-benefit analysis – does not deliver.


Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeroen Hopster

AbstractA challenge faced by defenders of the precautionary principle is to clarify when the evidence that a harmful event might occur suffices to regard this prospect as a real possibility. Plausible versions of the principle must articulate some epistemic threshold, or de minimis requirement, which specifies when precautionary measures are justified. Critics have argued that formulating such a threshold is problematic in the context of the precautionary principle. First, this is because the precautionary principle appears to be ambiguous about the distinction between risk and uncertainty: should the principle merely be invoked when evidential probabilities are absent, or also when probabilities have low epistemic credentials? Secondly, defenders of the precautionary principle face an aggregation puzzle: in judging whether or not the de minimis requirement has been met, how should first-order evidential probabilities and their second-order epistemic standing be aggregated? This article argues that the ambiguity can be resolved, and the epistemological puzzle can be solved. Focusing on decisions in the context of climate uncertainty, I advance a version of the precautionary principle that serves as a plausible decision rule, to be adopted in situations where its main alternative—cost–benefit analysis—does not deliver.


Author(s):  
Kylie Morphett ◽  
Wayne Hall ◽  
Coral Gartner

Abstract In Australia, the precautionary principle has been used to justify an effective sales ban on nicotine vaping products (NVPs) by requiring all NVPs to be approved as medicines. Australia’s policy is out of step with other English-speaking countries, which allow the sale of NVPs as consumer products. We provide a brief history of the precautionary principle, discuss guidelines on how it should be used, and examine key documents from Australian policy debates to describe how the precautionary principle has been misapplied in justifying Australian NVP policy. We argue that the precautionary principle has been inappropriately applied to NVP regulation in Australia in that it has: failed to consider the regulation of similar products, imposed regulations that are disproportionate to the level of risk, failed to assess the costs of its regulatory approach, and failed to undertake a cost/benefit analysis of a range of available regulatory options. Australian policy illustrates the risks of regulating nicotine products in isolation rather than considering NVPs as falling on a continuum of harmful nicotine products. Implications The precautionary principle has been misapplied to NVP regulation in Australia. We recommend that the precautionary principle be used in a way that regulates nicotine products in proportion to their risks.


2007 ◽  
pp. 70-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Demidova

This article analyzes definitions and the role of hostile takeovers at the Russian and European markets for corporate control. It develops the methodology of assessing the efficiency of anti-takeover defenses adapted to the conditions of the Russian market. The paper uses the cost-benefit analysis, where the costs and benefits of the pre-bid and post-bid defenses are compared.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13(62) (2) ◽  
pp. 157-166
Author(s):  
Ștefan Bulboacă ◽  
Ovidiu Mircea Țierean

"This paper aims to evaluate the economic effects that the Romanian National Gambling Office has over the gambling industry and to determine whether this public institution brings enough benefits to cover the costs. The aim of the research was to gather information about the Romanian gambling industry, the way that this industry is managed and to make a comparison between its societal costs and benefits. "


2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (S1) ◽  
pp. 75-76
Author(s):  
Paul van Gils ◽  
Eelco Over ◽  
Anita Suijkerbuijk ◽  
Joran Lokkerbol ◽  
Ardine de Wit

INTRODUCTION:Due to their chronic nature and high prevalence, alcohol and cannabis addiction leads to a significant (disease) burden and high costs, both for those involved and for society. The latter includes effects on health care, quality of life, employment, criminality, education, social security, violence in the public and private domain, and traffic accidents. In the Netherlands, a considerable number of people with an alcohol or cannabis addiction currently do not receive addiction care. Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) is effective as a treatment for both alcohol and cannabis addiction and is widely used in specialized addiction care centers. This social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA) models costs and benefits of increasing the uptake of CBT for persons with an alcohol addiction and for adolescents with a cannabis addiction, taking into account a wide range of social costs and effects (1).METHODS:The method follows general Dutch guidance for performing SCBA. A literature search was conducted to evaluate efficacy of CBT for alcohol and cannabis dependence. In addition, the social costs of alcohol and cannabis addiction for society were mapped, and the costs of enhancing the uptake of CBT were explored. Costs and benefits of increased uptake of CBT for different social domains were modeled for a ten year period, and compared with current (unchanged) uptake during this period. Compliance problems (about 50 percent of clients do not finish CBT) and fall-back to addiction behavior (decrease of effects of CBT over time) were taken into account in model estimations.RESULTS:Per client treated with CBT, the estimated benefits to society are EUR10,000-14,000 and EUR9,700-13,000, for alcohol and cannabis addiction, respectively. These benefits result from reduced morbidity and mortality, improved quality of life, higher productivity, fewer traffic accidents, and fewer criminal activities.CONCLUSIONS:This SCBA shows that not only treated clients but also society will benefit from an increase in people treated with CBT in specialized addiction care centers.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document