Three Models of Territory

2021 ◽  
pp. 78-94
Author(s):  
Alice Pinheiro Walla

The chapter argues that regardless of whether a legal order has been established over a territory, possession of land itself already imposes obligations on persons outside the territory to respect it. She points out that possession of land also imposes duties on the holders of territory that are global in scope. It is therefore not possible to reduce territorial rights to claims of juridical independence in virtue of a state’s internal civil condition, although the existence of a legal order over a territory is an additional argument to the duty to respect a group’s occupation of land. This is because the internal legal order is only binding to its members, while occupation of land is binding to individuals and states already in the state of nature.

2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 439-463 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. P. MESSINA

AbstractI argue that Kant’s mature political philosophy entails the provisionality thesis. The provisionality thesis asserts that in a world like ours, populated with beings sufficiently like us, acquired rights (rights to external objects of choice, including property, sovereignty and territory) are necessarily provisional. I motivate the standard view, which restricts the notion of provisional right to the state of nature and the transition from the state of nature to the civil condition. I then provide two textual arguments against it. I conclude by reflecting on the normative implications of the provisionality thesis, arguing that they are more modest than has been formerly appreciated.


Diametros ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Stefano Lo Re

In Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason Kant speaks of an ethical state of nature and of an ethico-civil condition, with explicit reference to the juridical state of nature and the juridico-civil condition he discusses at length in his legal-political writings. Given that the Religion is the only work where Kant introduces a parallel between these concepts, one might think that this is only a loose analogy, serving a merely illustrative function. The paper provides a first outline of the similarities and the differences between the state of nature and the civil condition in Right and in ethics. The comparison points to a deeper, structural relation between the two pairs of concepts. By doing so, it makes room for developing a unitary conception of the state of nature and of the civil condition, which would underlie both the ethical and the juridical version.


2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis-Philippe Hodgson

The central claim of Kant's political philosophy is that rational agents sharing a territory can justifiably be forced to live under a state; they have, in Kant's words, a duty of right to leave the state of nature. Perhaps something along these lines is entailed by any theory of state legitimacy, but the point raises special difficulties for Kant. He believes that rational agents have a right to freedom; that is, he believes that a rational agent's external freedom - her ability to set and pursue ends for herself without being subject to the choices of others - can justifiably be restricted only for the sake of external freedom itself. To establish that human beings can be forced to join a civil condition, it will therefore not do to show that the state promotes security, prosperity or any other such value: Kant has to show that human beings living side by side need a state to be free.


Author(s):  
Karl Widerquist ◽  
Grant S. McCall

Earlier chapters of this book found that the Hobbesian hypothesis is false; the Lockean proviso is unfulfilled; contemporary states and property rights systems fail to meet the standard that social contract and natural property rights theories require for their justification. This chapter assesses the implications of those findings for the two theories. Section 1 argues that, whether contractarians accept or reject these findings, they need to clarify their argument to remove equivocation. Section 2 invites efforts to refute this book’s empirical findings. Section 3 discusses a response open only to property rights theorists: concede this book’s empirical findings and blame government failure. Section 4 considers the argument that this book misidentifies the state of nature. Section 5 considers a “bracketing strategy,” which admits that observed stateless societies fit the definition of the state of nature, but argues that they are not the relevant forms of statelessness today. Section 6 discusses the implications of accepting both the truth and relevance of the book’s findings, concluding that the best response is to fulfil the Lockean proviso by taking action to improve the lives of disadvantaged people.


Author(s):  
Thomas Sinclair

The Kantian account of political authority holds that the state is a necessary and sufficient condition of our freedom. We cannot be free outside the state, Kantians argue, because any attempt to have the “acquired rights” necessary for our freedom implicates us in objectionable relations of dependence on private judgment. Only in the state can this problem be overcome. But it is not clear how mere institutions could make the necessary difference, and contemporary Kantians have not offered compelling explanations. A detailed analysis is presented of the problems Kantians identify with the state of nature and the objections they face in claiming that the state overcomes them. A response is sketched on behalf of Kantians. The key idea is that under state institutions, a person can make claims of acquired right without presupposing that she is by nature exceptional in her capacity to bind others.


Author(s):  
David Boucher

Among philosophers and historians of political thought Hobbes has little or nothing to say about relations among states. For modern realists and representatives of the English School in contemporary international relations theory, however, caricatures of Hobbes abound. There is a tendency to take him too literally, referring to what is called the unmodified philosophical state of nature, ignoring what he has to say about both the modified state of nature and the historical pre-civil condition. They extrapolate from the predicament of the individual conclusions claimed to be pertinent to international relations, and on the whole find his conclusions unconvincing. It is demonstrated that there is a much more restrained and cautious Hobbes, consistent with his timid nature, in which he gives carefully weighed views on a variety of international issues, recommending moderation consistent with the duties of sovereignty.


Author(s):  
Christine Cheng

After war, rebuilding the state’s presence—or building it up for the first time—is both a physical and social endeavor requiring new norms of compliance and cooperation. Local authority is deeply contested and the state typically has minimal presence. These conditions are akin to those described in the state of nature. To escape these conditions, Hobbes and Locke argued for the necessity of a sovereign to impose order and impartial justice to form what I call the kernel of the state. Extralegal groups orient societies in that direction by performing a set of visible and hidden functions in contemporary post-conflict environments. But they are not intentionally state-making. Rather, extralegal groups are driven by the need to create a stable trading environment and state-making is a by-product of this imperative. In the contemporary era, the motivation that drives extralegal groups to begin state-making is trade, not war.


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