Rationality as the condition of individual rights in David Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement

The topic of this paper is the foundation for individual rights proposed by David Gauthier in his seminal 1986 book Morals by Agreement, and particularly the role of conception of rationality in this foundation. The foundation of rights is a part of Gauthier’s broader enterprise: to ground morals in rationality – more specifically, in the economic conception of rationality. Because of the importance of this conception for the whole of Gauthier’s project, we reconstruct first the conception of rationality which can be found in decision theory and game theory, presenting simultaneously in a relatively non-technical way some basic concepts of the aforementioned disciplines. We proceed then to reconstruction of the foundation of rights itself – it turns on Gauthier’s interpretation of the so-called “Lockean proviso.” Lastly, we turn to the connection between rationality and foundation of rights. It is to be found in the narrow compliance – the disposition to enter only into cooperation which satisfies conditions of fairness set out in part by the Lockean proviso.

Property, the environment, and the Lockean Proviso

It is common to posit a clear opposition between the values served by property systems and the value of the environment. To give the environment its due, this view holds, the role of private property needs to be limited. Support for this has been said to be found in Locke’s famous ‘enough and as good’ proviso. This article shows that this opposition is mistaken, and corrects the implied reading of Locke’s proviso. In reality, there is no opposition between property and the environment. This is shown using Locke’s theory of appropriation, as well as the real-life case of instream water appropriation.

The Birth of a Nationalist

This chapter explores the differences between nationalists and globalists. The chapter asserts that being a nationalist or a globalist is not a constitutive state of mind; on the contrary, in light of changing circumstances, individuals locate themselves at different points along the global—national (G—N) continuum. The chapter sheds new light on the correlation among education, rationality, and the way individuals position themselves on the G—N continuum. It argues that individuals are better of if they structure their preferences in light of actual risks and opportunities. The chapter also recounts social and economic circumstances affecting a person's scheme of risks and opportunities. The chapter elaborates the discussion concerning moral luck. It also assesses the impact of Lockean proviso, in which individuals have the right to acquire as much private property as they can (mostly land in Locke's days), as long as what they leave behind for others is enough and “as good.”

A Coasian Solution to Problems of Initial Acquisitions

This article extends the Coase Conjecture to ethical issues of initial acquisitions of property rights. The Coase Conjecture complements the Lockean labour-mixing criterion to limit the boundaries of morally legitimate initial acquisitions of unowned property; whenever the Coase Conjecture applies, the Lockean Proviso that there be “enough and as good” left is automatically satisfied. This holds provided that, when a claim is made, the marginal willingness to pay for the last portion of it is zero (infra-marginally, willingness to pay may be arbitrarily high). Thus, the market price of the claim is zero, except for the part of it that the claimant inhabits or improves. “Excessive” claims therefore come to have a zero market price, so anyone may take possession of them, by purchase or theft. In either case they must compensate the original claimant by a zero amount. It follows that non-claimants do not lose by putatively “excessive” grabs by claimants. This article argues that any initial claims are just under these circumstances.

Implications

Earlier chapters of this book found that the Hobbesian hypothesis is false; the Lockean proviso is unfulfilled; contemporary states and property rights systems fail to meet the standard that social contract and natural property rights theories require for their justification. This chapter assesses the implications of those findings for the two theories. Section 1 argues that, whether contractarians accept or reject these findings, they need to clarify their argument to remove equivocation. Section 2 invites efforts to refute this book’s empirical findings. Section 3 discusses a response open only to property rights theorists: concede this book’s empirical findings and blame government failure. Section 4 considers the argument that this book misidentifies the state of nature. Section 5 considers a “bracketing strategy,” which admits that observed stateless societies fit the definition of the state of nature, but argues that they are not the relevant forms of statelessness today. Section 6 discusses the implications of accepting both the truth and relevance of the book’s findings, concluding that the best response is to fulfil the Lockean proviso by taking action to improve the lives of disadvantaged people.

The Hobbesian Hypothesis: How a Colonial Prejudice Became an Essential Premise in the Most Popular Justification of Government

This chapter introduces the role of “the Hobbesian hypothesis” in social contract theory by discussing how Thomas Hobbes introduced it. It defines the version of “the Lockean proviso” relevant to social contract theory as the following moral standard: for a state to be justified virtually everyone must be better off under the state than they could reasonably expect to be in any stateless environment. The chapter defines the contractarian version of “the Hobbesian hypothesis” as the empirical claim that the Lockean proviso is fulfilled by the state: the state benefits everyone or at least everyone who prefers safety to a perilous environment devoid of security. The chapter argues that any plausible justification of existing states drawn from broadly Hobbesian or contractarian principles relies on this hypothesis as an empirical premise comparing the welfare of disadvantaged people in state society and people in stateless societies.

John Locke and the Hobbesian Hypothesis: How a Similar Colonial Prejudice Became an Essential Premise in the Most Popular Justification of Private Property Rights

This chapter introduces the role of “the Hobbesian hypothesis” (the claim that “the Lockean proviso” is fulfilled) in the natural rights justification of private property by discussing John Locke’s use of it in his “appropriation” theory. The chapter defines the property-theory version of “the Lockean proviso” as the claim that everyone is better off in a society with private ownership of land and natural resources than they could reasonably expect to be in any society in which land remains a commons as it was for many small-scale stateless peoples in history and prehistory. The chapter defines the property-theory version of “the Hobbesian hypothesis” as the empirical claim that the Lockean proviso is fulfilled by the property rights system: even the least advantage people under the private property system are better off than they could reasonably expect to be in a small-scale society with common land. It argues that any plausible natural rights justification of the private property system relies on this hypothesis as an empirical premise comparing the welfare of disadvantaged people in societies with a well-develop private property system and people in small-scale, stateless societies that treat land as a commons.

The Hobbesian Hypothesis in Contemporary Political Theory

This chapter argues that “the Hobbesian hypothesis” (the claim that the Lockean proviso is fulfilled: everyone is better off in a state society with a private property system than they could reasonably expect to be in any society without either of those institutions) plays a large role in contemporary justifications of the state and/or the property rights system. The search turns up few attempts to justify existing states or property rights systems without some version of the hypothesis. Theorists asserting it as an obvious truth in need of little or no supporting evidence include David Gauthier, Jean Hampton, James Buchanan, Gregory S. Kavka, George Klosko, Dudley Knowles, Christopher Heath Wellman, Robert Nozick, Jan Narveson, and many others. Critics include Alan Ryan, Carole Pateman, Charles Mills, Patricia Williams, and others. Yet all this disagreement has produce very little debate or interest in an empirical investigation of the hypothesis.

Introduction

This chapter defines “the Hobbesian hypothesis” as the claim that the Lockean proviso is fulfilled: everyone benefits from the state and/or the property rights system. The chapter previews the book’s arguments, including these five: 1. Although previously unnamed, this hypothesis has been used in many prominent political theories for at least 350 years. 2. This hypothesis is an empirical claim about all stateless peoples. 3. Despite equivocation, social contract justifications of the state and natural rights justifications of property use this hypothesis as a fundamental premise. 4. Most philosophers who rely on it have asked readers to assume it is true without offering evidence. 5. It is false.