Virtue Ethics and Medical Law

Author(s):  
Robert Gay

Virtue ethics is a way of viewing the moral life in terms of the necessary dispositions which shape human action towards the good, and towards human flourishing. Thinking of the moral life in terms of virtue was the dominant approach to moral philosophy in ancient and medieval thought. Although largely absent as a major strand of thought in moral philosophy after the Enlightenment, it has key features which challenge the dominant approaches in moral philosophy. The second half of the twentieth century saw a revival in virtue ethics, inspired by philosophers such as Anscombe and MacIntyre. The Hippocratic tradition provides a virtue framework for medicine, and the revival of virtue ethics has led to further work to explore the importance of virtue in medical practice. In the morally and technically complex world of medical practice, the virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance are necessary for the doctor to act according to the best interests of the patient, which are in line with the proper ends of medicine. The law has a role in prohibiting acts which are not in accordance with the ends of medicine, which cannot be virtuous. It also has a role in helping to arrive at prudential decisions in cases where there are disputes between patients or their families and medical teams about a best course of action. Finally, medical law should have a role in cultivating virtue within medicine for the benefit of patients and doctors.

2021 ◽  
pp. 88-96
Author(s):  
Richard Kearney ◽  
Melissa Fitzpatrick

This chapter will explore what I take to be the post-Kantian practical-possible ethics par excellence: contemporary virtue ethics. In the spirit of Aristotle, contemporary virtue ethics seeks to provide an account of ethics that is relevant to life, as we know it—and for our purposes, an ethics of hospitality that is more than armchair theory. Elaborating on the two preceding chapters, I will critically interpret Talbot Brewer’s recent and remarkably comprehensive Aristotelian-inspired approach to re-imagining the task of moral philosophy and the moral philosopher, ultimately illustrating that a vital aspect of human flourishing—eudaimonia, a life of practical wisdom—is hospitality to the strange and strangers.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 336-351
Author(s):  
Christopher D. Jones

Eastern Orthodox accounts of acedia are often neglected in Catholic and Protestant circles, yet offer a range of insights for contemporary virtue ethics and moral psychology. Acedia is a complex concept with shades of apathy, hate, and desire that poses grave problems for the moral life and human wellbeing. This is because acedia disorders reasoning, desiring, willing, and acting, and causes various harms to relationships. Evagrius Ponticus and John Cassian discuss acedia in the context of a virtue ethic ordered to human flourishing that includes practices to combat vices and build character. The result is an Orthodox conception of virtue and moral psychology that rewards ecumenical attention.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 3-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shih-Ning Then

Young children who are called upon to donate regenerative tissue – most commonly bone marrow – to save the life of a sick relative are in a unique position. The harvest of tissue from them is non-therapeutic and carries the risk of physical and psychological harm. However, paediatric donation is relatively common medical practice around the world. Where some doubt exists over the legality of allowing a child to donate, courts can be asked to authorize the procedure and in doing so will apply the ‘best interests’ test in making their decision. How are a young child’s rights recognized in such a situation? This article considers whether the best interests test is the ‘best’ test to be applied by courts when cases of potential child donors come before it. The approach of courts in three jurisdictions is analysed, and problems in the application of the test in this context are discussed. While the continued use of the test by courts is supported, the way the test has been used by courts is critiqued and recommendations made to better respect the rights of the potential donor child.


2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Foster

Over the last quarter of a century, English medical law has taken an increasingly firm stand against medical paternalism. This is exemplified by cases such as Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority, Chester v Afshar, and Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board. In relation to decision-making on behalf of incapacitous adults, the actuating principle of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 is respect for patient autonomy. The only lawful acts in relation to an incapacitous person are acts which are in the best interests of that person. The 2005 Act requires a holistic assessment of best interests. Best interests are wider than ‘medical best interests’. The 2018 judgment of the Supreme Court in An NHS Trust v Y (which concerned the question of whether a court needed to authorise the withdrawal of life-sustaining clinically administered nutrition/hydration (CANH) from patients in prolonged disorders of consciousness (PDOC)) risks reviving medical paternalism. The judgment, in its uncritical endorsement of guidelines from various medical organisations, may lend inappropriate authority to medical judgments of best interests and silence or render impotent non-medical contributions to the debate about best interests—so frustrating the 2005 Act. To minimise these dangers, a system of meditation should be instituted whenever it is proposed to withdraw (at least) life-sustaining CANH from (at least) patients with PDOC, and there needs to be a guarantee of access to the courts for families, carers and others who wish to challenge medical conclusions about withdrawal. This would entail proper public funding for such challenges.


2018 ◽  
Vol 86 (3) ◽  
pp. 142-146
Author(s):  
Emma M Szelepet

The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (‘MCA’) sets out a regime which governs the making of decisions for people who lack mental capacity. Acts must be carried out, and decisions made, for such an incapacitated person, based on what is in her best interests (section 4 MCA). In this paper, I consider the body of post-MCA case law which applies the MCA best interests test to decision-making for elderly people, in various contexts. Is the best interests test ‘fit for purpose’ for the vulnerable elderly? The key aims of Parliament in introducing the test seem to have been empowerment, protection and support – and alertness to undue influence – as well as a balance between the objective and subjective viewpoints. Laudable attempts have been made by some judges, applying the MCA, to pay real heed to the patient's wishes and values, and to balance physical risk with welfare and happiness. However, it is not yet clear in my view that the new regime fully achieves Parliament’s aims. Indeed, these aims themselves should be expanded; the law in this area should also promote the significance and value of advanced years and should recognise Aristotle's concept of ‘human flourishing’ in old age. Consideration should be given to amending the MCA, adding guidance specifically for the elderly and also to introducing a Convention of Human Rights for the older person and to creating a new statutory Older Persons’ Commissioner and/or a cabinet-level Minister for Ageing and Older People.


Author(s):  
Bernd Carsten Stahl

AbstractAny discussion of the ethics of AI needs to be based on a sound understanding of the concept of ethics. This chapter therefore provides a brief overview of some of the key approaches to ethics with a particular emphasis on virtue ethics and the idea of human flourishing. The chapter reviews the purposes for which AI can be used, as these have a bearing on an ethical evaluation. Three main purposes are distinguished: AI forefficiency, optimisation and profit maximisation, AI forsocial control and AI for human flourishing. Given the focus on human flourishing in this book, several theoretical positions are introduced that provide insights into different aspects and ways of promoting human flourishing. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the currently widespread principle-based approach to AI ethics.


2007 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-86
Author(s):  
Anna Abram

This article presents a view of moral development based on the interdisciplinary study of moral psychology and virtue ethics. It suggests that a successful account of moral development has to go beyond what the developmental psychology and virtue ethics advocate and find ways of incorporating ideas, such as “moral failure” and “unpredictability of life.” It proposes to recognize the concept of moral development as an essential concept for ethics, moral philosophy and philosophy of education, and as a useful tool for anyone who wants to engage constructively in dialogues of religions, cultures and personal interaction.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document