Plutarch’s Cosmological Ethics

Plutarch of Chaeronea (c. 45-120 CE) is the most prolific and influential moral philosopher in the Platonic tradition. This book is a fundamental reappraisal of Plutarch’s ethical thought. It shows how Plutarch based his ethics on his particular interpretation of Plato’s cosmology: our quest for the good life should start by considering the good cosmos in which we live. The practical consequences of this cosmological foundation permeate various domains of Greco-Roman life: the musician, the organiser of a drinking party, and the politician should all be guided by cosmology. After exploring these domains, this book offers in-depth interpretations of two works which can only be fully understood by paying attention to cosmological aspects: 'Dialogue on Love' and 'On Tranquillity of Mind'.

Philosophy in the Narrative Mode

Histories of Arabic and Islamic philosophy tend to focus on texts which are systematic in nature and conventionally classified as philosophy or related scholarly disciplines. Philosophical principles, however, are also defining features of texts associated with other genres. Within the larger field of philosophy, this might be especially true of ethics and within the larger body of literature this might be especially the case for stories. Indeed, it is sometimes argued that the very purpose of storytelling is to reinforce and disseminate moral conventions. Likewise, the moral philosopher can be conceptualized as a homo narrans.The aim of this contribution is to apply the approach to narratives as a mode of debating ethical or moral principles to biographies of Alexander the Great. More than any other figure of the classical world, Alexander was religiously validated in the Islamic tradition due to his quasi-prophetic status as the ‘man with the two horns’ in the Qur’an. He appears prominently in the larger orbit of Arabic and Islamic philosophy as interlocutor and disciple of Aristotle and is adduced anecdotally in philosophical literature as an example to teach larger lessons of life. As a world conqueror, he provided an attractive model for those who sought to reconcile philosophical insight with worldly ambition.Focusing on biographies of Alexander, this article explores ethical principles which are inscribed in this body of literature and thus reads the texts as a narrativized form of philosophy. The analysis is comparative in two ways. Biographies of different periods and regions of the Islamicate world will be discussed, but comparisons with pre-Islamic biographies of Alexander (notably Roman biographies and the Alexander Romance) are included as well.

Book Review: Robert J. Barro and Rachel M. McCleary, The Wealth of Religions: The Political Economy of Believing and Belonging, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019.

A preface, eight chapters, notes, a bibliography, and an index are what constitute Barro and McCleary’s in-depth analysis of the “wealth” of religions. The book’s title is very attractive, and at the same time quite provocative, as politics, economics and religions are widely debated topics in most societies these days, but people remain reserved to tackle certain aspects, in particular the link between money, markets and religious beliefs and belonging. Bringing together the views of an economist, Barro, and a moral philosopher, McCleary, leads to an interesting approach to religion as different from a social construct, the main idea upon which reflecting and debating religion has been based upon for years, if not centuries.

Foundations on Silt: Jeremy Bentham, Liberalism and the Science of International Law

<p>When the words good or bad are uttered the user generally takes their meaning derived from a system of ethics or morals. In this sense good and bad are particularist in nature and also socio-culturally specific. Let us take a simple example from Antiquity. At school in the West we learn of a figure called Alexander the Great, the Macedonian. By all accounts we are taught that he was a great, and by extension a good man. In modern day Iran Alexander of Macedonia is known as Alexander the Devil. So the question arises: was Alexander good or bad, or both? Is it possible to state unequivocally that the actions of Alexander were as a matter of fact morally good or morally bad? I think the answer to this question is fairly straightforward: it depends. Now this answer is not a simple descent into postmodern territory and moral relativism; there are genuine and empirical reasons to believe all three possibilities pertaining to the actions of Alexander. In short it is not possible to extrapolate from the particular to the general and it is not a question of semantics or even of critical hermeneutics. There is no either/or for Alexander of Macedonia. The binary opposition of good and bad cannot be applied to the particular actions of an individual and furthermore cannot be generalized as a principle, rule or otherwise. This distinction or argument between what can be deemed good and what can be deemed bad may at first sight seem irrelevant to the law but it is not. In moral philosophy natural law theory states that law is based on morality, therefore negating the possibility of a bad law. It is at this point that Jeremy Bentham comes to our attention. Bentham believed that law and morality, although connected need not necessarily be so. Under the principle of utility, which I will explore in more detail later in this essay, Bentham believed that individual intent of an action could be disassociated from the intent that ought to be in place. The principle of utility was this test. In other words when determining the right course of action and what laws should be obeyed for all circumstances and systems, the principle of utility was the foundation. And I will argue later on in this essay that although Bentham is identified as a legal positivist and a philosophical realist his negative idealism is based on an error, much in the same way that he thought he had identified the fallacy of natural law. Bentham’s foundations may not be on stilts but perhaps, more accurately, they were built on silt. Moreover Bentham’s position as a moral philosopher is rather unusual in that although he was indeed interested in the behavior of the individual he was insofar as that behavior might have some bearing on a general system of law. This essay is therefore concerned with this troubling problem. I will proceed as follows. Firstly, I will give an overview of Bentham’s criticism of natural law and of William Blackstone in particular. Secondly, I will look at Bentham’s contribution to the internationalization of the law and his use of the “principle of utility”; he coined the neologism “international” as one of many. I will then move on to see how Bentham expected to actualize his foundational principle through his efforts to persuade others of the efficacy of codifying international law as a form of ‘science’. I conclude by arguing that Bentham’s philosophical realism was, in fact a form of idealism, bordering on the religious; his ‘cosmic calculus’.</p>

Foundations on Silt: Jeremy Bentham, Liberalism and the Science of International Law

<p>When the words good or bad are uttered the user generally takes their meaning derived from a system of ethics or morals. In this sense good and bad are particularist in nature and also socio-culturally specific. Let us take a simple example from Antiquity. At school in the West we learn of a figure called Alexander the Great, the Macedonian. By all accounts we are taught that he was a great, and by extension a good man. In modern day Iran Alexander of Macedonia is known as Alexander the Devil. So the question arises: was Alexander good or bad, or both? Is it possible to state unequivocally that the actions of Alexander were as a matter of fact morally good or morally bad? I think the answer to this question is fairly straightforward: it depends. Now this answer is not a simple descent into postmodern territory and moral relativism; there are genuine and empirical reasons to believe all three possibilities pertaining to the actions of Alexander. In short it is not possible to extrapolate from the particular to the general and it is not a question of semantics or even of critical hermeneutics. There is no either/or for Alexander of Macedonia. The binary opposition of good and bad cannot be applied to the particular actions of an individual and furthermore cannot be generalized as a principle, rule or otherwise. This distinction or argument between what can be deemed good and what can be deemed bad may at first sight seem irrelevant to the law but it is not. In moral philosophy natural law theory states that law is based on morality, therefore negating the possibility of a bad law. It is at this point that Jeremy Bentham comes to our attention. Bentham believed that law and morality, although connected need not necessarily be so. Under the principle of utility, which I will explore in more detail later in this essay, Bentham believed that individual intent of an action could be disassociated from the intent that ought to be in place. The principle of utility was this test. In other words when determining the right course of action and what laws should be obeyed for all circumstances and systems, the principle of utility was the foundation. And I will argue later on in this essay that although Bentham is identified as a legal positivist and a philosophical realist his negative idealism is based on an error, much in the same way that he thought he had identified the fallacy of natural law. Bentham’s foundations may not be on stilts but perhaps, more accurately, they were built on silt. Moreover Bentham’s position as a moral philosopher is rather unusual in that although he was indeed interested in the behavior of the individual he was insofar as that behavior might have some bearing on a general system of law. This essay is therefore concerned with this troubling problem. I will proceed as follows. Firstly, I will give an overview of Bentham’s criticism of natural law and of William Blackstone in particular. Secondly, I will look at Bentham’s contribution to the internationalization of the law and his use of the “principle of utility”; he coined the neologism “international” as one of many. I will then move on to see how Bentham expected to actualize his foundational principle through his efforts to persuade others of the efficacy of codifying international law as a form of ‘science’. I conclude by arguing that Bentham’s philosophical realism was, in fact a form of idealism, bordering on the religious; his ‘cosmic calculus’.</p>

Recent Work on Nietzsche’s Moral Psychology and Ethics

Each of these books presents itself as rescuing Nietzsche from misinterpretation. Thus, Leiter wants to prevent Nietzsche from being “moralized” (i. e., read in a way that makes him sound like a contemporary moral philosopher); Stern wants to prevent Nietzsche from being iron-manned (i. e., read in a way that assumes his arguments must be invulnerable to critique); Alfano wants to correct what he sees as a tendency to misrepresent Nietzsche’s central concerns; and Ridley claims writers have been misled when thinking about Nietzsche on action. Alfano’s book is, to my mind, the most successful at achieving its stated aims; while I point out some potential oversights and some areas that could benefit from further development, Alfano’s book is both novel and important. Leiter’s book is clearly written and presents the arguments in an admirably forthright manner, but some of its conclusions are vitiated by lapses and mischaracterizations. Stern gets Nietzsche’s basic view right, but does not probe it very deeply and is too quick to present Nietzsche as confused; I see the confusions as emanating less from Nietzsche’s texts and more from Stern’s reading of them. Ridley’s book is original and provocative, but I find the central claim - that Nietzsche endorses an expressive account of action - ultimately unconvincing.

Sources of Learning: Zhu Xi’s Theory of Moral Development

As moral philosopher Zhu Xi (1130–1200) sought to nurture the autonomous moral self. In his pedagogical scheme, one ought to cultivate the innate goodness of the heart, investigate principles in things, and embody ethical standards in daily life. In Zhu Xi’s view, the ability to exercise moral autonomy is obtained through a long period of moral and ethical training under the close surveillance of one’s immediate surroundings since early childhood. For this reason, Zhu Xi emphasized the practice of social norms as well as the performance of mundane rituals as the preconditions for the development of the autonomous moral self. By combining the Lesser Learning (xiaoxue 小學) with the Great Learning (daxue 大學), Zhu Xi articulated an integrated vision of moral development from the heteronomous performing of ethical duties to the autonomous embodiment of moral principles.

Recent Work on Nietzsche’s Moral Psychology and Ethics

Each of these books presents itself as rescuing Nietzsche from misinterpretation. Thus, Leiter wants to prevent Nietzsche from being “moralized” (i. e., read in a way that makes him sound like a contemporary moral philosopher); Stern wants to prevent Nietzsche from being iron-manned (i. e., read in a way that assumes his arguments must be invulnerable to critique); Alfano wants to correct what he sees as a tendency to misrepresent Nietzsche’s central concerns; and Ridley claims writers have been misled when thinking about Nietzsche on action. Alfano’s book is, to my mind, the most successful at achieving its stated aims; while I point out some potential oversights and some areas that could benefit from further development, Alfano’s book is both novel and important. Leiter’s book is clearly written and presents the arguments in an admirably forthright manner, but some of its conclusions are vitiated by lapses and mischaracterizations. Stern gets Nietzsche’s basic view right, but does not probe it very deeply and is too quick to present Nietzsche as confused; I see the confusions as emanating less from Nietzsche’s texts and more from Stern’s reading of them. Ridley’s book is original and provocative, but I find the central claim – that Nietzsche endorses an expressive account of action – ultimately unconvincing.