scholarly journals The All-Powerful, Perfectly Good, and Free God

Author(s):  
T. Ryan Byerly

This paper argues that to be omnipotent is to possess all the powers. This view accommodates the demands and insights of the literature on omnipotence quite well while overcoming difficulties faced by alternative accounts of omnipotence. At the same time, the account makes available equally attractive resolutions of two puzzles: one concerning the compatibility of omnipotence and perfect goodness and a second concerning the compatibility of perfect goodness and divine freedom. In the course of articulating solutions to these puzzles, novel suggestions are proposed about divine self-control and about how best to understand the principle of alternative possibilities, while engaging with relevant literature on topics such as the truth conditions of counterpossible conditionals, the neo-Aristotelian view of powers and dispositions, and the interpretation of so-called “Luther cases.”

2021 ◽  
pp. 295-319
Author(s):  
Patrick Kain

While several scholars have suggested that Kant’s early engagement with Leibniz’s philosophical theology led Kant to a conception of the divine will that helped to motivate many of the distinctive features of Kant’s mature moral psychology and moral philosophy, commentators have nevertheless neglected and failed to understand Kant’s account of divine freedom and how it functions in his rejection of substance monism, fatalism, and threats to divine self-sufficiency. This chapter examines the development of Kant’s position in a variety of his early and later published works and in his drafts, Reflexionen, and lecture notes. God is conceived of as the ens realissimum, possessing or exemplifying all fundamental realities or perfections, and it is God’s cognition of his own goodness that gives rise to his volition to create the most perfect world. Divine freedom is understood as a rational and autonomous expression of the divine nature itself, without requiring alternative possibilities.


2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-220
Author(s):  
Paul Bernier

Free will and determinism have recently attracted the attention of Buddhist scholars who have defended conflicting views on this issue. I argue that there is no reason to think that this problem cannot arise in Buddhist philosophy, since there are two senses of ‘free will’ that are compatible with the doctrine of non-self. I propose a reconstruction of a problem of free will and determinism in Early Buddhism, given a) the assumption that Buddhist causation entails universal causal determinism, and b) a crucial passage (A I 173–175) suggesting that Early Buddhism is committed to the principle of alternative possibilities which is arguably incompatible with a determinist interpretation of causation. This passage suggests that Early Buddhism must leave room for a robust, incompatibilist form of free will, and that a conception of indeterminist free will in the spirit of Robert Kane’s theory allows us to make sense of that notion.


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (01) ◽  
pp. 211-233
Author(s):  
Michael Robinson

Abstract:This essay advances a version of the flicker of freedom defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) and shows that it is invulnerable to the major objections facing other versions of this defense. Proponents of the flicker defense argue that Frankfurt-style cases fail to undermine PAP because agents in these cases continue to possess alternative possibilities. Critics of the flicker strategy contend that the alternatives that remain open to agents in these cases are unable to rebuff Frankfurt-style attack on the grounds that they are insufficiently robust (that is, morally significant in a way that could ground ascriptions of moral responsibility). Once we see that omissions are capable of constituting robust alternatives, even when they are not intentional, it becomes clear that agents in these cases do indeed possess robust alternative possibilities—alternatives that are ineliminable from cases of this sort. The upshot is that Frankfurt-style cases are theoretically incapable of providing us with good grounds for rejecting PAP.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 41-59
Author(s):  
Tariro Maraire ◽  
Saralah Devi Chethiyar Mariamdaran

Drug abuse has become a problem among youths in Zimbabwe, so dire is the situation that more than half of the youths’ population, approximately 57% in Zimbabwe are involved in drug abuse. The statistics on youth drug abuse in Zimbabwe increase yearly despite measures implemented by various stakeholders to fight the pandemic. The study seeks to understand the problem of drug abuse within the Zimbabwean context from a psychological perspective. The current study takes a desk research approach to understand the problem of drug abuse by the youth in Zimbabwe. The study unearths the most affected age group by drug abuse, the causes of drug abuse, the types of drug abuse and the effects of drug abuse to that age group. The study reviewed relevant literature, using key terms in the study, which are youth, drug abuse and problem. Literature was systematically categorised into categories of causes of drug abuse, types of drug abuse and the effects of drug abuse among the youth. Findings from the study are that, the youth are the most affected age group by drug abuse in Zimbabwe and the problem stems from lack of self-control and negative self-concept on the youth drug abusers. The study also established that cannabis is the most abused drug in Zimbabwe and that the problem of drug abuse has negative effects to the drug abuser, family, community and nation at large. The current study recommends for future studies to establish intervention programs in Zimbabwe that aim to enhance self-control and self-concept in youth drug abusers.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 113-131
Author(s):  
Samuel Director

I argue that perfect being theologians cannot endorse the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (AP). On perfect being theology, God is essentially morally perfect, meaning that He always acts in a morally perfect manner. I argue that it is possible that God is faced with a situation in which there is only one morally perfect action, which He must do. If this is true, then God acts without alternative possibilities in this situation. Yet, unless one says that this choice is not free, one must say that God has acted freely without alternative possibilities.


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