The Development of Kant’s Conception of Divine Freedom

While several scholars have suggested that Kant’s early engagement with Leibniz’s philosophical theology led Kant to a conception of the divine will that helped to motivate many of the distinctive features of Kant’s mature moral psychology and moral philosophy, commentators have nevertheless neglected and failed to understand Kant’s account of divine freedom and how it functions in his rejection of substance monism, fatalism, and threats to divine self-sufficiency. This chapter examines the development of Kant’s position in a variety of his early and later published works and in his drafts, Reflexionen, and lecture notes. God is conceived of as the ens realissimum, possessing or exemplifying all fundamental realities or perfections, and it is God’s cognition of his own goodness that gives rise to his volition to create the most perfect world. Divine freedom is understood as a rational and autonomous expression of the divine nature itself, without requiring alternative possibilities.

Divine Agency, Divine Freedom, and Divine Suffering

This chapter argues that traditional concepts of God as pure act, impassible, atemporal, and simple should be rethought in light of the canonical claims the Christian tradition makes about divine action. First, it examines why we should hold to a strong account of divine agency. On this basis, it argues that we cannot avoid predicating such concepts as choice, mercy, rational deliberation, love, suffering, wrath, and patience to God. The chapter calls this divine “agentism.” Second, it argues that the central claims of agentism are incompatible with the thought of Thomas Aquinas (“Thomism”) and some of its major exponents. Third, it argues why Thomism is unpersuasive. Finally, it indicates some directions for future research in this area.

Transcendant Temporality

This paper looks at several key motivations behind the prisoner of time objection and a view against which it is leveled, the Oxford School of divine temporality, with respect to the Christian God. Shared between these opposing views are concerns for divine freedom and sovereignty. While the objection, coming from divine atemporalists, has in its background a concern for the creator–creature distinction, the Oxford School prizes the authenticity of temporal God–talk in the Scriptures and the coherency of human God–talk more generally. By following these motivations closely in conversation with M–theory discussions about the nature of time as a dimension of spacetime, I propose a new model of God’s relation to time called transcendent temporality. In it, God is transcendently present in our temporal dimension, so that he is temporal but experiences our time differently than we do. Moreover, God has his own time which is distinct from but correlated to our time. God, on this view, is temporal, but in a way that he can experience succession in different ways than our one–directional and linear experience of succession. I conclude by unpacking some implications of this model and addressing possible objections.

Walter Burley on divine Ideas

This paper focuses on the theory of divine ideas of Walter Burley (1275-1347). The medieval common theory of divine ideas, developed by Augustine, was intended to provide an answer to the question of the order and intelligibility of the world. The world is rationally organized since God created it according to the models existing eternally in his mind. Augustine's theory, however, left open problems such as reconciling the principle of God's unity with the plurality of ideas, the way in which ideas can or cannot be said to be eternal, their ontological status. Medieval authors discussed such questions until at least the late 14th century. By resorting to the semantic tool of connotation, Burley explains both in what way ‘idea' can signify the divine essence as much as the creatures (thereby reconciling the principle of God's unity with the multiplicity of ideas), and in what sense we can say that God has thought them from eternity, without slipping into a necessitarian view that undermines the principle of divine freedom. Moreover, by envisaging the objective mode of being as the only mode of being of ideas, he explains in what way they truly differ from one another on the basis of their different conceptual contents

Reliable knowledge, true freedom: The remnant of the analogia temporalis in the theology of Robert Jenson and its implications for the epistemology–freedom debate

While Karl Barth balances the reliability of revelation with divine counterfactual freedom through the analogia temporalis, Robert Jenson rejects this form of analogy, arguing that it posits an unknowable reality of God behind revelation. He instead transposes metaphysics into narratological terms, arguing that this secures the reliability of revelation and divine freedom, since it means God is future to (and so undetermined by) events in time. This metric for divine freedom cannot, however, replace counterfactual possibility; hence, the analogia temporalis (presupposed in counterfactuals) re-emerges in Jenson's theology. This form of analogy is essential in balancing the reliability of revelation with divine freedom.