scholarly journals Wagering on Pragmatic Encroachment

Author(s):  
Daniel M. Eaton ◽  
Timothy H. Pickavance

Pragmatic encroachment, the view that knowledge is sensitive to one’s practical situation, is a marked departure from traditional epistemology. What follows from this view? This chapter gives a partial answer by defending the following conditional: If pragmatic encroachment is true, then it takes more evidence to know that atheism is true than to know that God exists. The chapter begins by introducing and unpacking the technical term ‘practical adequacy’ and then uses it to define pragmatic encroachment. It then connects this version of pragmatic encroachment and Pascal’s Wager. The connection yields an argument for the thesis of the chapter. Importantly, no stand is taken here as to whether one ought to affirm the antecedent or deny the consequent of this conditional. Maybe it takes more to know that atheism is true, but maybe this version of pragmatic encroachment is false.

Episteme ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Briana Toole

Abstract Standpoint epistemology, the view that social identity is relevant to knowledge-acquisition, has been consigned to the margins of mainstream philosophy. In part, this is because the principles of standpoint epistemology are taken to be in opposition to those which guide traditional epistemology. One goal of this paper is to tease out the characterization of traditional epistemology that is at odds with standpoint epistemology. The characterization of traditional epistemology that I put forth is one which endorses the thesis of intellectualism, the view that knowledge does not depend on non-epistemic features. I then suggest that two further components – the atomistic view of knowers and aperspectivalism – can be usefully interpreted as supporting features of intellectualism. A further goal of this paper is to show that we ought to resist this characterization of traditional epistemology. I use pragmatic encroachment as a dialectical tool to motivate the denial of intellectualism, and consequently, the denial of both supporting components. I then attempt to show how it is possible to have a view, similar to pragmatic encroachment, that takes social identity, rather than stakes, to be the feature that makes a difference to what a person is in a position to know.


2014 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-113
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
David Herman

This chapter uses a variety of example narratives to consider how cultures’ ways of orienting to animals (i.e., cultural ontologies) translate into, and depend for their support on, constellations of “discourse domains.” This technical term refers to the arenas of conduct in which strategies for negotiating self-other relationships—including human-animal relationships—take shape. At issue are frameworks for activity that determine what kinds of subjective experiences it is appropriate and warranted to attribute to others, nonhuman as well as human. The chapter draws on these ideas to reframe debates organized around a polarity between legible and illegible animal minds, commonly associated with fiction and nonfiction, respectively. To work past this polarity, the chapter outlines techniques for documenting and analyzing the attested range of mind-ascribing practices in a given culture or subculture, as they manifest themselves in nonfictional as well as fictional narratives about animals across different discourse domains.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomoya Miura ◽  
Shun Maeta

Abstract We show that any triharmonic Riemannian submersion from a 3-dimensional space form into a surface is harmonic. This is an affirmative partial answer to the submersion version of the generalized Chen conjecture. Moreover, a non-existence theorem for f -biharmonic Riemannian submersions is also presented.


Episteme ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Shin

AbstractCiting some recent experimental findings, I argue for the surprising claim that in some cases the less time you have the more you know. More specifically, I present some evidence to suggest that our ordinary knowledge ascriptions are sometimes sensitive to facts about an epistemic subject's truth-irrelevant time constraints such that less (time) is more (knowledge). If knowledge ascriptions are sensitive in this manner, then this is some evidence of pragmatic encroachment. Along the way, I consider comments made by Jonathan Schaffer (2006) and Jennifer Nagel (2008, 2010) to construe a purist contextualist and a strict invariantist explanation of the data respectively, before giving reasons to resist them in favor of an account that indicates pragmatic encroachment. If successful, this may suggest a new way to argue for the controversial thesis that there is pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.


Theology ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 124 (2) ◽  
pp. 84-92
Author(s):  
David Jasper

The priestly figure in Graham Greene’s fiction may or may not wear a clerical collar. But through such characters salvation may be glimpsed not only through faith but through doubt and human weakness. Saints and sinners are not far apart. Pascal’s ‘wager’ is also ever present in these novels that reflect the ambiguities of Greene’s conversion to Roman Catholicism.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document