Realism and Knowledge First. Interview with Timothy Williamson

The renowned British philosopher Timothy Williamson talks about his philosophical views and main lines of research. Williamson is a metaphysical realist in a broad sense. Fir him there are true or false answers to questions about all aspects of reality. Classical logic is a universal true theory. Knowledge-first epistemology is an alternative to the traditional belief-first epistemology. The former takes the concept of knowledge as a basic concept, explaining other epistemic concepts, including belief, in its terms, whereas the latter does the opposite. Knowledge, not truth, is the fundamental epistemic good. The Gettier problem and the skeptical problem that arise within traditional epistemology are ill posed and therefore cannot be solved. Hybrid epistemological theories do not satisfy the principles of simplicity and beauty and are refuted by counter-examples. Epistemic contextualism is problematic, and relativism violates the semantics of the phenomena being explained. Knowledge does not entail knowledge about knowledge. Knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. The distinction between a priori and a posteriori is superficial, and there are no analytical truths. The concept of qualia is unhelpful for solving the problems related to consciousness. The so-called “hard problem” of consciousness points to an area of conceptual confusions in which we do not know how to reason properly. Speculative metaphysics is quite a respectable enterprise. But progress in metaphysics is not automatic; it requires the right methodology.

The Language of Adam, Epistemic Crisis, and the “Radical Truths” of John Dee

The life and work of John Dee (1527–1608/9), an English mathematician, eru­dite and occultist, remains an enigma that gives rise to intensive controversies, puzzles scholars, and nourishes imagination of mass culture makers. The aim of the article is to consider a magical practice of the late Dee and a unique narrative recorded in his diaries, in a context of the intellectual situation of that epoch. The analysis is concentrated on a role of those practice and narrative in dialectics of the search for the perfect language which took place in the West in 15th–17th cc. A technical facet of crystallomancy and its standing in the Renaissance culture as well as conditions and motives urging Dee to invest his years in practicing the magic of that kind. A special attention is paid to the course and results of re­vealing of the primordial tongue by the ‘angels’ and to the Adamic myth that accompanied the linguistic material and informed of substance, functions, and historical fate of Ursprache. It is argued that despite its reprehensibility crystal­lomancy took a relatively high cultural status and a wide spreading. Dee became its convinced adept due to a deep inner crisis caused by eschatological anxiety, collapse of traditional epistemology, and discontent with his previous intellectual initiatives. As spirits claimed, the language that they were imparting to him con­nected the protoplasts with God and angels in Eden and served Adam as a per­fect instrument of knowledge and magic. Explaining his lasting failure of com­prehending of the revealed language the spirits persuaded Dee that it was not time yet for activation of its potencies but that it was very near though known only to God. That time had never come in the magician’s life. Nonetheless, glad­ness of (seeming) communication with the ‘angels’ compensated for bitterness of futile expectations.

CRITICAL POTENTIAL OF FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY

The article explores the arguments in favor of feminist epistemology used in the works of L. Code, S. Harding, D. Haraway, J. Lloyd and other gender (radical) feminists. The sources of feminist epistemology are the naturalized epistemology and the thesis of underdetermination by W. Quine, the views of W. Sellars, Marxism, the strong program of sociology of knowledge, logical positivism. The features of feminist epistemology include many signature schemes, the tendency to use different schemes from suitable disciplines, rethinking of the concepts «knowledge» and «knower» for previously excluded or non-included groups of women, people with disabilities, representatives of different races, sexual minorities. Another feature is that «Feminine» experience and voice, viewed from an essentialist or non-essentialist approach, are considered the grounds for the position of «knower». The article examines the critical remarks made by feminists against the assumptions of traditional epistemology: universal human nature, «a view from nowhere», pureimpersonal reason, the assumption of «Robinsonade». Attention to subjectivity, values and selfish interests in the production of knowledge should be considered a merit of feminist epistemology. However, L. Laudan has already shown that no one, including representatives of feminist epistemology, have demonstrated the plausibility, let alone the veracity of judgements that justify any number of possible interpretations of the knowledge gained. The paper shows that feminist epistemology cannot avoid the well-known vicissitudes of epistemological relativism. However, feminist epistemology deserves the attention of philosophers because it is part of a broader relativist turn in social sciences and the humanities that seeks to extend its criticism to scientific knowledge.

Razão (jñāna) e Devoção (bhakti) no Advaita Vedānta: Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (séc. XVI) e o Bhagavad Gītā

Razão (jñāna) e Devoção (bhakti) no Advaita Vedānta: Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (séc. XVI) e o Bhagavad Gītā 1 Resumo: O artigo tem por objetivo empreender a análise dos princípios constitutivos da práxis devocional (bhakti) proposta pelo Bhagavad Gītā, segundo a interpretação do filósofo Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (séc. XVI). Excelso representante do Advaita Vedānta (“[Escola da] Não-Dualidade”), Madhusūdana Sarasvatī buscou incorporar as práticas devocionais à epistemologia tradicional da escola, centrada num exercício radical de reflexão racional (jñāna), em sintonia com os ensinamentos do filósofo fundador Śaṅkarācārya (séc. VIII). Devoto inarredável de Kṛṣṇa, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī cumpriu sua tarefa filosófica em meio a uma interlocução fascinante com a escola Acintyabhedābheda Vedānta (“[Escola da] Não-diferença e da Diferença Inconcebíveis”), fundada por Caitanya Mahāprabhu (séc. XVI), de orientação predominantemente devocionalista vaiṣṇava.Palavras-chave: Devoção. Bhakti. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. Bhagavad Gītā. Vedānta. Reason (jñāna) and Devotion (bhakti) in Advaita Vedānta: Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (16th century) and the Bhagavad Gītā Abstract: The article aims to undertake the analysis of the constitutive principles of devotional praxis (bhakti) proposed by the Bhagavad Gītā, in accordance with philosopher Madhusūdana Sarasvatī’s (16th century) interpretation. A great representative of Advaita Vedānta (“[School of] Non-Duality”), Madhusūdana Sarasvatī sought to incorporate devotional practices into the school’s traditional epistemology, centered around a radical exercise of rational reflection (jñāna), in line with the teachings of philosopher and founder Śaṅkarācārya (8th century). A great devotee of Kṛṣṇa, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī fulfilled his philosophical task in the midst of a fascinating dialogue with the school Acintyabhedābheda Vedānta (“[School of] Non-difference and Inconceivable Difference”), founded by Caitanya Mahāprabhu (16th century), of a predominant vaiṣṇava devotionalist orientation. Key-words: Devotion. Bhakti. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. Bhagavad Gītā. Vedānta. Raison (jñāna) et Dévotion (bhakti) dans Advaita Vedānta: Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (XVIe siècle) et la Bhagavad Gītā Résumé: L'article vise à entreprendre l'analyse des principes constitutifs de la praxis dévotionnelle (bhakti) proposée par le Bhagavad Gītā, selon l'interprétation du philosophe Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (XVIe siècle). Représentant notable d'Advaita Vedānta («[École de] non-dualité»), Madhusūdana Sarasvatī a cherché à incorporer les pratiques de dévotion dans l'épistémologie traditionnelle de son école, centrée sur un exercice radical de réflexion rationnelle (jñāna), conformément aux enseignements du philosophe fondateur Śaṅkarācārya (8ème siècle). Un ardent dévot de Kṛṣṇa, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī a accompli sa tâche philosophique au milieu d'un dialogue fascinant avec l'école Acintyabhedābheda Vedānta («[École de] la différence non-différence et inconcevable»), fondée par Caitanya Mahāprabhu (XVIe siècle), et dont l’ orientation est principalement dévotionnelle vaiṣṇava. Mots clés: Dévotion. Bhakti. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. Bhagavad Gītā. Vedānta. Data de registro: 30/07/2020 Data de aceite: 21/10/2020 1 As palavras transliteradas do sânscrito seguem as normas do International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration (I.A.S.T.). Todas as traduções de originais em sânscritos foram feitas pelo autor

The Mood of the World

The phrase, “epistemology of moods,” appears in Stanley Cavell’s writings in the late 1970’s, as The Claim of Reason is published and Cavell begins the direct engagement with Emerson around which his work will pivot for the rest of his career. Indeed, it is as an “epistemologist of moods” that Emerson first appeals to Cavell in his own right, and not as merely a “second-hand Thoreau.” The phrase is an odd one. Most of us would not think that knowledge and mood are connected in the way it suggests: my foul mood may make it difficult for me to concentrate on, say, my taxes, but it does not appear to otherwise affect my ability to know how much or how little I owe—and the same could be said of Sextus’ honey, Descartes’ ball of wax, Price’s tomato, and Clarke’s block of cheese. The oddity of the phrase is, if anything, even more marked when coming from Cavell: though Cavell is deeply interested in questions of self-knowledge, and of our ability to speak for one another and in that sense know one another, he is not an epistemologist; and when he writes of epistemology he often uses phrases like traditional epistemology or classical epistemology that distance him from it. Cavell does not share the traditional epistemologist’s interest in determining what, if anything, might warrant our claims to knowledge of the empirical world or the existence of “other minds”; and “the truth of skepticism” that he announces and explores is not the truth of the claims of the epistemological skeptic regarding such matters. While the epistemologist seeks to assure himself of the certainty of his knowledge, Cavell seeks to understand our disappointment with the knowledge we have. What, then, does Cavell mean by this phrase? What is the epistemology of moods?

Closing Reflections1

In these brief comments, the author discusses the origins of his interest in the epistemology, why he has always found inferentialist accounts of it implausible, and why the similarities between the epistemology of logic and the epistemology of other domains have always been salient to him. There is also a brief account of the asymmetry between the role of internalism in Boghossian’s epistemology and the role of externalism in the author’s epistemology. Finally, there are some reflections on the ways in which we can hope to improve the shaky methodology of traditional epistemology, for example by making more use of formal methods and the findings of experimental psychology.

Epistemology Naturalized: Quine's Intervention in the Debate Concerning the Problem of Knowledge

The present paper attempts critical navigation of what could be referred to as the Quinean Intervention in the debate concerning the problem of knowledge. This problem easily represents the central concern of traditional epistemology, particularly since the modern period. Its retrospective statement finds expression in the ancient definition of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB). Among the problems easily identified with the traditional conception of knowledge is the problem of exhaustive or conclusive justification, which is to form the base of the structure of knowledge. Philosophers across the spectrum of discourse have risen to respond to the problem. Prominent among the position is foundationalism and coherentism as theories of justification. However, these theoretical representations are never able to proffer conclusive justification condition; and so, the traditional problem of epistemology has remained largely unresolved. Several alternatives have therefore been proffered by philosophers across the board. One of such is the project to naturalize epistemology – a programme famously identified with W.V.O. Quine. The paper examines Quine's position to move epistemology from philosophy to psychology. This project, the paper argues, stripped epistemology of its normative status, and therefore cannot be regarded as a philosophical proposal, as philosophy is essentially prescriptive not descriptive, matters of ought not matters of is or matters of values not matters of fact. For this reason, the paper rejects the Quinean project, describing it as a non-epistemic response to an epistemological problem. The paper employs the philosophical method of analysis, clarification and criticism, combining this with the method of reconstruction and clarity.

Testimony: A Matter of Social Practices

Traditional epistemology rests on sources of information and knowledge such as perception, memory, ways of reasoning etc. In social epistemology, we find the primacy of an “indirect” form of information and knowledge, namely “testimony”: a justified belief can be acquired by hearing what others say or write. We focus on the contemporary debate, and in particular, on “communitarian” views.

Testimony: A Matter of Social Practices

Traditional epistemology rests on sources of information and knowledge such as perception, memory, ways of reasoning etc. In social epistemology, we find the primacy of an “indirect” form of information and knowledge, namely “testimony”: a justified belief can be acquired by hearing what others say or write. We focus on the contemporary debate, and in particular, on “communitarian” views.

Toward a Lockean Unification of Formal and Traditional Epistemology

A Lockean metaphysics of belief that understands outright belief as a determinable with degrees of confidence as determinates is supposed to effect a unification of traditional coarse-grained epistemology of belief with fine-grained epistemology of confidence. But determination of belief by confidence would not by itself yield the result that norms for confidence carry over to norms for outright belief unless belief and high confidence are token identical. We argue that this token-identity thesis is incompatible with the neglected phenomenon of “mistuned knowledge” – knowledge in the absence of rational confidence. We show how partial epistemological unification can be secured, even without token identity, given determination of outright belief by degrees of confidence. Finally, we suggest a direction for the pursuit of thoroughgoing epistemological unification.