World in Mind

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather Logue
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
External World ◽  
Naive Realism ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Relational View ◽  
Naïve Realism ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
External World Skepticism

I will begin this paper by sketching a view according to which perceptual phenomenal character is “extended”, in the sense of literally incorporating mind-independent entities in the subject’s environment (a view also known as Naïve Realism or the Relational View). I will then argue that this metaphysical thesis about perceptual phenomenal character affords a novel version of epistemological disjunctivism (a view that is elaborated and defended by John McDowell and Duncan Pritchard). I will conclude by comparing the resulting view with other versions of epistemological disjunctivism, and arguing that the version I have offered provides the most satisfying response to external world skepticism.

The Non-existence of the External World

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-80
Author(s):  
Jan Westerhoff
Keyword(s):  
Main Part ◽  
External World ◽  
Material Objects ◽  
Naive Realism ◽  
Naïve Realism ◽  
Selection Of

This chapter begins with an investigation of the reasons for the presumed certainty of the existence of the external, mind-independent world around us, and considers a selection of arguments directed against the existence of such an external world. I begin by arguing that we do not need to postulate an external world in order to justify the illusion–reality distinction, or to explain the coherence, intersubjectivity, and efficacy of our perception. The second main part of the chapter focuses on the discussion of different theories of perception (naïve realism, disjunctivism, representationalism) and the ontologies they involve, arguing that ultimately a kind of brain-based representationalism (referred to as irrealism) works best as a theory of perception but that this, somewhat surprisingly, also undermines the justification of a mind-independent world of material objects.

scholarly journals REFLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.J. Cunningham
Keyword(s):  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Bridge Principle ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism

AbstractIt is now common to distinguishMetaphysicalfromEpistemologicalDisjunctivism. It is equally common to suggest that it is at least not obvious that the latter requires a commitment to the former: at the very least, a suitable bridge principle will need to be identified which takes one from the former to the latter. This paper identifies a plausible-looking bridge principle that takes one from the version of Epistemological Disjunctivism defended by John McDowell and Duncan Pritchard, which I labelReflective Epistemological Disjunctivismor (RED), to Metaphysical Disjunctivism. Moreover, it identifies a modification the proponent of (RED) could, and should, make to the Internalist component of their theory, and argues that the commitment to Metaphysical Disjunctivism remains, even if such a modification is made. The upshot is that the commitment to Metaphysical Disjunctivism on the part of (RED) is shown to be particularly robust.

Non-Cognitivist Rebuttal

1957 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-66
Author(s):  
Felix E. Oppenheim
Keyword(s):  
Observational Data ◽  
External World ◽  
Naive Realism ◽  
Naïve Realism ◽  
Future Events ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Objective Existence

1. “Facts.” Jaffa holds value non-cognitivism (NC) to imply both “complete credulity concerning ‘facts’” and “total skepticism” about facts. One and the same epistemological theory can hardly be akin to naive realism as well as to skepticism. NC implies neither. As an outgrowth of modern empiricism, NC considers concepts such as “man,” “chair,” “atom” as constructs, and statements such as “man is a political animal,” “this is a chair” as hypotheses. Empirical hypotheses are scientifically meaningful if they can be tested, however indirectly, by observational data. Most of Jaffa's comments fail to meet this criterion of meaningfulness because they contain words such as “reality,” “order of the soul,” “man's humanity,” “Justice,” which cannot be operationally defined. “The objectivity of the external world cannot be demonstrated,” Jaffa concedes. Then why talk about it? Physicists never “debate the nature of the universe” and never ask “whether it has objective existence.” Physicists establish empirical laws in order to explain past and predict future events (not “reality”). Political scientists do the same—unless they turn metaphysicians.

Naive realism in terrain appreciation

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harvey S. Smallman ◽  
Maia B. Cook ◽  
Daniel I. Manes ◽  
Michael B. Cowen
Keyword(s):  
Naive Realism ◽  
Naïve Realism

scholarly journals The Appearance of Skepticism: Possibility, Conceivability and Infinite Ascent

2021 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 94-107
Author(s):  
Sorin Bangu
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Skeptical Argument ◽  
External World Skepticism ◽  
Novel Strategy

AbstractThe paper articulates a novel strategy against external world skepticism. It shows that a modal assumption of the skeptical argument cannot be justified.

scholarly journals Skeptical Arguments and Deep Disagreement

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guido Melchior
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
Different Types ◽  
External World Skepticism ◽  
Agrippa’S Trilemma

AbstractThis paper provides a reinterpretation of some of the most influential skeptical arguments, Agrippa’s trilemma, meta-regress arguments, and Cartesian external world skepticism. These skeptical arguments are reasonably regarded as unsound arguments about the extent of our knowledge. However, reinterpretations of these arguments tell us something significant about the preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation. These results contribute to the ongoing debates about the nature and resolvability of deep disagreement. The variety of skeptical arguments shows that we must distinguish different types of deep disagreement. Moreover, the reinterpretation of skeptical arguments elucidates that deep disagreement cannot be resolved via argumentation.

scholarly journals Naïve Realism In Kantian Phrase

Mind ◽  
2016 ◽  
pp. fzw009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anil Gomes
Keyword(s):  
Naive Realism ◽  
Naïve Realism
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