Ersatz Modal Realism

2019 ◽  
pp. 73-92
Author(s):  
Francesco Berto ◽  
Mark Jago
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Impossible Worlds ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Extended Approach

Ersatz possible worlds can be understood as maximal states of affairs; maximal properties; recombinations of actual bits of reality; as maps; or as entities built from propositions or sentences. The question was: can these approaches be extended to include impossible worlds? The states of affairs approach can, with some modification, accommodate impossible worlds. The property approach too can, with some modification, be extended to impossible worlds. It is argued that the extended approach is best viewed as a form of linguistic ersatzism. The combinatorial faces the question: what are recombinations, metaphysically speaking? This approach collapses into one of the others. Map ersatzism does not seem general enough to accommodate all the impossibilities. The most promising approach is linguistic ersatzism. The chapter discusses an issue all ersatz accounts face: the problem of aliens.

scholarly journals The best possible option of impossible worlds: Hybrid Modal Realism

KÜLÖNBSÉG ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamás Ádám Tuboly
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Impossible Worlds ◽  
Modal Realism

In this paper I reconstruct the merits and drawbacks of the concretist and abstractionist theories of possible worlds and face them with the challenge of impossible worlds. I show how these two types of theories deal with the problem of impossibilities, and argue that the best option is two advance the so-called hybrid modal realism, namely concret possible worlds and abstract impossible worlds. Finally, as a conclusion, I highlight some of the disadvantages of this view as well and note the possibility of a Carnap-like solution.

Lewis' Indexical Argument for World-Relative Actuality

Dialogue ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard M. Gale
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
The Other ◽  
Abstract Entity ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Possible World ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Systematic Analysis ◽  
Reductio Ad Absurdum ◽  
Critical Scrutiny

David Lewis has shocked the philosophical community with his original version of extreme modal realism according to which “every way that a world could possibly be is a way that some world is”. Logical Space is a plenitude of isolated physical worlds, each being the actualization of some way in which a world could be, that bear neither spatiotemporal nor causal relations to each other. Lewis has given independent, converging arguments for this. One is the argument from the indexicality of actuality, the other an elaborate cost-benefit argument of the inference-to-the-best explanation sort to the effect that a systematic analysis of a number of concepts, including modality, causality, propositions and properties, fares better under his theory than under any rival one that takes a possible world to be either a linguistic entity or an ersatz abstract entity such as a maximal compossible set of properties, propositions or states of affairs. Lewis' legion of critics have confined themselves mostly to attempts at a reductio ad absurdum of his theory or to objections to his various analyses. The indexical argument, on the other hand, has not been subject to careful critical scrutiny. It is the purpose of this paper to show that this argument cannot withstand such scrutiny. Its demise, however, leaves untouched his argument from the explanatory superiority for his extreme modal realism.

Analysing Modality

2020 ◽  
pp. 22-73
Author(s):  
Alastair Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Metaphysical Modality ◽  
Novel Theory ◽  
Reductive Theory

This chapter presents and defends the basic tenets of quantum modal realism. The first of these principles, Individualism, states that Everett worlds are metaphysically possible worlds. The converse of this principle, Generality, states that metaphysically possible worlds are Everett worlds. Combining Individualism and Generality yields Alignment, a conjecture about the nature of possible worlds that is closely analogous to Lewisian modal realism. Like Lewisian modal realism, Alignment entails that each possible world is a real concrete individual of the same basic kind as the actual world. These similarities render EQM suitable for grounding a novel theory of the nature of metaphysical modality with some unique properties. Also like Lewisian modal realism, quantum modal realism is a reductive theory: it accounts for modality in fundamentally non-modal terms. But quantum modal realism also has unique epistemological advantages over Lewisian modal realism and other extant realist approaches to modality.

Constructing the Impossible

2021 ◽  
pp. 141-163
Author(s):  
Kit Fine
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Formal Languages ◽  
Impossible Worlds ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Limited Role ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Degree Of Acceptance ◽  
Broad Role ◽  
Natural Way

Please keep the original abstract. A number of philosophers have flirted with the idea of impossible worlds and some have even become enamored of it. But it has not met with the same degree of acceptance as the more familiar idea of a possible world. Whereas possible worlds have played a broad role in specifying the semantics for natural language and for a wide range of formal languages, impossible worlds have had a much more limited role; and there has not even been general agreement as to how a reasonable theory of impossible worlds is to be developed or applied. This chapter provides a natural way of introducing impossible states into the framework of truthmaker semantics and shows how their introduction permits a number of useful applications.

Is mathematical knowledge a precedent for modal knowledge?: A novel objection to Lewis’s modal epistemology

SATS ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-199
Author(s):  
Joungbin Lim
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Knowledge ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Modal Epistemology ◽  
Modal Realism

Abstract The goal of this paper is to raise a novel objection to Lewis’s modal realist epistemology. After reformulating his modal epistemology, I shall argue that his view that we have necessary knowledge of the existence of counterparts ends up with an absurdity. Specifically, his analogy between mathematical knowledge and modal knowledge leads to an unpleasant conclusion that one’s counterpart exists in all possible worlds. My argument shows that if Lewis’s modal realism is true, we cannot know what is possible. Conversely, if we can know what is possible, his modal realism is false. In the remainder of the paper, I shall consider and block possible objections to my argument.

scholarly journals QUANTIFIED LOGIC OF AWARENESS AND IMPOSSIBLE POSSIBLE WORLDS

2008 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 514-529 ◽  
Author(s):  
GIACOMO SILLARI
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Explicit Knowledge ◽  
Impossible Worlds ◽  
Kripke Semantics ◽  
Logical Omniscience ◽  
Neighborhood Semantics ◽  
Two Systems ◽  
The Many ◽  
Implicit And Explicit

Among the many possible approaches to dealing with logical omniscience, I consider here awareness and impossible worlds structures. The former approach, pioneered by Fagin and Halpern, distinguishes between implicit and explicit knowledge, and avoids logical omniscience with respect to explicit knowledge. The latter, developed by Rantala and by Hintikka, allows for the existence of logically impossible worlds to which the agents are taken to have “epistemological” access; since such worlds need not behave consistently, the agents’ knowledge is fallible relative to logical omniscience. The two approaches are known to be equally expressive in propositional systems interpreted over Kripke semantics. In this paper I show that the two approaches are equally expressive in propositional systems interpreted over Montague-Scott (neighborhood) semantics. Furthermore, I provide predicate systems of both awareness and impossible worlds structures interpreted on neighborhood semantics and prove the two systems to be equally expressive.

Impossible Worlds

Philosophy ◽  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ira Kiourti
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Impossible Worlds ◽  
Impossible World ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Accessibility Relation ◽  
Possible World Semantics ◽  
Potential Applicability ◽  
Controversial Topic ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
Modern Work

Impossible worlds constitute an increasingly popular yet controversial topic in logic and metaphysics. The term “impossible worlds” parallels the term “possible worlds” and commonly refers to setups, situations, or totalities (“worlds”) that are inconsistent, incomplete, non-classical, or non-normal in possible-world semantics and metaphysics. These may verify a proposition and its negation, be silent as to the truth value of a proposition, or somehow fail to conform to the (classical) laws of logic. Some authors object to the term “impossible world,” preferring to talk of nonstandard worlds or partial situations instead. While the term “impossible world” is sometimes used to refer to a world that is inaccessible from another relative to some specified accessibility relation, impossible worlds are often conceived of as absolutely impossible in a broadly logical, conceptual, or metaphysical sense. As in the case of possible worlds, modern talk of impossible worlds originates with semantic interpretations of modal and non-classical logics, yet the potential applicability of these worlds to logical, metaphysical, and semantic philosophical puzzles has allowed them to permeate the wider philosophical arena. Arguments for impossible worlds often parallel those for possible worlds (see From Possible Worlds to Impossible Worlds) and focus largely on the proposed applications for such worlds (see Applications). As with possible worlds, there are various metaphysical conceptions of impossible worlds (see the Metaphysics of Impossible Worlds), and objections to such worlds are often theory specific (see Objections to Applications and Objections to Impossible Worlds). This article focuses on modern work on impossible worlds and its critics.

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