Is mathematical knowledge a precedent for modal knowledge?: A novel objection to Lewis’s modal epistemology

SATS ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-199
Author(s):  
Joungbin Lim
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Knowledge ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Modal Epistemology ◽  
Modal Realism

Abstract The goal of this paper is to raise a novel objection to Lewis’s modal realist epistemology. After reformulating his modal epistemology, I shall argue that his view that we have necessary knowledge of the existence of counterparts ends up with an absurdity. Specifically, his analogy between mathematical knowledge and modal knowledge leads to an unpleasant conclusion that one’s counterpart exists in all possible worlds. My argument shows that if Lewis’s modal realism is true, we cannot know what is possible. Conversely, if we can know what is possible, his modal realism is false. In the remainder of the paper, I shall consider and block possible objections to my argument.

Analysing Modality

2020 ◽  
pp. 22-73
Author(s):  
Alastair Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Metaphysical Modality ◽  
Novel Theory ◽  
Reductive Theory

This chapter presents and defends the basic tenets of quantum modal realism. The first of these principles, Individualism, states that Everett worlds are metaphysically possible worlds. The converse of this principle, Generality, states that metaphysically possible worlds are Everett worlds. Combining Individualism and Generality yields Alignment, a conjecture about the nature of possible worlds that is closely analogous to Lewisian modal realism. Like Lewisian modal realism, Alignment entails that each possible world is a real concrete individual of the same basic kind as the actual world. These similarities render EQM suitable for grounding a novel theory of the nature of metaphysical modality with some unique properties. Also like Lewisian modal realism, quantum modal realism is a reductive theory: it accounts for modality in fundamentally non-modal terms. But quantum modal realism also has unique epistemological advantages over Lewisian modal realism and other extant realist approaches to modality.

scholarly journals The best possible option of impossible worlds: Hybrid Modal Realism

KÜLÖNBSÉG ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamás Ádám Tuboly
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Impossible Worlds ◽  
Modal Realism

In this paper I reconstruct the merits and drawbacks of the concretist and abstractionist theories of possible worlds and face them with the challenge of impossible worlds. I show how these two types of theories deal with the problem of impossibilities, and argue that the best option is two advance the so-called hybrid modal realism, namely concret possible worlds and abstract impossible worlds. Finally, as a conclusion, I highlight some of the disadvantages of this view as well and note the possibility of a Carnap-like solution.

Norman Malcolm e Alvin Plantinga - Duas Versões Analíticas do Argumento do Proslogionde Santo Anselmo

2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (34) ◽  
pp. 333-355
Author(s):  
Maria Helena Reis Pereira ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Concept Of God ◽  
De Re ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
The Sixties ◽  
De Dicto

The purpose of this work is to show some aspects which characterized the way analytical philosophers in the sixties and seventies (last Century) have read Saint Anselm’s argument in the Proslogion, thereby bringing its problematic into a new light. And had the virtue to begin the question of the existence of God in the heart of the analytical philosophy which up to the date was concerned by atheism. In the Introduction, we will point out the most frequent analytical objections to the argument - (i) existence is not a predicate (ii) the concept of God is incoherent (iii) existence is not perfection. Anscombe - an exception in this analytical context - has defended and supported the thesis that the argument is not an ontological one. Malcolm discovered two arguments in the Proslogion: one in chapter II which he considers invalid, another one in Chapter III considered valid and interpreted as modal by him. Plantinga was one of the first critics of the modal proof because there was - according to him - a confusion between necessity de dicto and necessity de re. Plantinga thought that the two arguments implied and/or complemented each other and developed a theory of modal realism in which he explains the nature and divine necessity in terms of possible worlds. Based on this concept he has rewritten a new modal proof considered “victorious” by him but that was later refuted by Mackie, Tooley and Davis (amongst others) and accused of circularity. Plantinga didn’t accept his proof to be considered fallacious and Oppy didn’t also recognize the same claim made by Fergie. However, Plantinga has rephrased his proof and summarized it in just one premise: “maximal greatness is possibly instantiated”. More than a proof of God’s existence, this is a defense of the acceptance of theism, a justification of the rationality of belief. And the possibility of existence of a metaphysically necessary being drives us to a deepest reflection from where every cognitive potentiality from the labor of the philosopher can be taken.

Classical theism and modal realism are incompatible

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 561-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHAD VANCE
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Intrinsic Properties ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Special Case

AbstractThe classical conception of God is that of a necessary being. On a possible worlds semantics, this entails that God exists at every possible world. According to the modal realist account of David Lewis, possible worlds are understood to be real, concrete worlds – no different in kind from the actual world. But, modal realism is equipped to accommodate the existence of a necessary being in only one of three ways: (1) By way of counterpart theory, or (2) by way of a special case of trans-world identity for causally inert necessary beings (e.g. pure sets), or else (3) causally potent ones which lack accidental intrinsic properties. I argue that each of these three options entails unacceptable consequences – (1) and (2) are incompatible with theism, and (3) is incompatible with modal realism. I conclude that (at least) one of these views is false.

scholarly journals On the Humphrey Objection to Modal Realism

2018 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael De
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Modal Properties

An intuitive objection to modal realism is that merely possible worlds and their inhabitants seem to be irrelevant to an analysis of modality. Kripke originally phrased the objection in terms of being concerned about one’s modal properties without being concerned about the properties one’s other-worldly counterparts have. The author assesses this objection in a variety of forms, and then provides his own formulation that does not beg the question against the modal realist. Finally, the author considers two potential answers to the objection so understood and concludes that only one of them has a chance of succeeding.

Metaphysics of knowledge

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesper Kallestrup
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Modal Epistemology ◽  
Physical Realization ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Essential Nature ◽  
The World ◽  
Structure Of Knowledge ◽  
Shed Light

Epistemology has traditionally been concerned with the scope, sources and structure of knowledge and other epistemic statuses such as justified belief. Metaphysics of knowledge seeks to answer metaphysical questions about knowledge and its place in the world as they arise in such epistemological pursuits. More generally, metaphysics of epistemology can be understood to include metaphysical questions about a broader range of epistemic statuses. In either case, answers to such questions may help solve distinctive problems in epistemology or neighbouring fields, or they may be of independent theoretical importance. Since modal logic, possible worlds semantics and related formal frameworks are frequently brought to bear in traditional metaphysics, for example Williamson 2013, metaphysical inquiries about knowledge may also utilize such modal tools. But metaphysics of knowledge is distinct from both modal epistemology, which concerns the necessary links between belief and truth that supposedly constitute knowledge, and epistemology of modality, which concerns knowledge of modalities – that is, of what is necessary, possible, contingent and so on. Metaphysics of knowledge sits at the intersection of epistemology and metaphysics, whereas modal epistemology is an externalist branch of epistemology, and epistemology of modality is a sub-discipline within philosophy of modality. Both modal epistemology and epistemology of modality may of course shed light on metaphysical aspects of knowledge, for example, if it turns out knowledge is essentially a modally sensitive or safe belief. However, the intended scope of metaphysics of knowledge is much broader, encompassing not just the essential nature of knowledge, but also its metaphysical ground and its physical realization.

Theism and modal realism

2006 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
PAUL SHEEHY
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Classical Theism ◽  
Divine Omnipotence ◽  
Divine Knowledge ◽  
Classical Conception ◽  
Creative Role ◽  
The Relationship

This paper examines the relationship between the classical theistic conception of God and modal realism. I suggest that realism about possible worlds has unwelcome consequences for that conception. First, that modal realism entails the necessity of divine existence eludes explanation in a way congenial to a commitment to both modal realism and classical theism. Second, divine knowledge is dependent on worlds independent of the creative role and action of God, thereby suggesting a limitation on the nature of divine knowledge and on the nature of God's creative role. Third, modal realism indicates the existence of real, albeit non-actual, worlds of appalling evil threatening the classical conception of divine omnipotence and benevolence.

From Possibility to Properties? Or from Properties to Possibility?

Philosophy ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 92 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-49
Author(s):  
Sophie R. Allen
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Metaphysical Possibility ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Fundamental Ontology ◽  
Causal Necessity

AbstractThis paper contrasts two metaphysical accounts of modality and properties: Modal Realism which treats possible entities as primitive; and Strong Dispositionalism in which metaphysical possibility and necessity are determined by actually existing dispositions or powers. I argue that Strong Dispositionalism loses its initial advantages of simplicity and parsimony over Modal Realism as it is extended and amended to account for metaphysical rather than just causal necessity. Furthermore, to avoid objections to its material and formal adequacy, Strong Dispositionalism requires a richer fundamental ontology which it cannot explicate without appealing either to possible worlds or to an account of counterfactual truth conditions, both of which Strong Dispositionalism was intended to replace.

Ersatz Modal Realism

2019 ◽  
pp. 73-92
Author(s):  
Francesco Berto ◽  
Mark Jago
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Impossible Worlds ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Extended Approach

Ersatz possible worlds can be understood as maximal states of affairs; maximal properties; recombinations of actual bits of reality; as maps; or as entities built from propositions or sentences. The question was: can these approaches be extended to include impossible worlds? The states of affairs approach can, with some modification, accommodate impossible worlds. The property approach too can, with some modification, be extended to impossible worlds. It is argued that the extended approach is best viewed as a form of linguistic ersatzism. The combinatorial faces the question: what are recombinations, metaphysically speaking? This approach collapses into one of the others. Map ersatzism does not seem general enough to accommodate all the impossibilities. The most promising approach is linguistic ersatzism. The chapter discusses an issue all ersatz accounts face: the problem of aliens.

Modal Realism and the Possibility of Island Universes: Why There are no Possible Worlds

Metaphysica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiri Benovsky
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Island Universes

AbstractIn this article, I defend Lewisian modal realism against objections arising from the possibility of ‘Island Universes’ and other similar cases. The problem comes from Lewis’ claim that possible worlds are spatio-temporally isolated. I suggest a modification of Lewisian modal realism in order to avoid this family of objections. This modification may sound quite radical since it amounts to abandoning the very notion of a possible world, but as radical as it may sound it in fact remains well in the spirit of Lewis’ original view.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document