Conditional Reasoning Part II
The influential idea that the Ramsey test provides a proper analysis of the psychological means by which we evaluate indicative and subjunctive conditionals is explained. Several recent views have implicated sui generis imaginative states in the psychological implementation of the Ramsey test. The comparative relevance of the Ramsey test to indicative and subjunctive conditionals is explained. It is then argued that one can accept the basic insight afforded by the Ramsey test without concluding that sui generis imaginative states are used in conditional reasoning. A simpler, more parsimonious approach involves only beliefs. Anyone who could have used sui generis imaginative states to arrive at a belief in a new conditional via the Ramsey test could have, with equal warrant, inferred the conditional from their standing beliefs. Finally, it is shown how the imaginings that occur in response to philosophical thought experiments can in fact be sequences of beliefs.
