Organizing and Reorganizing Markets

Author(s):  
Nils Brunsson ◽  
Mats Jutterström

Organizing and Reorganizing Markets is an edited volume that brings organization theory to the study of markets. The differences between markets and organizations are often exaggerated. Both are organized. Organizing exists in addition to other processes and phenomena that form markets: the mutual adaption among sellers and buyers as described in mainstream economics and the institutions described in institutional economics and economic sociology. Market organization can be analysed with the same type of theories used for analysing organization within formal organizations. Through the use of many empirical examples, the book demonstrates how this can be done. We argue that the way a certain market is organized can be understood as the (intermediate) result of previous organizing processes. We discuss such questions as ‘What drives market organizing and reorganizing processes? What makes various organizations intervene as market organizers? And how are the specific contents of market organization determined?’ The answers to these questions help us to analyse similarities and differences among organizing processes in formal organizations and those in markets. The arguments are illustrated by in-depth studies of many types of markets. The book is intended to open up markets as a field of study for scholars of organization. Although the chapters have different authors, they use and elaborate upon the same general theoretical framework. The book contributes to the issue of organization outside and among organizations where a fundamental concept is that of partial organization.

Author(s):  
Nils Brunsson ◽  
Mats Jutterström

The study of market organization can be used for a comparison between organizing markets and organizing formal organizations. W use the empirical results for adding a systematic investigation of the similarities and differences between these activities. There are strong similarities in how organization takes place in practice—not least regarding the dynamics of organization, the ample supply of problems driving reorganization, and the unintended and uncertain effects of organization. We point to differences in such aspects as the number of organizers and their responsibility, who is organized—individuals or organizations—the extensiveness of organization, and the incentives for reorganization. While there are many similarities in the practice of organizing markets and organizations, most differences can be explained by differences in standard views, about how markets and organizations function. Theories of organization are useful for understanding both markets and formal organizations and the study of market organization is likely to be an important contribution to organization theory in general.


Author(s):  
Göran Ahrne ◽  
Patrik Aspers ◽  
Nils Brunsson

The term organization has earlier been used in the context of markets, but what is missing from current literature is a more systematic analysis of this notion. We present an analysis of partial organization that provides a theoretical framework for the discussions in the remaining chapters. Organization is described as a decided order where the most fundamental decisions are about membership, rules, monitoring, sanctions, and hierarchy. We exemplify how these ‘organizational elements’ are common in contemporary markets—not only in markets within formal organizations such as exchanges, but also in the more common form of markets described in the book, markets outside formal organizations. We demonstrate that a decided order has specific characteristics that make it salient to distinguish it from orders emerging from mutual adaptation among market actors and from institutions in markets.


2010 ◽  
pp. 110-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Avdasheva ◽  
N. Dzagurova

The article examines the interpretation of vertical restraints in Chicago, post-Chicago and New Institutional Economics approaches, as well as the reflection of these approaches in the application of antitrust laws. The main difference between neoclassical and new institutional analysis of vertical restraints is that the former compares the results of their use with market organization outcomes, and assesses mainly horizontal effects, while the latter focuses on the analysis of vertical effects, comparing the results of vertical restraints application with hierarchical organization. Accordingly, the evaluation of vertical restraints impact on competition differs radically. The approach of the New Institutional Theory of the firm seems fruitful for Russian markets.


2010 ◽  
pp. 39-55
Author(s):  
M. Ellman

This article is an overview of the contribution made by economic Sovietology to mainstream economics. The long debate about the universal applicability of mainstream economics is reconsidered in the light of the Soviet experience. Information is provided on the contribution of the study of the Soviet economy to fields as diverse as the measurement of economic growth, institutional economics, economic administration, the economics of property rights, the economics of the informal sector, the economics of famines, the Austrian critique of general equilibrium theory, and incentives.


2015 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-265
Author(s):  
Peter Galbács

This paper offers a few remarks on the so-called heterodoxy commentaries of recent times (e.g. Bod 2013, Csaba 2011). In accordance with the growing popularity of unusual economic policy actions, a set of “tools” is emerging that aims to exert its effects breaking with instrumental actions. Outlining a special framework of the history of mainstream economics, it will be argued that economic policy only gradually has become capable of applying this system. In our view, both the emergence of symbolic economic policies mentioned above and the rise of heterodoxy are on the same level, since certain governments can only operate through giving signals. Although it is not the time to formulate ultimate and eternal generalised statements, it may perhaps be stated that symbolic economic policies can make some room for manoeuvring available as a last resort. In other words, the possibility of a certain kind of economic policy “tools” can be derived from theoretical considerations, and this set has become highlighted recently by some constraining changes in the macroeconomic environment. Our theoretical framework will be filled sporadically with some episodes from the last few years of the economic policy of Hungary.


Author(s):  
Andrea Lorenzo Capussela

This chapter lays out one part of the theoretical framework of the book, drawn from institutional economics. This literature maintains that institutions are the main determinant of long-term growth, and that to remain ‘appropriate’ institutions must evolve in synchrony with an economy’s progress through the stages of its development. Their evolution depends on a society’s openness to political creative destruction. Limited-access social orders tend to constrain it, to safeguard elites’ rents, and typically undermine progressive institutional reforms, breaking that synchrony. The transition from that social order to the open-access one is an endogenous and reversible process, in which inefficient institutions, which allow elites to extract rents, coexist with appropriate ones, which constrain their power and make it contestable. The hypothesis is advanced that Italy has not yet completed this transition, and that the tension between its efficient and inefficient institutions can endogenously generate shocks, which open opportunities for equilibrium shifts.


Ekonomika ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafał M. Jakubowski ◽  
Paweł Kuśmierczyk

We analyse the possibility of an experimental study of the efficiency of market institutional structures. In the paper “On the new institutionalism of markets: the market as an organization” by R. Richter, the implicitly agreed upon market organization is regarded as a Nash equilibrium of a game between potential market participants. The solution of such coordination problem is not necessarily Pareto-efficient but could be efficient given assumptions of New Institutional Economics (i. e. could be NIE-efficient). This framework can be very helpful as a descriptive tool used to explain the persistence or transition of market institutions, but in can be difficult to be verified empirically.Economic experiments have been successfully applied to analyse market institutions and to compare their efficiency. In the paper, we demonstrate how this methodology could be used to analyse the “spontaneous” market organizations reached as a tacit agreement in a coordination problem. We also advocate that economic experiments can be a very useful tool to verify the efficiency of such institutions.


2021 ◽  
pp. 52-70
Author(s):  
James D. Westphal

This chapter traces the origins of my research on corporate governance and describes the pitfalls and challenges that arose early in my career. Many of these pitfalls are characteristic of conducting interdisciplinary research more generally. They include criticism from discipline-based scholars, special challenges in negotiating the peer review process, failure to articulate a coherent theoretical framework in individual articles, and the struggle to articulate a coherent identity as a scholar. The lessons learned should apply broadly to conducting interdisciplinary research on virtually any topic in organization theory and strategic management.


Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (9) ◽  
pp. 1469
Author(s):  
Andrew James Bruce ◽  
Janusz Grabowski

Very loosely, Z2n-manifolds are ‘manifolds’ with Z2n-graded coordinates and their sign rule is determined by the scalar product of their Z2n-degrees. A little more carefully, such objects can be understood within a sheaf-theoretical framework, just as supermanifolds can, but with subtle differences. In this paper, we examine the notion of a Riemannian Z2n-manifold, i.e., a Z2n-manifold equipped with a Riemannian metric that may carry non-zero Z2n-degree. We show that the basic notions and tenets of Riemannian geometry directly generalize to the setting of Z2n-geometry. For example, the Fundamental Theorem holds in this higher graded setting. We point out the similarities and differences with Riemannian supergeometry.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Cropper ◽  
Sanne Bor

In their treatise on meta-organization, Ahrne and Brunsson theorize a distinctive organizational form, the association of organizations. Meta-organizations have the properties of formal organizations—boundaries set by determinations of membership, goals, a centre of authority, and ways of monitoring and sanctioning member behaviors. The theory draws a strong distinction between meta-organizations and networks, suggesting that similarity among members is the primary characteristic of meta-organizations, whereas networks signify complementarity and difference. Meta-organizations serve and are governed by their members, though the meta-organization itself may develop its own agency and may regulate its members. It is on this basis that Ahrne and Brunsson develop an account of the dynamics of meta-organizations, placing less emphasis on external sources of change than on the internal relationships between members and the meta-organization itself. This paper appraises the theory of meta-organizations, using a case study of Partners in Paediatrics, a subscription association of health care organizations, as the empirical reference point. Data about this partnership’s membership and its activities are drawn from 12 ‘annual reports’ covering a 17-year period. Focusing, particularly, on the membership composition of the Partnership and its relationship to the changing environment, the case analysis traces the changing character and circumstances of the Partnership, identifying four distinct phases, and raising questions for meta-organization theory and its account of meta-organization dynamics.


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