Community Interests in International Taxation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tsilly Dagan
Keyword(s):  
Tax Competition ◽  
Tax Policy ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
International Taxation ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Double Taxation ◽  
Second Best ◽  
International Tax ◽  
International Tax Policy

This chapter describes the multilateral efforts regarding four key concerns of the international community: Prevention of double taxation, fighting “harmful tax competition,” sharing of information, and the “gaps and frictions” between the tax systems of various countries noted by the recent BEPS report. It then asks what, in fact, constitutes the community’s interest in the international tax area, arguing that where tax policy is concerned, there is no clear “textbook answer” regarding the best way to tax internationally. The chapter criticizes two proxies which are often implicitly endorsed in order to evaluate international tax policy: Cooperation among states, and the prevention of market failures. It argues that cooperation, contrary to conventional wisdom, is neither a goal in itself nor is it a good enough proxy for the collective good, and that the elimination of market failures, although indisputably beneficial, may raise a second-best problem.

A Sceptic’s Guide to Justice in International Tax Policy

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (02) ◽  
pp. 499-512
Author(s):  
Laurens van Apeldoorn
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Tax Policy ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
The State ◽  
International Taxation ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Multilateral Cooperation ◽  
International Tax ◽  
International Tax Policy

AbstractWhat, if any, are the moral norms governing the international taxation regime if the sceptic is right to think that considerations of distributive justice do not apply beyond the state? I sketch an answer to this question by examining Tsilly Dagan’s illuminating recent book International Tax Policy: Between Competition and Cooperation. In her work, Dagan identifies the position of Thomas Nagel, an influential global justice sceptic, as predominant among commentators in legal scholarship and policy debates on international taxation. According to Nagel, multilateral cooperation is appropriately conceived as a bargain between mutually self-interested states. In tracing the implications of his position for international tax policy Dagan argues that even a sceptic like Nagel is committed to identifying some considerations of distributive justice beyond the state to ameliorate the harmful effects of tax competition. In response I argue that Dagan is correct to claim that the global justice sceptic is committed to seeing cooperation in international tax policy as constrained by moral norms, but that these norms are what Nagel calls humanitarian duties rather than duties of justice. I establish that Dagan’s argument that Nagel is committed to a duty of justice to promote distributive justice abroad faces some significant obstacles and suggest that Dagan can ground her argument in a humanitarian duty that Nagel does accept. The upshot of the argument is that even if the sceptic is right to think that considerations of distributive justice do not apply beyond the state, multilateral tax cooperation is governed by a duty of states to prevent human rights deficits where they can.

scholarly journals INTER-NATION EQUITY REVISITED

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-88
Author(s):  
Ivan Ozai
Keyword(s):  
Tax Policy ◽  
Policy Design ◽  
International Taxation ◽  
Recent Attempt ◽  
Tax Base ◽  
Poverty And Inequality ◽  
International Tax ◽  
The One ◽  
International Tax Policy ◽  
Degree Of Redistribution

States are on the verge of a new form of global competition. Some have taken unilateral measures to tax multinational profits that they would typically not be able to tax, at least not according to conventional international tax concepts and rules. Others have threatened to retaliate with economic countermeasures to protect their tax base and corporate residents. The recent attempt of the OECD to build consensus for a global tax compact has so far proven unsuccessful due to broad disagreement about how taxing rights should be equitably distributed between countries. As policymakers and tax scholars increasingly call into question long-standing theories of international taxation, the concept of inter-nation equity plays a pivotal role as a guiding principle in determining how to divide the international tax base among states. Inter-nation equity is one of the most ubiquitous concepts appearing in international tax policy discussions and yet one of the most understudied in tax scholarship. This Article introduces a comprehensive normative analysis of inter-nation equity by discussing how the concept should reconcile the two primary goals of international allocation of taxing rights: on the one hand, the concern of states to preserve their tax sovereignty and, on the other hand, the need to promote some degree of redistribution to address the challenges of global poverty and inequality. This Article further explains how a similar notion of inter-nation equity has developed in other areas of international law and discusses some practical implications for tax policy design.

International Tax and Global Justice

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tsilly Dagan
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Tax Competition ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
The State ◽  
International Taxation ◽  
Political Justice ◽  
Poor Countries ◽  
Transfer Payments ◽  
International Tax ◽  
International Tax Policy

AbstractInequality, as well as the scope of the duty of justice to reduce it, has always been a central concern of political justice. Income taxation has been seen as a key tool for redistribution and the state was the arena for discussions of justice. Globalization and the tax competition it fosters among states change the context for the discussion of distributive justice. Given the state’s fading coercive power in taxation and the decreasing power of its citizenry to co-author its collective will due to global competition, we can no longer assume that justice can be realized within the parameters of the state. International tax policy in an effort to retain justice often opts for cooperation as a vehicle to support distributive justice. But cooperation among states is more than a way for them to promote their aims through bargaining. Rather, it is a way for states to regain legitimacy by sustaining their very ability to ensure the collective action of their citizens and to treat them with equal respect and concern. The traditional discussion in international taxation seems to endorse a statist position — implicitly assuming that when states bargain for a multilateral deal, justice is completely mediated by the agreement of the states. In contrast, this Article argues that such a multilateral regime intended to provide the state with fundamental legitimacy requires independent justification. Contrary to the conventional statist position, I maintain that cooperating states have a duty to ensure that the constituents of all cooperating states are not treated unjustly because of the agreement. I argue that not only cosmopolitanism but political justice too requires that a justifiable cooperative regime must improve (or at least not worsen) the welfare of the least well-off citizens in all cooperating states. I explain that cooperation alone is no guarantee of improved welfare and that certain transfer payments between rich and poor countries might be required to ensure this.

scholarly journals Avoiding Double Taxation Through The Assessment of International Tax Treties. Case: ESP’s versus Anaf Braşov

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (37) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Florin Dumiter ◽  
Ștefania Amalia Jimon ◽  
Florin Gheorghe Bene
Keyword(s):  
Best Practices ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
International Taxation ◽  
Double Taxation ◽  
Asymmetrical Information ◽  
Treaty Shopping ◽  
International Tax

Abstract International double taxation represents one of the main problems’ for which taxpayers have to deal within a world fulfilled with globalization, uncertainty, risk, asymmetrical information and moral hazard. In this sense, in this article it is provided a qualitative overview regarding the appearance and evolution of the main double taxation conventions and their legal framework. In this article it is tackled some important issues, namely: the rationale behind the construction and engaging in double taxation conventions; the need for a coherent and just application of those conventions; the historical appearance and evolution of the double taxation conventions, as well as the quid pro quo OECD Model Convention and UN Model Convention. The conclusions of this article highlight the importance and ultimately need for construction of best practices new and complex multilateral tax convention at the UE level in order to diminish the contagious effects of the treaty shopping practices. The case study presented in this article from the Romanian jurisprudence highlights the multi-faced concept of double taxation and the comprehension approach which must be undertaken in order to solve the complex issues of the international taxation via double taxation treaties.

scholarly journals Offshore financial activity and tax policy: evidence from a leaked data set

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 457-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Caruana-Galizia ◽  
Matthew Caruana-Galizia
Keyword(s):  
Tax Policy ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Financial Activity ◽  
Interest Income ◽  
Beneficial Ownership ◽  
International Tax ◽  
International Tax Policy

AbstractWe assess the European Union’s (EU) most significant international tax policy. The 2005 Tax and Savings Directive obliges cooperating jurisdictions to withhold tax or report on interest income earned by entities whose beneficial owner is an EU resident. As the Directive applies only to beneficial ownership in cooperative jurisdictions, it can be circumvented by transferring ownership to a non-EU resident or company or by transferring the entity to a non-cooperative jurisdiction. Using a database on individual offshore entities leaked from two firms in 2013, we compare the response of EU-owned entities with a control group of non-EU-owned entities. We show that the growth of EU-owned entities declined immediately after the Directive’s implementation, whereas that of non-EU-owned entities remained stable. We observe the substitution of EU ownership for non-EU ownership, as well as the substitution of cooperative for non-cooperative offshore jurisdictions. This calls for anti-evasion policies that are broader in scope and scale.

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